FILE A16-6 Javan # 1 - N/8

U. S. S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

WFR; as CVE115/A4-3 Serial: 017 1 March 1951

From: Commanding Officer, U. S. S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)

DECLASSIFIED

To: Via: Commander in Chief United States Pacific Fleet
(1) Commander Carrier Division FIFTEEN

(2) Commander Naval Forces Far East

Subj: ASW Hunter/Killer Operations Period 23 January - 3 February 1951, Report of

Ref:

(a) ComNavFE Operation Order 24-50

(b) Commander Task Group 96.7 Operation Plan 1-50

(c) Commander Task Group 96.7 Operation Order 1-51

Encl: (

(1) Task Organization

(2) Summary of Operations

1. Narrative of Events

2. Operating Area Grid

3. Sealed Submarine Instructions

(3) Tabulated Data

(4) Materiel and Personnel Casualties

(5) Aerological Data

1. Subject operations were conducted in the Yokosuka Operating Areas in accordance with references (a), (b), and (c). Destroyer Division 131 (less the CUNNINGHAM and the WAIKE) participated during the second week as ASW refresher group.

# 2. Comments and Recommendations:

# a) Anti-Submarine

- 1. Surface. Excellent sonar conditions were encountered permitting initial contacts at ranges up to 2000 yards. Continued improvement was noted in the transferring of contacts from sonobuoy to sonar.
- 2. Air Surface. During one might Hunter/Killer exercise the submarine steamed for some eight hours on the surface without being detected. This is attributed almost entirely to the many fishing boats in the area. This circumstance is not an unusual one and it is recommended that serious consideration be given to the regulation of friendly small craft in all areas of probable wartime ASW operations.

# b) Electronic Countermeasures

1. RadCM. Continued improvement was noted in RadCM Tracking Drills.

## c) Communications

1. Radio (Voice). A screen common frequency (145.08 mcs) was used during these exercises and proved its worth. It is recommended that use of such a circuit be continued.

### 3. General

Although this Task Group has invariably sortied using an antisubmarine screen, the protection against mines has been nil. It
is believed that the use of mines by an enemy would play a large
part in the initial phases of any open hostilities. It is
therefore recommended that consideration be given to providing
mine sweeping services in the approaches to this and other naval
bases at a time to be determined by higher authority.

### 4. Summary of Recommendations

- a) Serious thought and planning should be given to the friendly small boat problem in areas of probable ASW operations.
- b) A VHF screen common frequency should be made available in all Hunter/Killer operations.
- c) The threat of offensive mining by the enemy should be considered in planning ASW and other operations, particularly in the initial phases of open warfare.

977 Raborn W. F. RABORN

Captain, U. S. Navy

# TASK ORGANIZATION

a)	96170	BAIROKO (CVE-115) CAPT W. F. RABORN (1	L563) 6092) 1.	4	CVE TBM3S
		Helicopter Detachment (If assigned) Plane Guards (as assigned)			TBM3W HO3S
ъ)	96.71	SCREEN ELEMENT CAPT C. M. HOWE III (2)	163)	8	<b>D</b> D
		96.71.1 Attack Unit One CAPT C. M. HOWE II	(2163)	4	DD
		DesDiv 32 CAPT C. M. HOWE II RUPERTUS (DD851) CDR E. S. GRIMM (2755) FECHTELER (DD870) CDR E. S. MANOWN (4219) H.W. TUCKER (DDR875)CDR G. P. ROGERS (2718) L. F. MASON (DD852) CDR J. P. FERRITER (43	<b>)</b> 	4 :	<b>D</b>
		96.71.2 Attack Unit Two CAPT W. L. ANDERSON	(1 <b>0</b> 88)	4	DD
		DesDiv 131 CAPT W. L. ANDERSON BLUE ( DD744) CDR R. S. BURDICK (3082 F. E. EVANS (DD754) CDR G. L. CHRISTIE (327 ** WALKE (DD723) CDR J. C. FORD Jr. (233 ** A. A. CUNNINGHAM (DD752) CDR L. P. SPEAR (4	2) 79) 34)	4	DD
		96.71.3 Attack Unit Three CDR C. M. HOWE III	(2163)	4	DD
	•	RUPERTUS (DD 851) CDR E. E. GRIEM (2755) BLUE (DD744) CDR R. S. BURDICK (3082 FECHTELER (DD870) CDR E. S. MANOWN (4219) F. E. EVANS (DD754) CDR G. L. CHRISTIE (327	?) ' '9)		
		96.71.4 Attack Unit Four CDR G. P. ROGERS (2	:718) i	4	DD
		H. W. TUCKER (DDR875) CDR G. P. ROGERS (271 WALKE (DD723) CDR J. C. FORD, Jr. (23 L. F. MASON (DD852) CDR J. P. FERRITER (430 A. A. CUNNINGHAM (DD752) CDR L. P. SPEAR (4	334) 02)		
6.	96.72	Submarine Element CDR J. R. TUCKER (4087) BESUGO (\$S321) CDR J. R. TUCKER (4087) BUGARA (\$S331) LCDR H. J. SWITH (5511) * Second Week Only ** Unable to participate in thusa exercises		2	SS

# ENCLOSURE II, SULMLARY OF OPERATIONS

# PART I, NARATIVE OF EVENTS

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#### EVENT 1

## Sortie and Tactics 230800I to 231200I

Task Group 96.7 less DesDiv 131 and the BESUGO sortied at 0800I from U. S. Naval Fleet activities, Yokosuka, Japan, and proceeded to the operating area. The U.S.S. BESUGO joined the Task Group at Point 0B0E. While underway, tactical exercises and underway training for 0.0.D.'s were conducted.

At 0930 all hands were called to General Quarters and by 0958, the BAIROKO, with four destroyers in circular screen commenced "Pointer-Trainer" drill with eight Air Force jet fighters ( 4 F 84's and 4 F 86's) which made simulated strafing and rocket runs on the Task Group. The jets made HOW, GEORGE, and QUARTERING runs which were varied from sea level to 5,000 feet. With two planes participating in each attack, the eight jets completed ten attacks in twenty minutes. The runs were commenced 10 to 15 miles from the Task Group and pressed home at speeds ranging from 410 to 525 knots. During this exercise, CIC was able to maintain better than 50 per cent blip scan ratio on the AN/SPS-6B radar.

#### EVENT 2

### RadCM Exercise 231000I to 231200I

The MASON acting as target took a position 13,000 yards and 080°T, on the port side of the Task Group. The FECHTELER took a position 1000 yards astern of the BaIROKO and the TUCKER in station #2 and the RUPERTUS in station #1 formed a bent line screen. The RCM cuts taken on the MASON by the Task Group were within five to ten degrees of visual bearings, and the course and speed of the target was readily plotted by the BAIROKO. Personnel and equipment showed definite improvement in this exercise. Improvement in ability to identify targets was illustrated at 1055 when the BAIROKO's RCM operator, while searching for the MASON, picked up an SG type radar bearing 019°T. This target was immediately identified as a merchant shap type of radar signal — and the indentification was visually confirmed by the bridge shortly afterwards.

#### EVENTS 3 and 5

Day Air Operations 231000I to 231700

The BAIROKO with VS-21 conducted daylight refresher landings preparatory to event 6. (Night Air Operations and Gualifications). Four planes from ATSUGI



were taken abourd during this period, to auguent available aircraft on board.

#### EVENT 4

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Multiple High Speed Tracking 2313001 to 2314001

High speed tracking drill was conducted by the TUCKER, MASON, RUPERTUS and FECHTELER. The results of the drill were evaluated as FAIR since about 40 per cent accuracy was achieved in calculating the courses and speed of the targets.

### EVENT 5

Elementary Air Control Exercises (Z-56-CC) 231000I to 231700I

While the destroyers were conducting high speed tracking drill the BAIROKO ran two Z-56-CC elementary air control problems. The carrier obtained a "Tally Ho" from the participating planes on each problem and the intercepta were rated by the pilots as POOR and GOOD respectively.

## EVENT 6

Night hir Operations 232015I to 23224I

The B.IROKO with VS-21 on board conducted Night Qualifications, consisting of catapult shots and night landings.

# EVENT 7

Night Exercise on Submerging Submerine (Y-55-AW) 231700I to 232157I

The destroyer (TUCKER) began each of its runs from a distance 8000 to 10000 yards from the submarine. As the TUCKER closed to 4000 yards it simulated gunfire by flashing lights. The submarine then submerged with running lights burning. When sonar contact was established the attacking destroyer closed making two attacks on the submerged BESUGO. On completion of the second attack, the destroyer opened range and signalled the submarine to surface. Five runs were made with the destroyer alternating the attack position with each run. During the first run the attacks were evaluated COOD and EXCELLENT; on the second, unevaluated and FAIR; on the third, both EXCELLENT; the fourth, both GOOD, and the fifth, GOOD and no attack. At 2157 the TUCKER surfaced the BESUGO and ended the Event.

# EVENT 8

Night Steaming and Tactics 231700I to 240600I

The Task Group conducted night steaming and tactics under darkened ship condition. Due to the necessity of using one engine to charge batteries which ENCLOSURE (2)

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left only three available for propulsion, the BESUCO experienced difficulty in tracking the Task Group and was unable to gain position for Event 9.

#### EVENT 9

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Dawn Submarine Attack 240600I to 240700I

At 0704 the BESUGO signalled Commander Task Group 96.7, "ATTACK IMPOSSIBLE X BEAR 045°T/15 MILES," and thus the event was cancelled.

#### EVENT 10

Day Air Operations 240800I to 241100I

VS-21 was the only unit participating in this event. At 0816 the first plane was launched and VS-21 conducted flight exercises to improve their gunnery, rocket, and instrument proficiency. The delay in streaming the target and the tractor plane for Event 11 necessitated VS-22 withdrawing from the Task Group to expend the remainder of their amounts on on smoke lights.

## EVENTS 11 and 12

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery vs. Towed Sleeve 240830I to 241130I

All ships of the Task Group participated. The BESUGO, TUCKER and MASON conducted gunnery exercises with Tractor 1 in the vicinity of Lat 35° 20° M, and longitude 143° E; while the BAIROKO, RUFERTUS, and FECHTELER operated with Tractor 2 at the intersection of Areas 7,8,9 and 10. Both tractor planes made HOW, UNCLE, and GEORGE runs for 20 MM, 40 MM and 5" mounts. Gun compared showed definite improvement in their firing as compared with previous governery exercises.

#### EVENT 13

Sonar Tracking Exercises (Y-41-AW), (Y-42-AW), (Y-43-AW), (Y-55-AW) 241300I to 242100I

The BESUGO with the TUCKER and the MASON participated in these exercises. The submarine employed mild evasive action and fired Pepper Pots while attempting to elude the attacking destroyers. The TUCKER completed 19 attacks evaluated by the submarine as follows: five EXCELLENT, six GOOD, six FAIR, and 1 POOR. The submarine reports that on one occasion a destroyer passed close aboard but made no attack. At 1638 the BESUGO surfaced to conclude the first phase of the event.

At 1836 the BESUGO submerged to carry out (Y-55-AW) with the MASON. Hight attacks were completed by the destroyer and were evaluated by the BESUGO



as: four EXCELLENT; two GOOD; one FAIR and one POOR. At 2029 the BESUGO was surfaced and the second and last phase of this event was completed.

#### EVENT 14

DECLASSIFIED

Day air Operations 241330I to 241500I

The BAIROKO with VS-21 on board conducted refresher landing exercises. Continued improvement was shown by both pilots and plane handling crews.

#### EVENT 15

Elementary .ir Control Exercise 241330I to 241500I

Two VA type aircraft were airborne by 1330 to rendezvous with the FECHTELER and the HUPERTUS. One destroyer was to control the CAP and the other the BOGEY. However, the MUPERTUS experienced a radar casualty and the FECHTELER therefore controlled both the CAP and the BOGEY. All vectoring by the destroyer was considered excellent by the pilots. At 1400 additional vectoring practice was obtained by the expeditious launching of two more VA aircraft to investigate SPOCK on the BAIROKO's crystal ball bearing 010° T, distance 15 miles. The BAIROKO's CIC vectored these planes to within first miles of the surface SPOCK.

## EVENT 16

Night air Operations 241730I to 242100I

This event was cancelled due to insufficient wind for night qualification exercises.

### EVENT 17

Night Steaming and Tactics 2421001 to 2506001

Night steaming and tactics under darkend ship condition were conducted by all ships of the Task Group. The BESUGO tracked the balance of the Task Group in preparation for Event 18.

#### EVENT 18

Dawn Submarine Attack 2506001 to 2507001

The BESUGO submerged at 0524I to commence its approach on the Task Group from a distance of 30,000 yards. At 0605 the submarine's periscope was sighted and at 0610 the RUPERTUS picked up screw noises bearing 205°T. At 0612 the BESUGO fired two groen flares indicating a simulated spread of 6 torpedoes

fired at the BAIROKO. The firing bearing was 352°T and the torpede run was 3400 yards with 3° right gyre angle. The target's course was 235°T, speed 15 knots. Immediately upon completing the firing of terpedees the BESUGO went down to 100 feet and rigged for depth charges. The BAIROKO took vigorous evasive action and the RUPERTUS closed in on the submarine. At 0641 the BESUGO was surfaced to conclude the event.

### EVENT 19

#### DECLASSIFIED

Day Air Operations (Tactics and Instruments) 250800I to 251100I

VS-21 conducted exercises during this period to increase pilot proficiency in flying instruments and in Hunter/Killer technique including searchlight runs. Four aircraft participated in this event. At 1015 each pilot simulated five searchlight runs on the BESUGO. All aircraft were landed at 1105.

#### EVENT 20

anti-aircraft Gunnery 250830I to 231100I

The MASON, TUCKER and BAIROKO participated in this event. A few UNCLE runs were made but very little practical experience was gained by the Task Group gunnery personnel due to the limited efficiency of the tractor plane which suffered material casualties (including communications failure, faulty sleeves, and jammed cable reels).

#### EVENT 21

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery 250800I to 25100I

The FECHTELER and the RUPERTUS were detached from the Task Group to conduct AA Gunnery exercises at the close of Event 18. The rendezvous area was Lat 35°20′ N, tongitude 143° E, well clear of the main formation which was north of Area 11. At 0830 the RUPERTUS and FECHTELER commenced firing on target sleeve towed by JD-1 aircraft making HOW and UNCLE runs. The exercise was concluded with the release of the tractor plane at 1015.


# EVENT 22-26

All these events were cancelled in order to conduct event 26-A

#### EVENT 26-A

Day Hunter/Killer Exercise 251200I to 251600I

This exercise was based on a hypothetical report that a submarine had been sighted just west of Long  $142^{\circ}$  E and in Area  $^{\circ}$ BH.



Planes launched by the BAIROKO at 1217 commenced searching the areawhere the submarine was reported to have been last seen. At 1212, SAU 1 (RUPERTUS, FECHTELER, and TUCKER) was detached by OTC and vectored out on course 120° T. distance 5 miles. By 1227 SAU 1 had meached the disignated area and commenced search. The two VA and one AW aircraft investigated false targets until 1243 when visual contact was made on a submarine. At 1245 the submarine was reported diving, and by 1247 the planes had laid a standard sonebucy pattern with axis 270° Mag bearing 7.5 miles from SAU 1.

At 1246 SAU I was vectored 115 °T, distance 7.5 miles at best possible speed, to the senebusy pattern. The BESUGO while observing the approach of the three destroyers was reported by one VA mircraft to be submerged dead in the water. The RUFERTUS passed 1000 yards abeam and to starboard, thus affording the submarine an excellent opportunity for torpede attack. At 1308 as the RUFERTUS made the first "hot" sonar contact, the submarine went to 100 feet and rigged for depth charges. At 1316 the first grande fired forward by the attacking RUFERTUS was evaluated by the submarine as GOOD. Immediately upon completion of the first attack the RUFERTUS regained contact and pressed home a second attack at 1325. This run was evaluated as "FAIR, starboard and astern" by the BESUGO. The SAU retired on course 280°T after the second attack and at 1345 signalled the submarine to surface, thus concluding the first problem.

The second problem commenced at 1417 when OTC directed the VS-21 planes to begin search. At 1425 the VA planes were vectored by the LEW to investigate "spook". Simultaneously the BESUGO gained contact on investigating aircraft bearing 344° T, distance 27,000 yards. At 1430 an investigator plane made a Class A attack on the submarine (the hull being visible during the entire run). Following the attack the VA plane dropped standard somebucy pattern with an axis 269°T. At 1432 the SAU 1 executed speed 5 (25 knots) to arrive at the schobucy pattern.

At 1444 the VA plane reported no cavitation on somebuoys and an extension of the pattern was dropped in order to regain contact. Believing it had regained contact, the VA plane reported at 1457 that the course of the submarine was 0900 mag, speed 3 knots. The RUPERTUS, arriving on the scene at 1518 immediately gained somar contact evaluated as submarine. At 1529 the RUPERTUS fired a grenade forward. The attack was evaluated by the submarine as "POOR, well astern." At second attack made at 1535 was evaluated as "FAIR, ahead and to port." On completion of her second attack, the RUPERTUS passed control to the FECHTELER who completed two attacks evaluated as "EXCELLENT, astern and starboard" and "POOR, astern." The BESUGO surface at 1626 and the event was secured.

#### EVENT 27

Night Air Operations 251800I to 252000I

Due to insufficient wind which made air operations hazardous, this event was secured after four landings had been made.

## EVENT 28

Wight Steaming and Tactics 252100I to 260600I

The Task Group conducted night stemming and tactics under darkened ship conditions.

# EVENTS 29 and 30

Pre Dawn Launch and Day Hunter/Killer Exercise 2606001 to 2612001


By O617 an investigator aircraft had been launched and was on close in sector search. At O621, two VA and 1 AEM type aircraft had commenced the outer perimeter sweeps investigating several false targets. However, at O655 the investigator found a "spock" which proved to be the submarine and made a Class A attack forcing the submarine to submorge. The VA plane immediately laid a standard sonobucy pattern axis 335 Mag, bearing 225° T., 20 miles from the B.IROKO.

at 0713 the VA received the first cavitation from the schebucys indicating that the submarine was on course 275° mag. By 0735 it became necessary to extend the pattern. Upon extension of the pattern all contact was lost due to receiver trouble. At 0740 another extension was dropped and cavitation was received. By 0742 the SAU 1 had entered the pattern and at 0800 the RUPERTUS gained so har contact. Two minutes later, the destroyer made her first attack, followed immediately by a second pass at the submarine. Both were evaluated as EXCELLENT. Upon completion of the second attack the RUPERTUS passed contact to the MASON and at 0810 executed operation QUEEN counter-clockwise. At 0822 the MASON made so har contact and immediately moved in for the kill, making two attacks one of which was evaluated as POOR and the other as GOOD. By 0833 the MASON had completed her second attack and turned the submarine contact over to the TUCKER.

The TUCKER fired center for her first attack at 0844 and followed this with a second attack. The first was evaluated as GOOD and the second was considered to be EXCELLENT. At 0909 the BESUCO was surfaced to conclude this phase of the event.

The second phase of this event commenced at 1033 when the BATROKO vectored SAU 1 260°T. At 1036 a VA plane made a Class A attack on the submarine bearing 265° T., distance 12 miles from the SAU 1. The SAU changed course immediately to 270°T and increased speed to 22 knots. At 1047 the plane reported a sonobuoy pattern had been dropped with axis 005° T. By 1051 an extension had to be dropped to gain contact with the submarine. At 1055 one VA plane developed engine trouble and had to be escerted back to the BAIROKO by the guppy. One VA plane remained at the scene to operate with the SAU.

The VA plane, still trying to obtain schobuoy contact, vectored the destroyers to the pattern. They arrived at the pattern at 1113 and between 1129 and



1147 the RUPERTUS, the MASON, and the TUCKER made one attack apiece, transferring contact at the completion of each attack. These attacks were evaluated as FAIR, FAIR and EXCELLENT, respectively. At 1158 the submarine was surfaced to secure this phase of the event.

The third phase commenced at 1211 when SAU 1 was vectored on course 120° T, distance five miles, and the VA and AEW aircraft were ordered to commence search At 1234 the submarine was sighted visually by a VA plane. However, it submerged before a class A attack could be made. The aircraft dropped a somebuoy pattern but was unable to make contact with the submarine. Extensions dropped were to no avail. At 1327 the TUCKER and the MASON, just outside the perimeter of the somebuoy pattern, made some contact. At 1328 SAU 1 executed operation QUEEN counter-clockwise. Between 1330 and 1454 the MASON, TUCKER, and RUPERTUS pressed home attacks. Difficulty was experienced by the destroyers in transfering and regaining contacts during the attack. These runs were evaluated by the submarine as follows: one EXCELLENT; two GOOD; three FAIR; and four POOR. At 1500 the MASON and TUCKER were detached and directed to return to the BAIROKO while the RUPERTUS remained with the BESUGO for Event 30 A.

Upon their return to the Task Group, each aircraft made simulated strafing and torpedo runs to enable the BAIROKO and plane guard to conduct "Pointer". Trainer" drill.

### EVENT 30-A


Night Exercise Against Submerging Submarine (Y-55-AM) 261730I to 262100I

The RUPERTUS and the BESUGO participated in this event. The destroyer completed two runs, each consisting of two attacks. On the first run the submarine submerged at 1838 having been sighted visually by the destroyer. The first attack, made at 1901, was evaluated by the submarine as GOOD. A second attack at 1910 was evaluated by the submarine as "FAIR, to starboard." At 1920 the BESUGO surfaced in preparation for the second run. The two final attacks were evaluated as EXCELLENT and GOOD, respectively. At 2023 the BESUGO was surfaced and directed to proceed to port independently and the RUPERTUS returned to the Task Group formation for night stemming.

# EVENT 31

Night Steaming, Enter Port 2621001 to 2708001

The Task Group formation conducted night steaming and tactics under darkened ship condition. At 0705 the first of five aircraft from Kisarazu (1 AEW and 4 VA) were landed on the Balkoko, as the Task Group proceeded up the Tokyo Kaiwan. After recovering the aircraft the Task Group proceeded to the anchorage at U. S. Naval Fleet Activites, Yokosuka, Japan.



### EVENTS 34-35

Sortie Tactics and Surface Gunnery 290700I to 291500I

At 0700 the BaIROKO, with the BESUGO and two newcomers to Task Group 96.7, the destroyers BIDE and EVANS, sortied from U. S. Navl Fleet activities, Yokosuka, Japan, to be on station in accordance with CTG 96.7 Operation Order, Annex "B". Two VS-21 planes from ATSUGI gave ASM coverage to the BAIROKO, BESUGO, BLUE and EVANS as the formation transited the Tokyo Kaiwan to the operating area.

The MASON, RUPERTUS, FECHTELER, and TUCKER departed U. S. Naval Fleet activities, Yokosuka, Japan, in time to rendezvous with target sled in Area KING at 1019. Surface gunnery exercises were then conducted as scheduled.

#### EVENT 36

Electronic and Visual Tracking Drill vs. Jet mircraft 291000 I to 291045I

At 1005 the BAIROKO, BESUGO, BINE and EVANS were intercepted as planned by four Navy-piloted F-86's which struck from out of the sun at speeds between 410 and 525 knots. The BAIROKO was able to obtain 100 per cent blip scan ratio inside of a 12 mile range. However, beyond a 12 mile range the blip could not be maintained. CIC and Gunnery experience difficulty in disseminating target data in sufficient time to allow pointers and trainers to track and fire. At 1045 after 12 runs had been completed, this event was secured with a thank you from the BAIROKO and a four plane formation salute from the Navy piloted F-86's.

### EVENT 37

RadCM Exercise 291045I to 291600I

Although the RCM gear aboard the BLUE, EVANS, and BESUGO was inoperative, the BAIROKO carried out the RCM exercise alone in order to afford practice to its RCM team. The results of this exercise were inconclusive,

#### EVENT 38

Day Air Operations 2912301 to 2914301

The BAIRCKO with VS-21 on board commenced day refresher landings in preparation for anticipated night qualifications and night ass exercises. This event was terminated at 1430.

#### EVENT 39

#### Dusk Submarine Attack 2917001 to 2918001

At 1700 the submarine was spotted by screen diving bearing 095°T, distance 5.2 miles. At 1710 radar contact was made on a target evaluated as submarine bearing 080° T, distance 7200 yards from the Balkoko. The FECHTELER at 1715 reported hydrophone effect bearing 085° T, and two minutes later made sonar contact 078° T, distance 1200 yards. At 1719 the BESUGO fired a simulated six torpedo spread at the Balkoko from a range of 1780 yards. Closing for an attack at 1720 the FECHTELER fired center, which was evaluated as POOR, the grenade passing well astern of the submarine. A second attack failed and at 1745 the submarine was instructed to surface.

### EVENT 40

Night Air Operations 2918001 to 2921001

This event was cancelled due to insufficient wind.

#### EVENT 41

Sonobucy Exercise (Y-81-AW) (Mod) 2918301 to 2921001

The lack of wind which caused the cancellation of Event 40, necessitated a substitution in Event 41. Exercises Y-55-AW and Y-56-AW were conducted in place of the scheduled Y-81-AW. The destroyers BLUE, EVANS, and MASON participated in this event with the BESUGO.

At 0905 the BESUGO submerged with running lights burning. On signal from the BIUE, which had made the first sonar contact at 1910, the MASON took station and executed Operation QUEEN at range 3000 yards. At 1917 the EVANS, assisted by the BLUE, made the first attack. The destroyers exchanged team positions during this event, so that each of them was able to make two attacks. These attack were evaluated by the submarine as follows: three FAIR; two GOOD; and one EXCELLENT. At 2043 the exercise was concluded and the BESUGO was signalled to surface.

#### EVENT 42

Night Steaming and Tactics 292100I to 300600I

The Task Group conducted night steaming and tactics under darkened ship conditions. The BESIGO tracked the balance of the Task Group in preparation for event 43.

11-1-10

ENCLOSURE (2)

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11-1-10

ENCLOSURE (2)

#### EVENT 43

Dawn Submarine Attack 300530I to 300630I

At 0536 the submarine submerged (radar centact from the BAIROKO indicated submarine bearing 190°T, distance 19,460 yards). At 0606 the EVANS obtained sonar centact at 245°T, distance 900 yards. At 0608 the submarine fired a green flare indicating that a simulated six-torpede spread had been fired on the BAIROKO from 2250 yards. (The torpede track angle to starboard was 40° with gyros at 40° right.) At 0611 the submarine fired a second green flare indicating a torpede spread fired at the MASON from 1200 yards on the port beam. (The torpede gyro was 60° right, track angle starboard 110°). At 0611 the EVANS and the MASON were detached to develop contact. At 0633 the EVANS reported contact lost. At 0634 the MASON made contact on target bearing 185° T, distance 450 yards and directed the EVANS to attack. This SAU team completed four attacks evaluated as follows: one EXCELLENT; two FAIR and one GOOD. At 0640 the submarine was ordered to surface, securing this event.

### EVENT 48

Day Air Operations, Gunnery on a Towed Spar 300800I to 300830I

With the HUPERTUS acting as plane guard, six VS-21 planes were launched from the BAIROKO at 0800 to conduct this exercise. At 0820 the first of a series of gunnery and rocket bembing runs was made on the towed spar. Considerable improvement was noted in gunnery, but nevertheless, there remains more work to be done.

## EVENT 45

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery vs Towed Sleeve 300830I to 301100I

The BLUE, EVANS, MASON, TUCKER, and BESUGO conducted AA gunnery exercises at the intersection of areas 3,4,5, and 6, on a radar type towed sleeve. HOW and UNCLE runs were made for 20mm, 40mm and 5" guns. Tractor plane was released at 1030.

# EVENT 46

Anti-Aircraft Gunnery vs. Towed Sleeve 300830I to 301100I

The FECHTELER, RUPERTUS, and BAIROKO conducted AA Gunnery at the intersection of areas 5,6,7 and 8 on a radar type towed sleeve. HOW and UNCLE runs were made for the 20MM, 40MM and 5" guns. The tractor plane was released at 1055.



#### EVENT 47

# Sonobuoy Exercise (Y-81-AW) 301330I to 302100I

At 1339 all participating units (the BLUE, EVANS, TUCKER, MASON, RESUGO and three VS-21 aircraft) were ordered to commence this exercise. At 1405 the submarine reported diving as a VA aircraft closed to 6000 yards. However, no contact was made by this aircraft. At 1413 the submarine reported that he had surfaced. The submarine continued to cruise undetected on the surface until 1513 when it made radar contact on approaching aircraft. At 1518 the VA aircraft made visual contact and closed for attack. At 1522 a standard sonobuoy pattern was dropped with axis 110° T. and the SAU 1 was vectored on course 125° T, distance 21 miles to the submarine contact.

At 1534 the green-white schobuoy had to be replaced by green-black. This was the only replacement that was necessary during the attack. The investigator aircraft reported that the last known position of the submarine was 0600 Mag, 1500 yards from the center of the schobuoy pattern. The submarine's course was reported to be 0700 Mag., speed 3 knots. At 1604 the AEW plane called the MASON to vector 1200 Mag., distance 8 miles. The MASON made sonar contact at 1626 and at 1640 fired center charge evaluated by the submarine as FAIR. At 1643 control was transferred to the EVANS and a second attack was made which was evaluated as "POOR, astern and to starboard." By 1704 the EVANS had completed one more attack evaluated, "POOR, ASTERN."

Arresting gear casualties aboard the carrier necessitated the day-light landing of all aircraft and therefore, at 1650 the participating planes were ordered to return to the BAIROKO. The cancellation of air operations made it necessary to substitute Y-55-AW and Y-56-AW for Y-81-AW. SAU 2 remained with the BESUGO to conduct the newly assigned exercises. Completing five attacks, evaluated as one POOR, one FAIR, one GOOD, and two EXCELLENT, SAU 2 was relieved on station by SAU 1.

SAU 1 comprised of the RUPERTUS, TUCKER and FECHTELER, continued these exercises, delivering six attacks on the submarine. Three attacks were evaluated as POOR, two as FaIR, and one as EXCELLENT. At 2128 the BESUGO was surfaced, thus terminating this event.

# EVENT 48

Night and Day Air Operations 3013301 to 3021001

The BAIROKO with VS-21 on board conducted air operations consisting of refresher landings preparatory for night carrier landings. Simulated strafing and torpedo runs for "Pointer-Trainer" drill of gun crews were carried out by VS-21 aircraft.

### EVENT 49

Elementary Air Control Exercise (Z-56-CC) 3013301 to 3016301

The elements participating in this exercise were the FECHTELER, RUPERTUS, and two VA aircraft, one acting as "C.P" and the other as "BOGEY". The two destroyers alternated making CAP intercepts on the BOGEY. A total of six intercepts were made and evaluated from GOOD to EXCELLENT.

#### EVENT 50

Night Steaming and Tactics 3021001 to 3105301

The Task Group conducted night steaming and tactics under darkened ship conditions. The BESUGO tracked the balance of the Task Group in preparation for Event 51.

#### EVENT 51

Dawn Submarine attack (UNcanned) 310530I to 310630I

Due to the low visibility and the long distances involved, this exercise was changed from uncanned to canned. At 0545 the submarine reported diving. The blip believed to be the submarine disappeared from the BaIROKO's scope at 169°T., distance 23,000 yards (Blip scan was 25 per cent). The Task Group continued to sterm in the direction of the submarine's last known position. At 0625 the submarine fired a green flare simulating a spread of four torpedoes fired from the sterm tubes at the HUPERTUS. (Torpedo run was 800 yards, gyros set 60° right; track angle 80 degrees starboard.) Two minutes later the second green flare was fired simulating a six torpedo spread launched at the BaIROKO (Torpedo run was 3500 yards, gyros 15 degrees right, track angle 70 degrees starboard).

At 0626 the RUPERTUS made sonar contact at 216°T., distance 800 yards. At 0630 the RUPERTUS reported target bearing 325°T., distance 450 yards, moving right on course 245°T., at speed 5 knots. The RUPERTUS at 0631 moved in for the kill and 30 seconds later fired center. The RUPERTUS immediately regained contact and at 0639 fired center charge. Three minutes later the RUPERTUS made contact again at 101°, distance 500 yards, and by 0643 had completed the third attack. These attacks were evaluated by the submarine as POOR, GOOD, and POOR, respectively. At 0648 the BIROKO ordered the RUPERTUS to instruct the RESUGO to surface and to track the formation. At 0700 the Task Group swung north in search of bottor weather for Event 52.



#### EVENT 52

# Day Joint Hunter/Killer Exercises 311000I to 311630I

This exercise was conducted in accordance with appendix IV, CTG 96.7 Operation Order No. 1-51. Aircraft elements participating in this event were two VA aircraft (investigators) for close in search, one AEW and two VA (investigators) for outer perimeter search. The other participating units were SAU 1 (the EVANS, BLUE, FECHTELER, and AUPERTUS) and the submarine BESUGO.

at 1018, CTG 96.7 gave the order, "Commence Problem." At 1058 the submarine reported diving. Believing the submarine to be in area to the southwest, the SAU 1 was vectored 230°T. at best possible speed. The Hunter/Killer team was unable to make submarine contact during the morning. Planes were recalled at 1335 to start a new problem.

At 1317 two VA aircraft with guppy were launched to relieve the five aircraft that had been launched during the merning. At 1442 a Va aircraft sighted the submarine bearing 262°T, distance 12 miles, from the BAIROKO. The aircraft immediately made a class A attack and then dropped standard senebucy pattern with axis 025°T. At 1502 the VA plane reported the submarine bearing 065°T, distance 1100 yards from the center of the pattern. At this time the SAU bore 262°T. 12 miles from the center of the pattern.

At 1506 the VA plane reported no cavitation on purple, blue, and yellow bucys (water noises only). At 1528 SaU I reported entering the area of last known contact. Propellor noises from the destroyers caused the VA plane to lose all possible sonebucy contact with the submarine. In order to prepare for scheduled night qualification landings, it was necessary for the BAIROKO to recall aircraft at 1547. However, the SAU I remained on the scene to develop their contact. By 1600 the EVANS obtained sonar contact on the submarine and the killer team moved in for the attack. Each destroyer made one attack and the three attacks were evaluated as: one POOR, one FAIR, and one GOOD.

Although the submarine operated as instructed, and did not submerge until it believed it had been sighted, the Hunter/Killer term did not make contact until 1442. Detween 1058 and 1442 the submarine reports that it held contact on elements of the Hunter/Killer term at ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 yards on seven different occasions. The BESUGO submerged at 1058 after making contact with a VA aircraft and surfaced at 1414 when it was apparent that the Hunter/Killers had not developed this contact. It remained surfaced until 1444 when a VA aircraft was sighted at range 5,000 yards.

#### EVENT 53

Night Exercise on Submerging Submerine (Y-55-AW), (Y-56-AW) 311630I to 312100I

The units participating in this event ware the BLUE, FECHTELER, EVANS and

BESUGO. The submarine, because of numerous strenuous exercises, earlier in the day, was unable to attempt any submerged evasive manuscers. The destroyers made four attacks apieco on the BESUGO between 1838I and 2016I, for a total of twelve attacks. These attacks were evaluated as two POOR, two FIR, six GOOD, and two EXCELLENT. At 2028 the BESUGO surfaced and the event was concluded.

#### EVENT 54

Night air Operations 311800I to 312100I

This event, which was to have consisted of Night Qualifications Landings, was cancelled due to the hazardous conditions imposed by the combination of extremely turbulent air and arresting gear casualties suffered earlier in the day.

#### EVENT 55

Night Steaming and Tactics 312100I to 010800I

The Task Group conducted night steaming and tactics under darkened ship conditions.

# EVENT 56

anti Aircraft Gunnery 010830I to 011130I

The ships participating in this event were the RUPERTUS, FECHTELER, and BAI-ROKO, operating in the vicinity of Lat 35°20 'N, Long 143°E. Due to fishing boats and bad weather, this event did not commence until 0930. HOW and UNCLE runs for 20MM, 40 MM and 5" guns were made by a tractor plane towing a radar type sleeve. The exercise was secured at 1115.

### EVENT 57

anti aircraft Gunnery 010830I to 011130I

The ships participating in this event were the BLUE, KVANS, TUCKER and MASON, loperating in the center of Area B. HOW and UNCLE runs for 20kM, 40MM and 5° guns were made by a tractor towing a radar type sleeve. By 1100 the destroyers had expended their allotted ammunition for this exercise.



# Day and Night Joint Hunter/hiller Exercise Oll130I to O21200I

This exercise was designed to provide training for the Hunter/Killer Group as a whole over a period long enough to involve sustained operations both day and night. The problem assumed that a hypothetical fishing boat operating along the convoy route has sighted a submarine. A Hunter/Killer group has been diverted with orders to destroy all submarines encountered in the area. All units of Task Group 96.7 participated in this Event.

At 1330, the event commenced as scheduled with an AEW aircraft flying close in search about the Tisk Group. At 1437 the VA aircraft made a radar contact which was developed into a class A attack on submartine at a point bearing 225°T, and 25 miles from SAU 1 (consisting of the BLUE, EVANS, TUCK-ER and MASON). Immediately following the attack a standard somebucy pattern was dropped with axis 205° T., and bearing 205°T., 40 miles from the BAIROKO. At 1445 the somebucy pattern was extended to the west in an attempt to track the submarine, but by 1506 the VA plane reported all contact lost. The SAU steaming at 25 knots arrived at the schobusy pattern at 1556 and started the first sweep through the pattern. By 1615 a second sweep was started employing the variable course clock, cam # 21. At 1655 a hot contact was made by the EVANS. At 1657 the EV NS made an urgent attack followed by additional attacks made in company with the BLUE. The TUCKER circled the contact at 4,000 yards. The EVANS and the BLUE made two attacks apiece evaluated as two GOOD, one F.IR, and one POOR. At 1735 the BESUGO was ordered to surface and the first phase was cincluded.

The second phase commenced at 1905. At 2000 the submarine reported diving. Shortly after the submarine's report, a Va investigator reported "Spook" and investigated same, only to discover that it was a fishing craft. At 2002 the submarine surfaced as a Va directaft was sweeping the perimeter of the suspected area. However, as the Va re-swept the area of the last known spook, the submarine again reported diving. The hours between 1905 on 1 February and 0530 on t2 February were spent investigating possible submarine contacts all of which proved to be fishing craft.

At 0530 VA planes sotted the submarine and made a class a attack. Position of the submarine was 255°T, distance 35 miles from SAU 2 (BLUE, EVANS, and RUPERTUS). a standard five budy somebudy pattern was dropped on axis 300° Mag., at 0540 the VA plane reported the course and speed of the submarine to be 158°Mag., speed 4 knots. at 0711 the SAU 1 approached the somebudy pattern and changed speed to 15 knots. at 0726 the RUFERTUS obtained somer contact bearing 310°T., range 750 yards. During the period from 0727 to 0815 each of the destroyers was able to make two attacks, which were evaluated as two POOR, one FAIR, and four GOOD. At 0822 the FECHTELER, arriving on the scene from plane guard duty with the BAIROKO, received submarine contact from the BLUE and pressed home one attack, evaluated as GOODs At 050057, before contact could be regained, the submarine was surfaced, and the second phase of the problem was concluded.



The third phase of this event utilzed SAU 1 consisting of the BLUE, EVANS, and TUCKER. By 1000 this phase commenced and at 1050 a Class A attack on the submarine had been made by VA aircraft. Immediately following the attack, a standard sonobuoy pattern was dropped with axis bearing 010° T., bearing 305°T. from the BAIHOKO. The last known course and speed of the submarine was 080°T., speed 5 knots. At 1100 the VA aircraft vectored SAULL for contact and by 1120 the TUCKER had made sonar contact and completed the first attack. By 1153 each of the destroyers had completed two attacks. Of the six attacks, one was evaluated as POOR, four as GOOD, and one as EXCELLENT. At 1207 the BESUGO was surfaced completing the third phase of the event. At the close of this phase, SAU 1 took position 15 miles west of the BAIROKO to commence a new problem.

In the fourth phase the SAU 1 consisted of the BLUE, EVANS, TUCKER and the MASON. At 1515 AEW plane had a "spook" on the crystal ball and vectored a VA plane to investigate. At 1518 the VA made visual contact with a diving submarine. Four minutes later the aircraft, unable to make a Class A attack, dropped a standard senebucy pattern, axis, 300 Mag. At 1529 the investigator plane reported slight cavitation. Although at 1540 the VA aircraft reported no contact, it was believed that the submarine was returing from the pattern on course 1850 Mag., speed unknown. At 1541 the MASON reported sonar contact and by 1547 she had made the first attack. In the next fifty-three minute a total of six attacks were made by the SAU. They were evaluated by the submarine as follows: one POOM, two GOOD, and three EXCELLENT. At 1650 the BLUE surfaced the submarine which was then directed to proceed independently to port.

At 1655 the Hunter/Killer Team (BLUE, EVANS, TUCKER, and MASON) was ordered to rejoin the Task Group at best possible speed, to allow the BALROKO, FECHTELER, and the RUPERTUS to conduct high-speed tracking drill. By 1915 the Hunter/Killer Team had rejoined the Task Group formation.

# EVENT 60

Night Steaming and Tactics, Enter Port 0222001 to 0308001

The Bairoko, with the FECHTELER, MASON, TUCKER, MIPERTUS, BLUE and EVANS in circulat screening position, conducted night steaming and tactics under darkened ship condition. At 0742 planes were launched from the Bairoko to simulate anti-submarine coverage while proceeding up the Tokyo Kaiwan. The launched planes landed at Kisarazu as the units of Task Group 96.7 anchored at U. S. Naval Fleet activities, Yokosuka, Japan.

II-I-17



# SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, PART II. OPERATING AREA CHID CHART

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DANGER AREA	2	4	6		8	10		12	14	16	
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### SUBMARY OF OPERATIONS, PART III, SEALED SUBMARINE INSTRUCTIONS

#### EVENTS-29 and 52

- 1. For these events it is desired to obtain maximum training in transfer of contact from sonobuoys to Sonar.
- 2. BESUGO operate in Area 15. \*BUGARA operate in Areas 11 and 12 East of 143°E.
- 3. Operate on surface until certain that aircraft have sighted submarine.
- 4. Use mildly evasive action in clearing sonobuoy pattern but do not go so deep as to cause sonobuoy and/or Sonar contact to be impossible.
- 5. If no apparent contact has been made, surface if clear and run on surface until contact is regained.
- 6. If SaU (normally four DD's) is involved in making attacks close aboard, remain submerged until all four have had a chance. Otherwise make proper signals and surface when safe after two attacks during a period of 30 minutes for recommencement of porblem.

## EVENT 62 \*\*

- 1. At Zero time BESUGO be surfaced at center of area 14 on course 265°, speed 10. \*BUG RA be surfaced at center area 15 on course 275° speed 10.
- 2. Submarines are attempting to intercept a convoy. In order to do this best speed must be made whenever possible. For purposes of problem maximum surfaced speed will be 10 kts.
- 3. If attacked by SAU twice in any half hour period, make proper signals and surface when safe. Problem will be recommenced by OTC.
- 4. Attempt to reach western area of "B" to intercept convoy by 021200.
- 5. BESUGO operate between 35°N and 35°15' N.
- 6.\*BUGARA operate netween 35° 25° N and 35° 40' N.
- 7. Do not dive until reasonably certain that aircraft has actually sighted submarine. Maximum training is desired.
- \* The BUGARA did not operate with the Task Group as originally scheduled.

  However, the BESUGO carried out instructions as directed in all exercises.

  \*\* This event was renumbered as Event 58 in the revised operating schedule.

AUTHENTICATED:

C. F. VOSSLER Commander, U. S. Navy Operations Officer W. F. RABOHN, Captain, U.S. Navy Commander Task Group 96.7 and CO, U. S. S. BAIHOKO CVE-115



# ENCLOSURE III, TABULATED DATA

# DECLASSIFIED

### I. FLIGHT OFERLATIONS

1.	Aircraft Launched252
	A. Day195
	b. Night58

- 2. nircraft Landed.....260 a. Day......202 b. Night.....58
- 3. Catapult Interval
  a. First Day 1 Minute, 56 Seconds
  b. Last Day 49 Seconds
- 4. Landing Interval

  a. First Day 1 Minute, 12 Seconds
  b. Last Day 40 Seconds

# Landing and Launching Record

	Landi	<u>Landings</u>			
Date	Day	<u>Night</u>	Fly-Away (Day Only)	Day	Night
23 Jan 24 Jan	14 19	16	10	18 28	16
25 Jan 26 Jan	19 26	33	9	28 32	4 29
29 Jan 30 Jan	16 24		4		·
31 Jan 1 Feb	15 6	1	3	26 20	ı
2 Feb 3 Feb	17 2	4		4 19	4 <u>4</u>
Totals		58	<del>36</del>	202	58

Total Lunnches: 252

Total Landings: 260

### II. NAVIGATION STATISTICS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	Miles Steamed	$D_0$ te	Time	Miles Steamed
23 Jan 24 Jan 25 Jan 26 Jan 27 Jan	0800-2400 0000-2400 0000-2400 0000-2400 0000-1100	227.20 361.16 353.08 323.17 151.51	30 Jan 31 Jan 1 Feb 2 Feb	0900-2400 0000-2400 0000-2400 0000-2400 0000-2400	337.21 345.25 376.57

Total Miles Steamed: 3,181.57

III. FUEL CONSUMPTION (BAIROKO) 22 Jan - 3 Feb 1951

Total Fuel Used: 247,587 Gals.

ENCLOSURE (3)

III-1

### ENCLOSUICE III, T.BUL. TED D. TA

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#### DECLASSIFIED SONAR MESSAGE REPORTS IV. Sonar Message <u>Date</u> Sonar Long 300/20 MIKE 24 Jan Sonar Long 300/24 MIKE 25 Jan Sonar Long 300/25 MIKE 26 Jun Sonar Long 300/22 MIKE 29 Jan Sonar Long 285/19 MIKE 30 Jan Sonar Medium 300/20 PREP 31 Jan Sonar Long 300/22 MIKE 1 Feb Sonar Long 385/21 MIKE 2 Feb V. AMMUNITION EXPENDED TUCKER BaIROKO 5" Proximity Fused (VT)......13 5" Anti-Aircraft (AAC)..... 5 5" anti-aircraft (AAC)......170 5" Non-Flashless..... 5" General Purpose (GP), Reduced Charge (RC), and Common (COM)Smokeless.....183 40 MM......1483 AirCraft Nockets 3.25 (MK 7 Motor, Mk 8 Head)....48 Miniature Practice Bombs......59 <u>BLUE</u> RUPERTUS 5" Anti-Aircraft (AAC)......36 5" Proximity Fused (VT).....0 5" anti-Aircraft (AAC)......113 5" Heduced Charge (SPNF)......36 5" General Purpose (GP), Reduced Charge (RC), and Common (COM) Smokeless....113 EV. NS FECH TLER 5<sup>H</sup> anti-aircraft (AAC)......36 5" deduced Charge (SPNF)......36 5" Anti-Arcraft (AAC)......89 5" General Purpose (GP), Reduced Charge (RC), and Common (COM) Smokeless.....89 TOTALS MASON 7.2 Plaster Loaded Proj. Chrgs.40 5" Anti-Aircraft (AAC)......121 3" Proximity Fused (VT)......271 5" General Purpose (GP), Reduced Charge (RC), and A/C Hockets (3.25).....48 Common (COM) Smokeless....121 7.2 Plaster Loaded Proj. Chrgs. 40

III-2

.ENCLOSURE 4 3.)

# ENCLOSUME IV TO REPORT OF OPERATIONS CTG 96.7, PERIOD 23 Jan- 3 Feb 1951

# MATERIEL DAMAGE AND PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

# I. Aircraft Accidents

- 1. Barrier Crash on 25 January 1951 involving BS-13-91287
- 2. Barrier Crash on 26 January 1951 involving BS-3- 91143 3. Barrier Crash on 29 January 1951 involving BS-7-65807

# 2. Material Damage (Air Department) BAINOKO

- 26 Jan Replaced top wire of #4 barrier as a result of barrier crash
- 29 Jan Upper starboard support pendant of #2 barrier parted and was
- replaced as a result of barrier crash.

  30 Jan Purchase cable kinked at deck sheave of #2 wire. New purchase cable reeved and two fittings poured on inner system.

# PERSONNEL CASUALTIES

There were no personnel casualties during the operating periods.

# ENCLOSURE V TO

# DECLASSIFIED

# REPORT OF OPERATIONS, TASK GROUP 96.7 PERIOD 23 Jan. - 3 Feb. 1951

# AEROLOGICAL DATA

EVENT	DATE TIME		a	****	r.+ <b>7</b> 1115	ODA DELLE
NO.	ITEA	SKY	CEILING	VIS.	WIND	SEA REMAF
,	23/0800	CLEAR	UNL	10	SE5	Slight
1	23/1000	PARTLEY CLOUDY	3000	10	SW13	SLIGHT SHOWE
<b>2-</b> 3 <b>-</b> 5	23/1000	TWEITHE OFFICER	5000	20	ريدان	IN S1
6	23/1300	PARTLEY CLOUDY	5000	10	SSW6	SLIGHT SHOWE
0	23/1600	CLOUDY	3000	8	SSE9	SLIGHT OF HA
	2), 2000				•	PELL
7	23/1700	CLCUDY	3500	7	W19	SLIGHT RAIN
•	-57 -1					SHOWE
8	23/2000	OVERCAST	3500	8	SW21	SLIGHT
	23/2200	CLOUDY	3000	8	SIN9	SLIGHT RAIN
				_	_ =====================================	SHOWE
	24/C <b>1</b> 00	CLOUDY	3000	8	WSW21	MODERATE WIN
	•					CUSTY
						TO 27 KNOT
	01/0400	overna em	2000	8	SW22	MODERATE RAI
	2 <b>¼/</b> 0300	OVERC.4ST	2000	0	OHZZ	SHOWE
9	24/0600	OVERCAST	1200	8	W26	MODERATE
9 10-11-12	24/0800	CLOUDY	2000	10	WSW23	MODERATE RAI
10-11-12	24/0000	020021	2000			SHOWE
13	24/1300	CLOUDY	UNL	<b>1</b> 0	Wll	MODERATE
14-15	24/1330	CLUDY	UNL	<u> 10</u>	W12	MODERATE
<del></del> >	24/1500	CLOUDY	4000	12	WNW16	MODERATE
16	24/1730	CLOUDY	2500	$\mathbf{n}$	WNW12	MODERATE
	24/2100	CLOUDY	UNL	8	N.V16	MODERATE
17	24/2200	CLUUDY	2000	8	NW12	MODERATE
	25/0500	OVERCAST	3000	10	S10	SLIGHT RAIN SHOWER
		ATTENDO : OM	0500	10	WN Wl4	SLICHT RAIN
18	25/0600	OVERCAST	2500	10	AATA AATA	SHOWER
10.07	n= /0000	CLOUDY	3000	10	NW21	MODERATE RAI
19-21	25/0800	CLOUDI	3000	10	11/12	SHOWER
20	25/0830	CLOUDY	3000	9	WW20	MODERATE RAI
20	23/0030	010001	,,,,,,	ŕ		SHOWEI
26A	25/1200	CLOUDY	3500	8	W24	MODERATE RAI
ZON	2), 2200	-	77-			SHOWEI
27	25/1800	PARTLY CLOUDY	3500	10	W14	MODERATE
28	25/2300	OVERCAST	4000	10	W8	MODERATE RAJ
	., .				•	SHOWEI
	26/0400	over <b>o<sub>a</sub>st</b>	3000	6	N14	MODERATE RAI
			-0.05	~	ATTĒT O	SHOWER MODER TE RAI
<i>-29</i> 30	26/0600	CLOUDY	3000	8	NEL3	SHOWE!
-6:	- 4 (	DAMEN ATOMOS	0000	10	Moo	MODERATE R.C.
304	26/1730	PARTLY CLOUDY	3000	10	N23	SHOVE
k <b>nc</b> ta	OSURE (5)		V-1		1	
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# U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) Fleet Post Office Francisco, California

RDH:wck CVE115/A12/10 Ser 0**01** 

# DECLASSIFIED

3 March 1952

# INFORMATION

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.13

Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11 From:

To:

Chief of Naval Operations

Via:

(1) Commander Task Group 95.1

- (2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
- (3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
- (4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Action Report 15 February through 26 February 1952 Subj:

Ref:

- (a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations

(b) OPNAV INST 3480.4 (c) CINCPACFIT INST 3480.1

- (d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (Revised)
- (e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-51

(1) Sample Air Schedule Encl:

- 1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c), and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 15 February through 26 February 1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) was CTE 95.11 during this period.
- 2. The report is divided into 6 parts, as listed below:

General Nattative. Part I

Chronological order of events. Part II

Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance material and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.

Summary of own and enemy battle damage. --Part IV

Part V Personnel performance and casualties.

Comments and recommendations. Part VI

## PART I GENERAL NARRATIVE

(A) During the period 15 February 1952 through 26 February 1952 the USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) under the Command of Captain R.D. HOGLE 62672/1310, USN, and the Marine Aircraft Squadron, VMF-312 embarked Lieutenant Colonel J.H. MC GLOTHLIN JR., 07445/7302, USMC, Commanding Officer operated as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH FLEET in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.

SECRET

RDH:wck CVE115/A12/10 Ser (DO)

- (1) The Commanding Officer, USS BAIROKO, was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100I 15 February 1652100I 24 February 1952 at which time the Command of the Element was shifted to the Commanding Officer HMS GIORY. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of one escort carrier and a maximum of 4 DD's acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three ships when required by operational demands. The mission of this Task Element was to conduct operations in support of the United Nations Blockade, West Coast of Korea, the United States Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK) and to render search and rescue assistance as required.
- (2) The enemy forces were the North Korean People's Army and "Volunteer Chinese Communist Forces" in enemy held North Korea. No enemy surface or Air Forces were encountered by this Trak Element and, therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Element when directed or as targets of opportunity.
- (3) During this operating period VMF-312 aircraft flew armed recconaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, pre-briefed strikes,
  Air Spot for Naval gunfire, and Photo Recconaissance missions as illustrated
  by schedule, enclosure (1). Of the nine (9) days scheduled in the operating area, one (1) day was lost due to inclement weather delaying arrival,
  thus giving a total of eight (8) days of Air Operations. During these eight
  (8) days VMF-312 flew 317 combat sorties (of which saborted) and four (4)
  administrative flights. There was a total of 652.3 combat hours flown for
  an overall average of 81.5 hours and 40 missions per day. The squadron
  aircraft allowance was 24, the total average aircraft flyable on board 22,
  and the total average aircraft availability 16.
- (4) During this operation period ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal area NAN in the vicinity of Lat 37°30N and 124°30E. The screen consisted of the HMS CHARITY (D-29), HMS COSSACK (D-57), USS SOUTHERLAND (DDR-743), and for the last two days HMCS NOOTKA (DDE-213).

# PART II CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

- 1507001 The USS BAIROKO (CVE-115) got underway for the Yellow Sea Area with VMF-312 embarked in company with HMS CHARITY (D-29) and HMS COSSACK (D-57).
- 1511001 Cancelled gunnery firing drills, on towed sleeve, because of inclement weather and reduced visibility.
- 152035I Rough choppy seas necessitated a reduction in speed. This poor weather condition held throughout the night.
- 1521661 Relieved the HMS GLORY and assumed duties of CTE 95.11.
- 1600011 Steamed throughout this day at reduced speed due to high winds and high seas-precluding a timely arrival in the operating area for air operations.

RDH:wck CVE115/A12/10 Ser :001

# PART II - CHRONOLOGIC .. L ORDER OF EVENTS (CONTID)

161050I The USS SOUTHERLAND (DDR-743) and the USS MARSHALL (DD-676) joined CTE 95.11.

161207I The USS MARSHALL (DD-676) was released from CTE 95.11 to return to Sasebo.

161800I Arrived in the operating area.

ODER AND THE PROPERTY OF THE P

17 Feb A total of thirty-eight (36) flights (2 of which were administrative) were flown this date. The weather was generally fair with low overcast and reduced visibility in scattered snow showers.

MERCHANIC

171626I HMS COSSACK (D-57) was detached to carry cut night patrol in the Paengnyong-Do Kirin-Do area. The remainder of the force retired to the southward for the night. VMF mircraft accomplished the following:

ORDNANGE	EXPANDED	WT2210N2		
34	500 lb GP bombs	0	CAP	
241	5" HVAR rockets	12	ARMED RECCO	
	3.5" rockets	0	PHOTO	
4	Napalm bombs	16	TARCAP	
20,500	Rounds .50 cal. ammo	8	STRIKE	
<b>V</b>	•** 	2	Other	

18 Feb A total of 40 flights (8 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather remained generally the same.

181632I Detached the USS SOUTHERLAND (DDR-743) to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paengnyong-Do Kirin-Do area.

VMF-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORLNANCE	EXPEN DED	MIS	SIONS
5	1000 lb GP bombs	8	CAP
27	500 lb GP bombs	8	ARMED RECCO
221	5" HVAR rockets	16	TARCAP
32	3.5" rockets	8	STRIKE
25,200	rounds .50 cal. ammo		

19 Feb A total of 39 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather remained gnerally the same.

191614I One F4U-4 missed all wires and crashed into barrier and island. structure. Wreckage quickly cleared - operations continued as usual - on time.



RDH:wck CVEll5/Al2/10 Ser 0**01** 

## PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS (CONT'D)

191625I Detached HMS CHARITY (D-29) to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do Kirin-Do area.

VMF-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDNANCE EXPENDED	<u>MISSIONS</u>
27 500 lb GP bombs 193 5" HVAR rockets 24 3.5" rockets 25,600 Rounds .50 cal. ammo	10 CAP 14 TARCAP 9 ARMED RECCO 4 STRIKE 2 PHOTO

20 Feb A total of 43 flights (12 of which were defensive) which were flown this date. The weather remained generally good with improved ceilings and visibility.

201640I HMS COSSACK (D-57) detached to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do Kirin-Do area.

VMF-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

<u>OR DNANCE</u>	EXPENDED	<u>MISSIONS</u>
28	500 lb GP bombs	12 CAP
183	5" HVAR rockets	16 TARCAP
64	3.5" rockets	12 ARMED RECCO
3	Napalm bombs	3 STRIKE
36,600	Rounds .50 cal. ammo	

21 Feb A **Actol**21 of 42 flights (10 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather was excellent with unlimited ceiling and visibility:

211622I Detached the USS SOUTHERLAND (DDR-743) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Pacgnyong-Do Kirin-Do area.

VMF-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

OR DNANCE	EXPENDED ,	<u>MIS</u>	SIONS
	1000 1b GP bombs		CAP
22	500 lb GP bombs	14	$T_{\perp}RCAP$
235	5" HVAR rockets	8	ARMED RECCO
5	Napalm bombs	8	STRIKE
26,375	Rounds .50 call amno	2	SPOT

RDH:wck CVE115/A12/10 Ser 0**01** 

## PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS (CONT'D)

22 Feb A total of 36 flights (6 of which were defensive and 2 administrative) were flown this date. Weather remained generally excellent.

221618I Detached HMS CHARITY (D-29) to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paegnyong-Do Kirin-Do area.

VMF-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDMANCE	EXPENDED	MIS	<u>SIONS</u>
	500 lb GP bombs	6	CAP
197	5" HVAR rockets	12	TARCAP
3	Napalm bombs	2	OTCHT
300ر18	Rounds 50 cal ammo	2	SPOT
÷		12	OTHER

23 Feb A total of 40 sorties (12 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather remained excellent unrestricted ceiling and visibility.

231315I The ship exercised the crew at General Quarters conducting antiaircraft tracking drills.

231646I Detached HMS COSSACH (D-57) to carry out night patrol assignment in the Paengnyong-Do Mirin-Do area.

VMF-312 accomplished the following:

ORDNANCE	EXPENDED	MIS	SIONS
224	500 lb GP bombs 5" HVAR rockets Rounds .50 cal ammo	16	CAP TARCAP ARLIED RECCO

- 24 Feb A total of 43 flights (12 of which were defensive) were flown this date. The weather remained generally excellent with a slightly reduced visibility over the previous day.
- 2414301 Detached USS SOUTHERLAND (DIR-743) and HMCS NOOTKA (DDE-213) to join Task Element 95.12, to carry out night patrols as assigned, and to join HMS GLORY as directed. Turnover notes, ICDR LUBBERTS from the BAIROKO, and ICDR O'CONNOR from CTF 95 Staff aboard the USS SOUTHERLAND for transfer to HMS GLORY.
- 241815I USS BAIROKO with VMF-312 embarked, accompanied by HMS CHARITY and HMS COSSACK took departure from the operating area for Sasebo, Japan.
- 242100I Command of Task Element 95.11 passed to the Commanding Officer HMS GLORY.

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# PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS (CONTID)

VMF-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDNANCE EXPENDED	<u>MISSIONS</u>	
27 500 lb GP bombs 216 5" HVAR reckets 28,400 Rounds .50 cal ammo	12 CAP 16 TARCAP 11 ARABD RECCO 4 SPOT	

25 Feb USS BATROKC with HMS CHARITY, HMS COSSACK enroute Sasebo, Japan.


2511001 USS BATROKO, HMS CHARITY and HMS COSSACK coeried out Anti-aircraft firing practice in area GEORGE

2511371 HMS CHARITY detached to proceed independently to Kure, Japan in accordance with previous instructions.

251742I Moored at buoy #18, Sasebo harbor to remain through 3 March 1952 for reglammishment and recreation.

# PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORINANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNI\* TION EXPENDITURE

- A. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.
- B. A total of 98 rockets, or about five percent of all rockets loaded, both 5 inch HVAR and 3.5 inch W.P., were returned to the ship as hung rockets. 95% these came off the launchers after arrested landings and were immediately jettisoned by means of a ramp extended over the port side of the flight deck. A rolled-up cargo net barrier was pulled into position just aft of the forward elevator as recommended by the USS BADOTAG STRAIT when recovering aircraft with hung rockets. Cross deck pendants were left in the up position after the aircraft engaged a wire, and in most cases the free rocket was arrested by the cross deck pendants and did not reach the carrier net.
- C. Numerous cases of erratic flight characteristics with the 5" HVAR rocket were reported by the pilots. This erratic flight consisted mainly of a tendency on the part of the rockets to fall off of the anticipated flight path causing the impact point to be short of the target. Whether the difficulty was due to low propellant temperatures, deteriorated propellant, or error in sighting on the part of the pilot has not been determined, but the few remaining 5" rocket motors on board will be turned in and an entire new lot of motors drawn prior to the next employment period.
- D. One underwater explosion resulted from the jettisoning of a 5" HVAR rocket. Depth of water was 40 fathoms. The rocket entered the water fin first and exploded approximately fifteen (15) seconds after entry. Nose arming wire remained attached to the arming solenoid and the vane cup was released from the nose. No other damage was noted to the AN-MK-49 nose fuze prior to jettisoning.



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# PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITUE CONT'D)

- E. Ammunition expenditures.
- 1. During the operating period covered by this report the following ordnance was expended:

# BY VMF-312 AURCRAFT.

1000 lb. GP bembs	10
500 lb. GP boribs	25
5" HVAR rockets	1,770
3.5" rockets	171
Napaln bombs	17
.50 cal (Belted)	207,425

#### BY USS BAIRCKO


40MM	1,500
20MM	
	2,791

# PART IV SUMMARY OF O'M AND PREMY BATTLE DAMAGE.

- A, Own Battle damage.
  - 1. None of the ships of the task element sustained battle damage.
- 2. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Report (OPNAV 338.5 revised 4-51) submitted for this operating period.
  - B. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy.
- 1. Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of screen during the period covered by this report,
- 2. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of the task element see Naval Air Warfare Report (CPNAV 338.5 revised 3-51) submitted for this operating period.

# PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

- A. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent especially in view of the fact that this was the first combat tour for both the BAIROKO and VMF-312.
  - B. Casualties,
    - 1. No casualties experienced.



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# PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES (CONT'D)

- C. Personnel requirements and individual department comments.
  - 1. Executive Department: No comment.
  - 2. Air Department:

V1 Division: Adequate rated personnel, but short about ten (10) AN/AA to provide adequate number of plane handlers. This is over and above present complement.

V2 Mivision: No Comment.

V3 Division: No Comment.

V4 Mivision: Two additional AD or AD strikers required to keep Quick Engane Change unit ready for installation. A ready QEC Unit will expedite shipboard engine changes, and thus cut down on the period of time that aircraft requiring engine changes are not available for combat duty.

V6 Division: Require one (1) Aviation Cheif Boatswain Mate (allowed by complement but not on board) to assist the Gasoline Officer in the proper supervision, operation, and maintenance of the gasoline system, and the refueling and defueling of aircraft.

#### 3. Gunnery Department:

Recommend that this department be brought up to complement as soon as possible. Continious Condition III watches, Condition lAA at dawn and dusk, and the possibility of fueling operations present a serious problem that can be solved only by the presence of adequate personnel. (4 BML, 1 BM3, 4 GM2, 5 GM3, 1 FCC, 1 FC2, 1 FT1).

- 4. Medical Department: No Comment.
- 5. Supply Department: No Comment.
- 6. Navigation Pepartment:

Recommend that a second and first class QM and two seamen allowed by complement but not on board be made available at the earliest possible time to bring this department up to best possible combat readiness.

#### 7. Squadron:

Recommend that one (1) engineering clerk MOS 7031, and six (6) aircraft engine mechanics MOS 6413 and three (3) metalsmiths MOS 6444 be added to the squadron complement in order to provide more efficient operations while at sea. Squadron in excess two (2) Electronics technicians MOS 6600.



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## PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALITIES CONTID

## 8. Engineering Department:

Recommend that the department be brought up to complement especially with respect to diesel and refrigeration mechanics. Department able to operate adequately with present personnel assigned but not at best combat efficiency.


# 9. Operation: Department:

In view of the exceedingly heavy amount of paper work and reports involved in the Ships air Intelligence functions during an operations such as this; it is recommended that the ships complement of first class youmen be increased by one (1) and that yeoman be specifically assigned to intelligence duties. There is an ungent need for the various teleman retains and the ships complement should be falled to whatever extent possible.

## PART VI COMMENUS AND REMORDED ALLONS

- 1. From an over all viewporat it is considered that the operations of the USS BAIROKO with VMP-322 orbarked as part of TE 95.11 for the period 15 February through 25 February 1952, were conducted in a satisfactory manner. It is felt that the primary mission of the Task Element, that of providing the necessary air cover in the enforcement of a seaward and coastwise blockade of the Vest Coast of Red held Korea, was effectively accomplished.
- 2. Coordination of offert and cooperation between the various ships of the Task Element was excellent. Factical maneuvering posed no problem whateso ever.
- 3. Air Operations were conducted in an expeditious manner with a minimum of delay. In the majority of cases all flights schedueld were flown. Aircraft Maintenan ce Grews performed a very commendable job in providing maximum availability possible.
- 4. Damage to aircraft from small arms fire was noticeable greater on missions flown on inland targets than on the coastal targets. Strikes on inland targets, while an effective method of interdication, are not considered as high priority flights as compared with Coastal Recon, Tarcap and NSF spotting.
- 5. Normally only three destroyers were attached to the Task Element. One destroyer was detached each evening for special patrol and returned to the TE in the morning. Therefore, only two destroyers were available for night screening. It is felt that this number represents the absolute minimum for anti-submarine protection, and that if at all possible four destroyers should normally be assigned to CTE 95.11.





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CTG-95 USS SICELY (CVE-118)
CTG-95.1 USS RENICVAL (CVE-114)

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
R. D. HOGAE

AUTHENTICATED:

R. M. ALLISON Commander, U.S. Navy

SECURITY INFORMATION





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## FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 21 February 1952

SUNRISE	0727		*		SUNSET 1828	3
EVENT	COMP	MISSION	LAUNCH	<u>LAND</u>	AMMO	FUEL
Al	2	CAP	0715	0915	Note 1	380 Gals
A2	2	TARCAP	0715	0915	Note 4	380 Gals
A3	4	STRIKE	0715	0915	Note 3	380 Gals
B4	2	CAP	0900	1100	Note 1	380 Gals
B5	2	TARCAP	0900	1100	Note 4	380 Gals
B6	2	SPOT	0900	1100	Note 1	380 Gals
07	2	CAP	1045	1245	Note 1	380 Gals
08	2	TARCAP	1045	1245	Note 4	380 Gals
09	4	COAST RECCO(N)	1045	1245	Note 4	380 Gals
D10	2	CAP	1230	1430	Note 1	380 Gals
D11	2	TARCAP	1230	1430	Note 4	380 Gals
D12	2	SPOT	1230	1430	Note 1	380 Gals
E13	2	CAP	1415	1615	Note 1	380 Gals
E14	2	TARCAP	1415	1615	Note 4	380 Gals
E15	4	COAST RECCO(S)	1415	1615	Note 4	380 Gals
F16	2	CAP	1600	1750	Note 1	380 Gals
F17	2	TARCAP	1600	1750	Note 4	380 Gals
F18	4	STRIKE	1600	1750	Note 6	380 Gals

NOTE 1 - All A/C full load. 50 cal.

2 - 500 1b GP/DC - 8 HVAR

3 - NAPALM - 8 HVAR

4 - 500 lb. GP 1/100 delay - 8 HVAR

- 5 Maintain 2 A/C condition 11 after each launch from one half hour before sunrise until sunset. 1 A/C each CAP flight with ADSK 1 mounted
- 6 1,000 lb. GP 1/1000 nose .025 tail 8 HVAR

#### APPROVED

SUBMITTED

R. M. ALLISON CDR, USN OPERATIONS OFFICER

J. C. COULTHARD LCDR, USN ALR OPERATIONS OFFICER

Gopy to: CO, XO, OOD, OPS, AIROPS, AIR, VMF-312, NAV, AERO LAB, GUNNERY AIR INTELLIGENCE, RR #2

Enclosure (1) to USS BAIROMO'S ltr Ser 001 of 3 March 1952

Original gost

## U. S. S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) PLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO

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17 MAR 1952

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11

To:

Chief of Naval Operations

Via:

(1) Commander Task Group 95.1

(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE

.

**DECLASSIFIED** 

(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet

(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 4 March through 14 March 1952

Ref:

(a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations

(b) OPMAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1

(c) CINCPACELT INSTRUCTION 3480.1

(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (revised)

(e) CTE 95.11 OpOrder 2-51

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

- 1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period four (4) March through four-teen (14) March 1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CNE-115) was CTE 95.11 during this period.
- 2. The report is devided into 6 parts, as listed below:

Part I General Narrative.

Part II Chronological order of events.

Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance material and equipment, including amountaion expenditure.

Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.

Part V Personnel performance and casualties.

Part VI Comments and recommendations.

#### PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period four (4)\*March through fourteen (14) March 1952 the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115); under the Command of Captain R. D. HOGLE 62672/1310, USN, and the Marine Aircraft Squadron, VMF-312 embarked, Lieutenant Colonel J.H. MC GIOTHLIN Jr., 07445/7302, USMC, Commanding Officer operated as a part of the U.S. SEVENTH FLEET in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.

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17 MAR 1952

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 2. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 21001 four (4) March to 21001 thirteen (13) March 1952 at which time the Command of the Task Element was shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of one escort carrier and a maximum of three (3) DD's acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three (3) ships when required by operational demands. The mission of this Task Element was to conduct operations in support of the United Nations. Blockade, West Coast of Kores, the United States Mighth Army in Korea (CUSAK) and to render search and rescue assistance as required.
- 3. The enemy forces were the North Korean People's Army and "Volunteer Chinace Communist Forces" in enemy-held North Korea. No enemy surface or Air Forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Element when directed or as targets of opportunity.
- 4. During this operating period VMA-312 aircraft flew armed reconaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, pre-briefed strikes, Air Spot for Maval Junfire, and Photo Reconaissance missions as illustrated by schedule, enclosure (1). Flight Operations were carried out for the entire nine (9) days scheduled. However, on the last day, the last two (2) flights were cancelled due to weather. During these nine (9) days VMA-312 aircraft flew 360 combat sorties plus six (6) aborted and five (5) administrative flights. There was a total of 779.2 combat hours flown for an overall average of 86.6 hours and forty (40) sorties per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was twenty four (24), the total average aircraft flyable on board twenty two (22), and the total average aircraft availability eighteen (18).
- 5. During this operating period chips of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area Nan in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30' N. and 124° 30' E. Several of the destroyers in the screen were replaced on a routine rotational basis. Those that participated in this periods patrol were HMCS CAYUGA (D-218), HMS CONCORD (D-03), U.S.S. SCUTHERLAND (DDR-743), HMAD BATAAN (D-191), and the U.S.S. D.A. MUNRO (DE-422).

#### PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

O40648I The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) with VMA-312 embarked was underway for Operating Area Nan, off the West Coast of Korea, with the HMCS CAYUGA (D-218), in company.

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17 MAR 1952

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O41028I Conducted anti-aircraft gunnery practice in area George.

0412011 Recovered three (3) of VMA-312's F4U's from ITAZUKI.

0421001 Assumed Task Element designation CTE 95.11.

050215I HMS CONCORD (D-03) joined CTE 95.11.

0507001 Commenced launching aircraft.

0507551 U.S.S. BallOFO (CVE-115) fired approximately baselve (12) rounds of 400M to warn fishing craft in an unauthorized area.

O51145I Captain Kenneth L. DODSON O35671/ USMCR while flying an F4U-4 BUNR 96879 failed to return to the ship. Plane is reported to have lost port wing due to enemy anti-aircraft flack and crashed at Latitude 38° O5' N. Longtitude 125° 16' E. Accompanying pilots report that there is little possibility that Captain DODSON is alive. He was therefore reported killed in action.

0512151 The U.E.S. LOUTHERLAND (SER-743) joined formation and assumed duties of Screen Commander.

O51515I Captain Jack DEITZ, USMC while on a combat mission, flying an F4U-4 BUNG 81706 encountered enemy flack resulting in damage to plane, forcing pilot to bail out at 38° 30' N. and 125° 08' E. Pilot suffered no injuries. The pilot was quickly picked up by rescue Melicopter, Pedro Ture, stationed at Dontist Charley.

051642I Released HAGS CAYUGA (D-218) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Pagngnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

7.1-312 flow a total of fity (50) Flights this date. TweIve (12) of these flights were defensive. Weather good, visibility unrestricted. Wind N.E. ten (10) to twenty (20) knots. Sea moderate.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDINATION '	TXPENDITURE		<u> </u>
4 - 19	00#GP		12 - CAP
15 - 50	00# GP		16 - TARCAP
302 + II	V.P. is		14 Armed Recco.
18 - 1	apaln		8 - Strikes
14.575 - 79	ounds . 70 cal.	emeno.	

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ADH:ACL:88 CVE-115/10/Al2

17 MAR 1952

#### SECURITY INFORMATION

#### **DECLASSIFIED**

- O52245I The U.S.S. SOUTH RLAND (DDR-743) was detached to return to Sasebo, Japan. The U.S.S. LUNRO (DE-422) joined formation and assumed station 1# in screen.
- 6 March VMA-312 sircraft flew a total of forty eight (48) flights for this date. Twelve (12) of these flights were defensive, two (2) were administrative flights, and two (2) were aborted. Weather good, visibility unrestricted. Wind N. twelve (12) knots. Sea slight.
- 060705I Commenced launching sircraft.
- 0611151 HMCS CAYULA (D-218) re-joined formation.
- 061644I Released HAS COMCORD (D-218) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDINANCE LEXPANDITURE	<u> </u>
30 - 500# GP	12 - CAP
128 - HVAR's	2 - Admin.
144 - 3.5" rockets	10 - TARCAP
4 - Napalm	32 - Armed Recco.
32,96550 cal. ammo.	2 - Aborted flights

- 7 March VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of forty three (43) flights for this date. Twelve (12) of these flights were defensive. The weather generally good. Visibility fifteen (15) to twenty (20) miles. Wind twelve (12) knots. Sea slight.
- 071337I U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) Helicopter returned Captain DEITZ, USAG from Paengnyong-Do.
- 0713451 HMAS BATAAN (D-191) joined CW 95.11.
- 0717001 Detached HEAS SATAAN (D-191) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Pachgnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.
- 071707I Detached HMS CONCORD (D-10) to return to Sasebo, Japan.



IN REPLY REPER TO

RDH:ACL:ss CVE-115/10/A12

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SCURLTY INFORMATION

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

OR LHANCE EXPENDITURE	MISSIONS
27 - 500# GP	12 - CAP
172 - 5" HVAR's	12 - TARCAP
64 - 3.5" rockets	18 - Armed Recco.
3 - Napalm	l - Photo
29,51550 cal. belted ammo.	

- 8 March A total of forty two (42) flights were flown this date. Eight (8) of these flights were defensive. The weather was variable with ceiling 1500 to 5,000 feet. Visibility ten (10) miles. Winds N.W. eleven (11) to twelve (12) knots. Sea slight.
- OS1647I Detached HMCS CAYUGA (D-218) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

#### VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORININGE EXPENDITURE	<u>MIUSIOMS</u>
32 - 500# GP 215 - 5" HVAR's 40 - 3.5" WP rockets 27,000 - rounds .50 ca. ammo.	12 - CAP 11 - TARCAP 18 - Armed Recco.

- 9 March A total of forty one (41) flights were flown this date. Twelve (12) of these flights were defensive. The weather was excellent. Visibility unlimited. Wind sixteen (16) to twenty (20) knots. Sea moderate.
- 091600I Detached the U.S.S. LUNRO (DE-422) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE	MT2210112
29 - 500# GP 216 - 5" HVAR's 16 - 3.5" rockets 28.825 - rounds .50 cal. ammo.	12 - CAP 12 - TARCAP 17 - Recco.

MICCIONO

#### U. S. S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

TEN ACCIFIF

IN REPLY REFER TO

RDH: AGL:ss GVE-115/10/A12 Ser: Q D 3

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 10 March A total of thirty six (36) flights were flown this date. Twelve (12) of these flights were defensive. The weather was variable with ocassional low cloudiness. Visibility unlimited. Wind N.E. seventeen (17) to twenty (20) knots. Sea moderate to rough.
- 101615I F4U BUNR 96973, pilot C. W. TUXBURY Captain USMC serial number 024940 encountered heavy machine gun fire, Latitude 38° 50' N. Longtitude 125° 10' E. causing the pilot to parachute into the water at Latitude 38° 47' N. Longtitude 125° 06' E. TUXBURY was picked up by the helicopter based at Dentist Charley. Pilot was taken to the island of Cho Do suffering from slight exposure.
- 101631I Detached HMCS CAYUGA (D-218) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDMANCE .	EXPENDITURE		MIS	:SI	<u>ons</u>
20 –	500# GP		12	-	CAP
167 -	5" NV⊿R's		13		TARCAP .
	Napalms .		6	-	Recco.
32 - (	6.5" ATAR's		4	_	Strikes
25,885 - :	rounds .50 cal.	anmo.	Ţ	-	Photo

- 11 March A total of forty one (41) flights were flown this date. Twelve (12) of these flights were defensive. The weather was good with visibility unrestricted. Wind was seventeen (17) to twenty (20) knots. Sea rough to moderate.
- 111642I MIAS BATAAN (D-191) was detached to carry out night patrol assignments in the Pulmanyong-Do and Kiran-Do area.

VLH-312 sircraft accomplished the following:

# ORDINATES MISSIONS 7 - 1000# GP 12 - CAP 17 - 500# GP 12 - TARCAP 232 - 5" HVAR's 14 - Armed Recco. 8 - 3.5" WP rockets 2 - NGF Spot 31,530 - rounds .50 cal. ammo. 1 - Photo 6 - Napalm

111642I HMAS BaTAAN (D-191) was detached to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

IN REPLY REFER TO

RIH:ACL:ss CVE-115/10/A12

Ser: **003** 17 MAR 1952

SECURITY IMPOREATION

VMA-312 nircraft accomplished the following:

CHIMANGE EXPENDITURE	<u>MISSIONS</u>
7 - 1000# GP 17 - 500# GP 232 - 5" HVAR's 8 - 3.5" WP rockets 6 - Napalm 31,530 - rounds .50 cal. ammo.	12 - CAP 12 - TARCAP 14 - Armed Recco. 2 - MGF Spot 1 - Photo

12 March - A total of thirty eight (38) sorties were flown this date.

Twelve (12) of these were defensive. The weather was excellent with ceiling unlimited and visibility unrestricted.

1214311 CODFISH (TBM) delivered Captain C. W. TUXBURY, USMC to the U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115) from K-16.

121640I Detached HMCS CAYUGA (D-218) to carry out night patrol assignments, in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMm-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE	MISSIONS
22 - 500# GP 192 - 5" HVAR's	12 - CAP 14 - TARCAP
2 - Napalm	10 - Armed Recco.
24.380 - rounds .50 cal. ammo.	2 - NGF Spot

13 March - A total of twenty three (23) flights were flown this date.

Eight (8) of these were defensive. The weather was generally poor with increased snow showers and lowering ceiling by midday.

131400I Cancelled this flight due to weather.

131500I Detached the U.S.S. MUNRO (DE-422) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area and cancelled the 1620I flight.

1321001 In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 110155Z the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) was relieved of his duties as OTC West Coast Korea by Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY.

SECURITY INFORMATION

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VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

## ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE MISSIONS 3 - 1000# GP 8 - CAP 9 - 500# GP 9 - TARCAP 109 - 5" HVAR's 5 - Armed Recco. 4 - Napalm 1 - Photo

- 14 March HMCS CAYUGA (D-218), HMAS BATAAN (D-191) in company with U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) in transit from operating area West Coast Korea to Sasebo, Japan.
- 141150I Launched four (4) VMA-312 aircraft for ITAMI.
- 141330I Exercised crew at General Quarters and conducted anti-aircraft gunnery exercises.
- 141810I Entered the harbor of Sasebo, Japan.

### PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE LATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPERIDITURES

- (A) Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment
- 1. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.
- 2. Fifteen (15) 500 lb. general purpose bombs failed to explode on impact. Four (4) of the fifteen (15) aircraft carrying these bombs failed to return arming wires. One (1) 500 lb. bomb was dropped safe by pilot. It was definitely established that one dud was caused by electrical trouble. Three (3) 1000 lb. G.F. bomb duds were reported. All arming wires of these three (3) bombs were returned except one tail arming wire. The arming solenoids of the a/c carrying these three (3) bombs checked out satisfactorily. The above reported duds used the following fuzes with the delay timing as indicated: AN-M101A2 (.01 sec. delay)-1; AN-M101A2 (.25 sec. delay)-14; AN-M103A1 (inst.)-3; AN-M139 (inst.)-12; AN-M139 (.01 sec. delay)-3; AN-M102A2 (1025)-2.
- 3. Five (5) Napalm duds were reported. Three (3) of these duds were the MK-77 tanks. Failure of the three (3) MK-77 fire bombs was attributed to the following: double arming wires being secured to the after arming solenoid and the arming solenoid pin being sprung allowing the arming wire to pass under the pin when the switch was on Armed. The two other bombs were the Japanese manufactured tanks. The reason for their failure to ignite is undetermined.

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#### DECLASSIFIED

#### (B) Ammunition Expenditure

1. During the operating period covered by this report the following ordnunce was expended:

#### BY VMA-312 AIRCRAFT

1000 lb. G.P. bombs	_				_	_	_	_	٠	_	_	-	_	$1l_i$
500 lb. G.P. bombs-	-	_	•-	nu.s	_				-		_	_	_	201
5" HVAR's reckets -	-		_		_	_	_	_	-	-	_	_	_	1,733
6.5" ATAR's rockets				-	_	_	-	-	-		_		_	· 32
3.5" W.P. rockets -		_		_		-	~	_	_	÷	_	-		272
Napalr		_	_	-	_			_	_	_	-		-	1.1
.50 calliber belted	OI	a at	ıni	tj	Lo:	1 <del></del>	_	-		_	-		_	241,415

#### PART IV - SUMMARY OF CAN AND ENERY BARTLE DAMAGE

- (A) Own Buttle Damage.
- 1. None of the ships of the Task Element sustained buttle danje.
- 2. For damage sustained by aircraft see Naval Air Warfare Report (OPNAV 036.5 revised 4-51) submitted for this operating period.
  - (B) Battle Damago Inflicted on the Enemy.
- 1. Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of screen during the meriod covered by this element.
- 2. For Lubble decade inflicted on the energy by directly of the Took Moment see Naval Air Harfare Report (OFWAV 336.5 revised 3-51) submidted for this operating period.

#### PART V - PERSOLMEL PARFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

- (A) Personnel performance was considered to be excellent.
- (B) Casualties.
- 1. On five (5) March 1952 Gaptain K. L. DODSON 035671 ULMUR while flying an F4U-4 BUNR 96879 failed to return to the ship. The plane is reported to have lost its port wing due to enomy anti-mircraft flack.

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The plane upon losing its wing rolled over and crashed into the ground scattering parts of the aircraft over a large area. The approximate position of the plane crash is Latitude 33° 05' N. and Longtitude 125° 16' E. Accompanying pilots report that there is little possibility that Captain DCDSON survived. He was therefore reported killed in action.

- 2. In the afternoon of five (5) March 1952 Captain Jack EMITZ .USMC while on a combat mission and flying F4U-4 BUNR 61/06 encountered enemy flack resulting in damage to the plane, forcing the pilot to bail out at Latitude 36° 40' W. Longtitude 125° 08: E. Pilot suffered no injuries. The pilot was picked up by a rescus helicopter, Pedro Tara, stationed at Dentist Charley and delivered to Paenanyong-Do where, on seven (7) March 1952 DETTZ was picked up by the U.S.S. BAIRONO (CVE-115) helicopter and returned to the ship.
- 3. In the afternoon of 10 March 1952 Captain C. W. TUXBURY USMC 024940 encountered heavy machine gun fire Latitude 380 501 1 === titude 1250 10' while flying an F4U-4 on a combat mission. The pilot was forced to bail out at Latitude 380 47' N. and Longtitude 1250 06' E. The helicopter based at Dentist Charley again picked up pilot and delivered the milot to the island of Cho Do where he was flown to K-16 to be picked up by CODFISH and returned to the U.S.S. BAIRCKO (CVE-115).
  - (C) Personnel Requirements and Individual Department Comments.
- 1. Previous comments made in Action Report for period 15 February through 26 February dated 3 March are considered to be still valid. - The following additional personnel requirements are submitted:

#### a. Medical Department

SECURITY INFORMATION

At the present time the number of personnel in the department is toolow to properly perform all functions and to fill Gameral guarters station billets. Recommend bringing personnel compliment up to allowance by adding 1 HM2, 1 HM3, and 1 SW.

#### b. Operations Department

In view of the increase in communication traffic while operating in this area it is recommended that the following rates be added to allow the communication division to function properly: 1 RMI, 3 RM2, 1 RM3, 1 RMSN, 4 RMSA.

security information

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#### PART VI - COMENTS AND RECOMENDATIONS

- l. From an overall viewpoint it is considered that the operations of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) with VMA-312 embarked, as part of T.E. 95.11 for the period 4 March through 14 March 1952, were conducted in a satisfactory manner. It is felt that the primary mission of the Task Element, that of providing the necessary air cover in the enforcement of a seaward and coastwise blockade of the West Coast of Red held Korea, was effectively accomplished.
- 2. Due to pilots in-experience in aerial photography, and antiquated, jury rigged equipment a considerable amound of precious time and effort was wasted in attempting to get suitable aerial photographs of areas containing suspected troop build ups, and well camouflaged gun emplacements. It is recommended that an aerial photographic unit be attached to CVE type Aircraft Carriers operating in this theater of operations.

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20 MAR 1952

R. D. HOGLE Captain, U.S.N. Commanding Officer

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION





### FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 5 March 1952

SUNRISE 0709 SUNSET 1841

<u>event</u>	<u>COLP</u>	MISSION	LAUNCH	LAMD	<u> Ald :C</u>	FUEL
Al	2	CAP	07,00	0905	Note 1	380 Gals
A2	3	TARCAP	0700	0905	Note 6	380 Gals
A3	4	Coast Recco (N)	0700	0905	Note 2	380 Gals
B4 B5 B6	2 3 4	CAP TARCAP Coast Recco (S) See Note 4	0850 0850 0850	1055 1055 1055	Note 1 Note 6 Note 3 Note 6	380 Gals 380 Gals 380 Gals
07	2	CAP	1040	1245	Note 1	380 Gals
08	2	TARCAP	1040	1245	Note 6	380 Gals
09	4	Strike	1040	1245	Note 3	380 Gals
10	2	CAP	1230	1/05	Note 1	380 Cals
11	3	TARCAP	1230	1435	Note 6	380 Gals
112	4	Strike	1230	1435	Note 7	380 Gals
1113	2	CAP	1420	1625	Note 1	380 Gals
1114	3	TARCAP	1420	1625	Note 6	380 Gals
1215	4	Coast Recco (N)	1420	1525	Note 3	380 Gals
F16	2	CAP	1610	1815	Note 1	380 Gals
F17	3	TARCAP	1610	1815	Note 6	380 Gals
F18	4	Coast Recco (S)	1610	1815	Note 3	380 Gals

MCTE 1 - All A/C full head .50 cal.

2 - 1000 GP/ 4 to 5 sec. delay - 8 HVAR

3 - 500 GF 1/100 sec delay nose - 4 to 5 sec. delay tail - 8 HVAR

4-2 A/C for K-16 to contact JCC. To be recovered with Fox flight.

5 - Maintain 2 A/C condition 11 after each launch from one half hour before sunrise until sunset. 1 A/C each CAF flight with ABSK1 mounted

6 - Napalm - 8 LAVAR

 $7 - 500^{\circ}_{H} \text{ GF 1/100 sec. delay } - 8 \text{ HVAR}$ 

APTROVED

SUBHITTED

R.M. ALLISON CDR, U.S.M. OPELATIONS OFFICER J. C. COULTHARD LCDR, U.S.N. ATR OPERATIONS OFFICER

Copy to: 00, XO, COD, OFS, ATROPS, ATR, VLA-312, N.V, SHIPS CYFIGE, AERO LAL, /2 AIR INTELL IGENCE, RA/2, GENNERY ENCLOSURE (1)

BDN: ..CL: chas CV:- L15/LC/ 112 Ser: COLL

6 Marin 1952

of Jan Der Com



From: Communding Officer and Connumber Task Elewant 95.11

To: Chief of Marval Operations

Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1

(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE

(3) Communder SEVILLEY Fleet

(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 22 March through 1 April 1954

Pof: (a) Article 0705 Havy Regulations

(b) of M.V INSTRUCTION 3480.1

(c) CINCPACELY THETRUCTION 3480.1 (d) CTG 95.1 Operder 2-51 (revised)

(e) CTE 95.1 Optrour 2-51

Mncl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

000306

1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) ad (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period twenty two (A1) Herch through the appril 1952 is submitted herewith. The Communical Officer, U.S.S. Jake (CVF-115) was CTE 95.11 during this period.

2. The report is divided into six (6) parts, as listed below:

Part I General Rarrative.

Partyll Chronological order of events.

Fart III Remarks on perfermance of ordrance material and equipment, including assumition expenditure.

Part IV Swamery of own and enemy battle damage.

Part V Personnel performance and commulation.

Part VI Comments and recommendations.

#### PERT I - GROER I NATE TWO

1. During the period twenty two (20) Larch through one (1) April 1952 the U.S.S. DAIROM (CNE-115), under the Constant of Captain R. D. HOSLE 62672/1310, USD, and the Marine Aircraft Squadron, VI A-312 cubarked, Lieutenant Colonel J. H. 10 CLOTHLIN Jr., 07845/7302, USD, Commanding Officer operated as part of the U.S. GEVIETH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.



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- 2. The Cormanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 21001 twenty two (22) March to 21001 thirty one (31) March 1952 at which time the Command of the Task Element was shifted to the Commanding Officer, Hab GLORY. During the reporting period, To 95.11 consisted of one (1) escort carrier and maximum of three (3) Destroyees acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less thus three (3) ships when required by operational demands. The mission of this Task Element was to conduct operations in support of the United Nations Blockade, West Coast of Korea, the United States Mighth Army in Korea (EUSAK) and to render search and rescue assistance as required.
- 3. The enemy forces were the North Koreau. People's Army and "Volunteer Chinese Communist Forces" in enemy- 1 ld North Korea. We carry surface or Air Forces were encountered by this Tack Element and, there is well no surface or air action is related. However, energy small craft epocything in the rivers, estuaries, and along the Most Coast of Korea word along the Most Coast of Korea word along and destroyed by aircraft of this Element when directed or as tangents of opportunity.
- 4. During this operating period WMA-312 aircraft flow armon . .. consissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, pro-bris'c: strikes, Air Spot for Naval gunfire, and Photo Reconnaissance at sich. as illustrated by schedule, enclosure (1). Flight Operations were carried out for the entire nine (9) days scheduled, During these nine (9) days, VMA-312 mircraft flow 379 combat sorties plus two (2) aborto. and thirteen (13) administrative flights. There was a total of 840.6 combat hours flown for an overall average of 93.4 hours and forty two (4,7)sorties per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was twenty four (24), the total average aircraft flyable on board twenty (20), and the total average aircraft availability fifteen (15).
- 5. During this operating period ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Koroan Coastal area Nan in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30' N. and 1240 301 E. Several of the destroyers in the screen were replaced on a routine rotational basis. These that participated in this periods patrol were HICS CAYUGA (D-218), U.S. ISBELL (DD-269) and the REAS BUTAAN (D-191).

#### PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL OR DER OF EVELITS

22 Harch

2206381 U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) underway from Sasebo Harbor for area Nam off the West Coast of horse.





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2209301 Exercised crew at General Quarters.

220930I Destroyer Element HECS CLYUGA (D-218) and HELS EATAIN (D-191) joined and commenced manuvering to take stations in column for gunnery exercises.

221024I Conceled enti-circroft firing exercises due to low visibility.

221028I Secured from General Quarters.

2211.001 Recovered six (6) of VEL-312's F4U's from IT.SUNI mir Force Base.

2221001 Assumed Task Element designation CAE 95,11.

23 Lirch

230937I Dollayed launching of mircroft at this time because of the faulty operation of the air search radar, the YE equipment, and the low visibility clused by a dust storm.

2311401 U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-869) and HIS CHARITY (D-29) with Admiral A. K. Scott-Monorieff on board, joined fermation.

231240I CTF 95.1, "dmirel A. K. Scott-Monorieff, came aboard the U.S.S. B. IROKO (CVE-115) to observe operations.

231659I Released HeLS BATMAN (D-191) to carry out might patrol assimption ments in the Prengnyone Do and Kirin-Do area.

Viii-312 aircraft flew a total of thirty nino (39) sorties, Ten (10) of the flights were defensive. The weather was good with the exception of the inclunity dust storm. The ceiling was unlimited and visibility jimproving to tan (10) miles by 10001. Wind velocity twenty eight (28) knots.

Wil-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

#### ORDNANCE EXCENDITURE

30 = 500# GP

171 - 5" HV.JIS

- 56 - 3.5" rockets WP

29,910 - .50 calliber immunition

#### LISSIONS

10 - CAP

10 - T.RC.P

19 - Irmed Recco.



6 April 1952



## CELLECTION

24 H rch

- 2411311 Commonced Launching mircraft. The first three (3) flights of the days scheduled operations were cancelled due to rough some and strong winds.
- 241625I Released MACS CHYUGH (D-218) to carry out might patrol assignments in the Prengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 mireraft flow a total of thirty three (33) sorties. Eight (8) of these were defensive and one (1) aborted. The weather was clear to few scattered clouds. Coiling unlimited and visibility unrestricted with surface winds thirty five (35) to forty (40) knots. See conditions were very rough, northwest ten (10) to twelve (12) feet diminishing to six (6) in the afternoon.

VMA-312 sirereft accomplished the following:

ORDNINGE EXPENDITURE	113SIONS			
1000 15. GP	6 - CLP			
21 - 500 15. GP	0 - THRCAP			
198 - 5" HV R's	16 - Inned Receo.			
23.32050 saliber ammunition	1 - Iborted			

#### 25 Herch

- 2506301 U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-269) came along side to transfor mail and passengers.
- 2509371 One (1) VML=312 mireraft BUNR 81790 made an excessively hard landing c using the wing root section and wing main spar to buckle. The circraft is considered a strike.
- 2514391 Released the U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-869) to corry out night patrol nesignments in the Frengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.
- 2516301 Energy anti-mircraft flack from Welsa Ri emused damage to one (1) of VIL-312 mircraft, BUNA 81658, pilet Captain J. H. MC B.NIGL, necessitating the plane being flown to K-13. Upon landing at K-15, Captain J. H. DECAMP was thrown into a violent ground loop causing major damage to the plane. It was discovered later that Captain DECAMP plane BUNN 97136 had received energy anti-mircraft flack.

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/ in his brake system which caused the accident. Ceptain MC-DANIEL experienced no difficulty in making a safe landing with his damaged aircraft.

Vill-312 mireraft flow forty eight (48) sorties plus two (2) administrative hops and two (2) test hops. Fourteen (14) of these sorties were defensive. The weather was clear with unflimited ceiling and visibility. Shas smooth. Mind, wright, calm to eight (8) knots. Air temperature thirty five (35) to thirty seven (27) degrees.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the fellowing:

ORDNINGE EXPENDITURES	HISCIONS
32 - 500 lb. GP 223 - 5" HV.R's 32 - 3.5" rockets WP 27,29550 deliber amounition	14 - C.P 16 - T.RCAP 14 - Recco. 2 - Strikes 2 - Spot

26 Earch

2616151 Released HRCS L.T...N (D-191) to corry out might patrol assignments in the Pechanyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMI-312 aircraft flew forty three (43) serties plus three (3) administrative hops for a total of forty six (46) flights. Twelve (12) of these were defensive. The weather in the morning was good, 9,000 foot heiling, and visibility ten (10) miles, but deteriorating to five hundred (500) to four hundred (400) foot ceiling and five (5) miles visibility. Wind wis South to Southwest four (4) to twelve (12) knots. Son slight.


VMA-312 direraft accomplished the following:

ORDNINCE EXPENDITURE	TSSIONS		
6 = 1000 lb. GP 30 = 500 lb. GP 264 = 5" HV. R's 16 = 3.5" rocket. WP 25 775 = 50 c liber argumition	12 - CAP 14 - TARCAP 17 - Arned Necco.		



MOH : . Clarks CVI-115/20/312

Ser: 0011





27 11 rch

2714501 Captain W. D. Wall 027751, USIC, while on a compact mission, flying on F/U-4, AMIR 96768, encountered energ nati-aircraft gunfire at Sugar Di, resulting in damage to bis plane and forcing Captain SM RT to Sall out at TC 3005. Filot suffered no injuries. The pilot; Captain SMRT, was rescued in the fir Force SM belicopter; fudro For and Melion to K-16 to be transferred, at a later date, to the snip.

2716351 Released MICS OFFG. (D-218) to corry but might otrol assigndente in the capayong-Do on Kirir-D oros.

> VIC-312 iron ft flow o total of forty size (16) serties, twolve (12) of these sorties were defensive. The wer bler was good; High overcast with scattered to broken at 1000 to 2000 feet, visibility to: (10) miles. And Nort west object (8) to trefve (12) kn ts.

VML-312 direroft recomplished the following:

CHEMINGS ELEVEDITURE	138TOAS
4 = 1000 15. GP 32 = 500 15. GP 2 = Nopolas	14 - C.T 16 - T.MC.P 16 - Armad Reco
299 - 5" (W. 4s - 40 - 3.5" redut W2	
24,00050 endibur draumition	

28 il rch

2013-261 Captain J. D. GMART arrived, via CCD, from 1-16 and happy to be back abound too 0.0.8. MARORO.

2016491 Released the 0.0.3. ISSELL (DD-669) to correct out might potred. essignments in the Frengny ng-Do one Harin-Do ores. Vill-312 eiger it flow : total of forty six (1/6) sertics this data. Frantism (14) of these serties were defensive. The we we ther was mustly cle r coming br ken to by reast in the afterruon with a 2500 foot coiling, visibility unrestricted bucking five (5) to seven (7) miles in the aftern in. Curfage wind





6 April 1952

variable Northwest to Southwest four (4) to twelve (12) knots. During the morning, the target area was obscured by low strates forming from surface to five hundred (500) feet, clearing by mid-day.

VIII-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

#### CRONANCE EXPENDITURE

#### HOLSSICH'S

		1000 lb. Gp
30 -	-	500 lb. GP
312 -	£444	5" HV.II's
· 16	A.	3.5° rockets W
27,030	_	.50 c. liber assaunition

14 = C.P 13 = T.HC.P

17 - rmed hecco. 2 - Strikes

29 Earch

- 290927I Majeria. S. M.LK.R Jr. 010150, while on a comb t mission in a F4U-4, BUMN 96890 was reported to have received enemy antimateraft gunfire at YD 0843 and ditched his plane at YC 7080 (12 miles West of the Island of Sok-to).
- 2909361 Major Malken was picked up by a boat from the CRDICAN BAY (PF).

  It was learned at this time that Major Walken had been struck by enemy anti-aircraft gunfire in the right thigh and elbow necessitating ditching the aircraft before losing consciousness.
- 2912021 Captein I. U. Baugh, 036516; while flying a combet mission in an FAU-4, BUNK, 61955 reported his plane had been hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire atribles Ri, that the entire top surface of the wing was on fire, and that he was steering for Paengayong-De.
- 2912981 Pilot BAUER reported fire was out, no hydraulic pressure, desire to come aboard.
- 2912381 Vectored Captain B.UER t K-16 because of required high landing speed due to damaged wing and low wing velocity across the deck.
- 2912.91 Captain ... C. SCHONEBERGER, 020306, while flying a combat mission in an F4U-4, MUH. 80869, off the island of Soleto (XC 764706), encountered energy anti-pircraft fire causing Captain SCHONEBERGER to sustain prinful shoulder and neck wounds, necessitating and energency landing (13101) on the island of lacengageng -Do. Filot

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was returned to the U.S.S. SATROYO (CVE-115) via helicopter a few hours after landing at Faengayong-Do.

2913301 Pilot BAUER landed safely at K-16, uninjured.

VMA-312 aircraft flow a total of thirty nine (39) sorties. Eleven (11) of these sorties were defensive. Neather was generally good. Target area was obscured by ground fog during morning. Cailing broken 10,000 feet, unrestricted visibility by mid-day, but steadly deteriorated in the afternoon to become overcast with four hundred (400) to eight hundred (800) feet ceiling and five (5) to seven (7) miles visibility by 15001.

19MA-312 hireraft accomplished the following:

#### OR DIANCE EXPERIDITURE

#### 3 - 1000 lb. GP

24 - 500 lb. GP

8 - 100 lb. GP

243 - 5" HVAR's

41 - 3.5" rockets MP

28,555 - .50 caliber ammunition

#### MISSIONS

11 - CAP

12 - TARCAP

15 - Armed Rocco.

1 - Photo

30 March

3017051 Detached the HMCS CAYUGA (D-218) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Pasagayong-De and Kirin-Do area.

30.3101 Captain H. C. ROBINSON Jr. 041704, while flying combat mission in an F4U-4 BUNK 81692 sustained superficial outs about the face from an enemy anti-aircraft explosive shell bursting inside his plane canopy. The area from which Captain ROBINSON received anti-aircraft sunfire was YC 245135. Captain ROBINSON returned safely to the ship.

WMA-312 aircraft flow a total of forty two (42) sorties, plus one (1) ferry hop this date. Four (4) of these flights were defensive. The weather was good, scattered to broken 10,000 feet visibility unrestricted. Surfact winds north five (5) to ten (10) knots. See smooth.





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VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORILANCE EXPERIEDITURE	MISSIONS
9 - 1000 lb, GP	4 - CAP
9 - 500 lb. GP	12 - TARGAP
38 - Napalin	5 - Armed Recco.
213 - 5" BVAR's	20 – S <b>trí</b> ko
73 - 3.5" rockets   F	l - Photo
45,31550 caliber ammunition	

31 March

311549I Detached U.S.S. ISBELL (19-869) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Fach-nyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

3121001 In accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 290416Z, the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115) was relieved of his daties as CTC West Coast Kerea by Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY.

WHA-312 hireraft flew a total of forty four (44) sorties plus one (1) aborted, this date. Twelve (12) of these sorties were defensive. Weather was good over ship, coiling and visibility unlimited. Major pertion of target area clear with broken to overcast low clouds in small pertion of area.

Win-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

CRIDNANCE DEPENDENTE	<u> Hasions</u>
7 - 1000 lb. GF 23 - 500 lb. GP 8 - 500 lb. Frag. Cluster (Butter Fly)	12 - CAP 16 - TARCAP
26 - 100 lb. GP	16 - Armed Recco.
190 - 5" HVAR's	
104 - 3.5" rockets "P	
21,56550 coliber ammunition	

1 April HMCS CAYUGA (D-218), HMMAS BATAAN (D-191) in company with the U.S.S. BAIRONO (CVE-115) in transit from operating area West Coast Morea to Sasebo, Japan.



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Ollo27 Exercised crew at General Quarters and conducted anti-aircraft gunnery exercises.

011312I Launched five (5) VLA-312 circraft for ITAZUKI.


Oll714I Moored in Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan.

## PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING ADMINITION EXPENDITURES

- (A) Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment.
- 1. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handleing of ordnance.
- 2. One (1) 5" HVAR fuzed ith MK-149 mass fuze, came out of rear launcher post as the aircraft left the ship from entapult launch. Subject rocket fell from the plane a short distance forward of forecastle and exploded within approximately three (3) seconds of impact.
- 3. Nine (9) 500 lb. GP bomb duds were reported. One (1) dud was due to failure of the electrical circuit to arming sclenoids. Two (2) planes with duds returned without arming wires; the arming sclenoids checked out satisfactorily. Six (6) planes returned ith arming wires.
- 4. Three (3) M-28 clusters failed to function satisfactorily. These clusters were fuzed with AN-Mil46 fuze set for six (6) seconds delay and released at thirty five bondred (3500) feet altitude. Clusters apparently failed to open.
- 5. Two (2) early air bursts were reported with T-91 fazo. Bombs were released between thirty five hundred (3500) and four thousand (4000) feet and functioned at approximately fifteen hundred (1500) feet.
  - 6. All remaining bombs used during period functioned satisfacturily.
- 7. Two hundred fifty two thousand, seven hundred and sixty five (252,765) rounds of .50 caliber assumitted were expended.



## DECLASSIED



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#### (b) Amounttion Expenditure

1. During the operating period envered by this report, the following ordnance was expended:

#### DY VII-312 .IRCL.FT

5" HV.R2,102
3. "25 WP
3. "25 112
100 lb, GP 34
500 16. GP 23.1
3000 31 07 m = 2 m
Frag. Clusters (Sutterfly)
_ M
.50 coliber assaunition

#### FUZE EXTENSITURES

N-X 219
MNOT
131 31 300 3
N U 200/2
(N ) ( 900 ) 1
2/ 376/3
M-12/ 13 25 - 2 ar. dekay
12 - 6  nr.   Gelny
6 - 12  hr. delay
6 - 12 hr. dolay

#### BY U.S.S. B IROKO (CVE-115)

20 111	ت عدد بد، جب بير		g niga gayan jalan bila dada milan		 	3560.
40Ei		that water from the second of		٠	 	1621

#### PURT IN A SUIDLINY OF OUR LIND ENTERY BATTLE DAMAGE

- (A) Own Jattle Descripe.
- 1. None of the ships of the Task Llement sustained bettle deringe.
- 2. For damage sustained by sireraft see Hevel air Warfare Report (OPNLV 338.5 revised 4-51, submitted for this operating period.



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


- (3) Battle Damago Inflicted on the Enemy.
- 1. Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the energy while operating as part of screen during the period covered by this also ment.
- 2. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by mircraft of this Task Element, see Naval Air We fore Report (OPNAV 338.5 revised 3-51) submitted for this operating period.

#### PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES


- (A) Personnel performance was considered to be excellent.
- (B) Casualties.
- 1. On twenty seven (27) March at 1458I, Captain W. D. SMART, USMC, 027751, while on a combat mission, flying an F4U-4 BUNR 96768, encountered enemy anti-aircraft gunfire at Suya Ri, resulting in such demage as to force Captain SMART to bail out in enemy territory at YC 3005. The pilot suffered a bruise and cuts on his left leg while making a parachute landing. Captain SMART was rescued by the Air Ferce SMA helicopter, Pedro Fox, and returned to the ship via K-16.
- 2. On twenty nine (29) March at 0927I Major A. S. MALKUT Jr., USMC, 010150, while on a combat mission in an F4U-4 BUNR 96890, received every anti-aircraft gunfire at YD 0843 and ditched at YC 7080, one and one half (12) niles West from the island of Sock-to. Major WALKUR sustained shrapnel wounds in the thigh of his right leg and right albow. Major WALKUR was quickly rescued by HIS CARRIGAN BAY (PF) and returned to the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) via U.S.S. CHEVALLER (DD-805) and HIAG BATMAN (D-191).
- 3. On twenty nine (29) March at 1249I Captain A. C. SCHONEBERGER USMC, 020306, while flying a combat mission in an F4U-4 BUNR 80869, off the island of Sok-to (XC 764606) encountered enemy anti-mirraft fire causing Captain SCHONEBERGER to sustain a painful shoulder wound in the shoulder nack, necessitating an emergency landing (1310I) on the island of Paengnyong-Do. Pilot was returned to the U.S.S. Balkoko (CVI-115) via ships helicopter in fairly good condition.
- 4. On thirty (30) Harch at 17551 Captain R. G. ROBINSON, USAC, 041704, while flying a combat mission in an F4U-4, BUNR 81692, sustained superficial cuts about the face from an energy enti-aircraft explosive shell





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bursting inside planes a nepy. The area from which Copt in ROWINSON received enouge anti-directift gunfire was YC 245135. Copt in ROWINSON returned safely to the ship.

(C) Fersonnel Requirements.

1. Provious commonts made in action deport d ted 3 March serial 001 and action Report dated 17 March serial 003 are considered to be still walld.

#### PART VI - COMMENTS AND SIGNATURED TONS

1. Experience during the last three (3) tours on the line has indicated that the optimum launch is made up as follows:

n. 2 C.T

b. 2 TRO 3

e. 4 Armed Recommaissance

The CAP is considered as mandatory for the protection of the force, to provide investigation of surface contacts, to act as utility secorts and to act as a RESCAP and communication relay as required. A minimum of two (2) aircraft may be used with more as required. Under existing instructions, a two (2) plane TARGAP must be kept on station under the control of CTU 95.12.1 during the operating day with the TARGAP relieving on station.

Complete reconnaissance of the entire North jest Korean Const line under North Korean control as far forth as Latitude 39° 15° and be carried out each day. In addition, interior main supply routes; road, rail and water; is considered a necessity in order to provide matall protection against air attack, diversity and mutual protectio in attacks against ground tartain attack, diversity and mutual protectio in attacks against ground tartagets, complete coverage of assigned area, a worthwhile ordenance load against gets, complete covered, and sufficient numbers to afford a downed pilot protection while radio communications are established and S.R brought to the scene.

liscollaneous administrative hops are also required, special strikes are requested, and naval guardire spetting missions are often called for. The operations order requires that two (2) aircraft be lept in conditional even (11) throughout the day, except when the dock is re-spetted for recovery.



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with an overlap of eight (8) aircraft returning to the ship, and eight (8) aircraft launched, it follows that the minusum availability of combat ready aircraft must be sixtuen (16) in order to carry out the flights as proposed in the first saragraph. Two (2) sireraft to be arintained in condition cloven (21), plus the after mentioned administrative flights, NGF spot and occassional special strikes indicate that an even greater availability is required.

Figures available from three (3) tours on the line by the U.S.S. AIROLO (CVE-115) show that the average number of aircraft an board was twenty one (21) out of the assigned twenty four (24). Aircraft lesses, both comb t and operational, accounted for this. Of the twenty one (21) miscraft board, the average availability was about seventy five (75) per cent, or just short of sixteen (16) that a ready for combat flight at any one given time.

A review of the above availability figures against the optimum requirements indicated that a squadron equipped with the only four (24) aircraft is just barely able to carry out its assigned adserous with no margin of reserve, or aircraft available for alorgency asc. It is impossible to keep aircraft in condition aloves (11), particularly for the last two (2) or three (3) days of a period on the line, and in semi-cases those flights considered as basic were cancelled or delayed an order to carry out special missions. It was noted numerous times that a launch would strip the ship of all flyable aircraft.

It is therefore recommended that serious consideration be given to the plass-bility of providing the Marine Squadrons operating under CTE 95.11 with a minimum of twenty eight (28) aircraft as a normal complement. It is full that the additional four (4) aircraft usual aliminate the undesirable anditions listed above, and permit the squadron and the ship to more effectively and efficiently carry out the mission assigned.

2. Due to the small number of aircraft on a CVE 105 type of carrier, a concerted effort should be made to utilize overy aircraft on brand to the fullest extent. It is recommended that this type of Aircraft Carrier operate as close to the target area as possible to allow the deployment of an Armed Combat Air Patrol to strike the pre-brief d targets that are in close proximaty to the ship. With targets close aboard, positive central can be maintained of Combat Air Patrol to and from the target. The distance to targets should be no greater than the usual radius assigned a Combat Air Patrol. This has been tried and proved successful by the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)



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3. The element disarprise is a much desired factor while making attacks or reconsitering with aircraft. By establishing a "milk run" type schedule, this desired element of surprise is lost, allowing enemy troops to man their juns and camouflage their sulplies. It is recommended to the definite effort be made to very the flight schedule as much as possible.

#### DISTRIBUTION

> R. D. HOGLE Captain, U.S.N. Commanding Officer

AUTHENTICATED:

A. C. LUBBERTS
ASST AIR OP RATIONS OFFICER
LCDR, U.S.N.



15



CLECHT SCHEDULE FOR 25 HANGOUSES (TED)

SUNRISE	0639		40 main into		SUNSET	1358
EVETT.	COLIF*	MISSION	LAUNCH	LND	<u> </u>	FUEL.
Al.	2	CAP	0630	0.15	Note 1	380 Gals
2	2	TARCAP	0630	0815	Moto 2	380 0∈ <b>ls</b>
B <b>B</b> 3	2	CaP	0630	0945	Note 1	380 Gplls
B4	4	TARCAP	0800	11945	Mote 3	380 Gala
B5	4 2	Co.st Tecco (IN)	0800	0945	Note 2	380 G 1s
В6	2	Spot	0800	0945	Note 1	380 Gals
<b>C</b> 7	2 2	CAP (MGG DAUT)	0930	1145	Noto 1	380 Gals
CS	2	TARCAF	0930	11.45	Roto 2	380 Gals
D9	2 2	Cat	1130	1315	Note 1	380 Chls
D10	2	TARCAT	1130	1315	Note 2	330 Gals
D1.1	4	Coast Recent (SD)	1130	1315	Note 5	380 Gals
D12	4	Const Recco (SI)	1130	1315	Note 4	380 Galls
313	2	CAP	1300	1515	Note 1	330 Gals
E14	2	TARCAP	1300	1515	No to 3	300 Gals
F15	2	CAP .	1500	1645	Note 1	380 Ga <b>ls</b>
F16	2 2	TARC.P	1500	1645	Note 7	
F17	4	Const Recce (50)			*	380 Gals
F18	4	River Recce	1500	1645	Note 4	380 Gals
	4	MINOR MOUGO	1500	1645	Note 4	300 Galls
G19	2	C¼₽	1630	1830	Note 1	360 Ghls
G20	2	TARC. P	1630	1530	Note 7	360 Cale
			2000	٠,٠		فاعهاده محدر

NOTE 1 - All ./C full head .50 cal a mo.

- 2 500% SP Inst. nose 1/100 tail 8 HV.R
- 3 500# GP VT nose Instt tail 8 HVAR
- 4 500% GP 1/100 neso .025 tail 6 HV.A
- 5 500# GP D/C 8 P
- 6 1000 GF 1/100 moso .025 tail 8 HV R
- 7 500% GP 2 hr. 101 my 6 HV..R
- 8 500# GP 6 hr. dollay 5 HV R
- 9 Laintain 2 ./C condition 11 after each launch from no half hour before survise until sunset. One ./C each CLF flight with LEME mounted.
- 10 CLP Be proported to carry out hickor control exercises if so directed 11 TARCAF launched first for running realize ascand relieve on station

ALPROVED:

SUB ITTED:

R. H. ALLISON CER, USN OF BUTIONS OFFICER

(enclosure 1)

J. G. COULTMIRD LCIR, U.S.N. ALC OPPRATIONS OFFICER

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U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) C/O FLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

In reply refer to:

RDH:ACL:amg CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 0015

24 APR 1952

From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11

To:

Chief of Naval Operations

Via:

(1) Commander Task Group 95.1

(2) Commander Task Force 95

(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet

(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Action Report 9 April through 18 April 1952 Subj:

Ref:

(a) Article 0705 Navy Regulations

(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1

(c) CINCPACELT INSTRUCTION 3480.1

(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-51 (revised)

(e) CTE 95.11 UpOrder 2-51

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule

- 1. In accordance with reference (a), (b), (c) and (d), the action report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 9 April through 18 April 1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) was CTE 95.11 during this period.
- The report is divided into six (6) parts, as listed below:

General Narrative Part I

Chronological order of events Part II

Remarks on performance of ordnance material and equipment, Part III including ammunition expenditure

Summary of own and enemy battle damage Part IV

Personnel performance and casualties Part V

Comments and recommendations Part VI

#### PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

1. During the period 9 April through 18 April 1952, the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), under the Command of Captain R. D. HOGLE, 62672/1310, USN, and the Marine Aircraft Squadron, VMA-312 embarked, Lieutenant Colonel R. E. SMITH Jr., 08172/7302, USMC, Commanding, operated as part of the United States SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.



## U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-118) Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California Col. ASSI-LD

RDH: ACL: 98 CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 00/5 24 APR 1952

- 2. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 21001 nine (9) April to 21001 eighteen (18) April 1952 at which time the Command of the Task Element was shifted to the Commanding Officer, HMS GLORY. During the reporting period, TE 95.11 consisted of one (1) escort carrier and a maximum of three (3) Destroyers acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than three (3) ships when required by operational demands. The mission of this Task Element was to conduct operations in support of the United Nations Blockade, West Coast of Korea, the United States Eighth Army in Korea (EUSAK) and to render search and rescue assistance as required.
- 3. The enemy forces were the North Korean Peoples Army and "Volunteer Chinese Communist Forces" in enemy-held North Korea. No enemy surface or Air Forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface or air action is related. However, enemy small craft operating in the rivers, estuaries, and along the West Coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by aircraft of this Element when directed or as targets of opportunity.
- 4. During this operating period VMA-312 aircraft flew armed reconnaissance, Target Combat Air Patrol, Combat Air Patrol, pre-briefed strikes, Air Spot for Naval gunfire, and Photo Reconnaissance missions as illustrated by schedule, enclosure (1). Flight Operations were carried out for the entire nine (9) days scheduled. During these nine (9) days, VMA-312 aircraft flew 327 combat sorties plus 6 aborted and 15 administrative flights. There was a total of 660.9 combat hours flown for an overall average of 62.3 hours and 36.3 sorties per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 20, the total average aircraft flyable on board 18.45, and the total average availability 15.34.
- 5. During this operating period ships of Task Element 95.11 operated in the Korean Coastal Area Nan in the vicinity of Latitude 37° 30° N. and 124° 30° E. The destroyers in the screen were replaced on a routine rotational basis. Those that participated in this periods patrol were U.S.S. MUNRO (DE-422), HMNS PIET HEIN (D-805), HMCS ATHABASKAN (DDE-219) and the HMS CONSTANCE (D-71).

#### CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

#### 9 April

0906321 U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) and HMNS PIET HEIN (D-805) sortied from Sasebo Harbor, Sasebo, Japan for area Nan off the West Coast of Korea.







## U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

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24 APR 1952

10 April

100135I HMCS ATHABASKAN (DDE-219) joined formation and assumed duties as screen commander.

100616I U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) commenced launching aircraft for this operating period.

101344I F4U-4 SINR 14, pilot Captain MANNING, USMC, hit barriers three (3) and two (2) while making qualification landings. Pilot was not injured.

1014401 U.S.S. D.A. MUNRO (DE-422) joined formation from Worthington patrol.

101655I HMNS PIET HEIN (D-805) detached to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft flew thirty three (33) sorties plus five (5) administrative flights, and one (1) aborted sortie. Fourteen (14) of these sorties were defensive. The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) also conducted carrier qualifications during operations this date. The weather was fair, visibility 5 miles, winds Southwest ten (10) knots, sea smooth.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

#### ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

E LAF ENTITORS

5 - 1000 1b. bomb GP 15 - 500 1b. bomb GP

120 - 5" HVAR's

40 - 3.5" rocket WP

19.875 - .50 caliber ammunition

#### MISSIONS

14 - CAP

14 - TARCAP

5 - Armed Recco

#### ll April

110616I Commenced launching aircraft.

1109251 HMNS PIET HEIN (DD-805) joined formation from Worthington patrol.

111158I F4U-4 side number eleven (11), piloted by Captain TORGENSON, USMC, of VMA-312 came in high for a landing with no flaps, missed arresting wires, and crashed through three (3) barriers causing extensive damage to his own aircraft, and to F4U-4 side number twenty five (25). F4U-4 side number three (3) was also damaged. Captain TORGENSON received no injuries.

1115481 HMS CONSTANCE (D-71) joined the formation relieving HMCS ATHABASKAN (D-219) to return to Sasebo.



## U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-118) Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

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VMA-312 aircraft flew twenty (20) sorties plus one (1) aborted sortie. Six (6) of these sorties were defensive. The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) also conducted carrier qualifications during operations this date. The weather was generally good in the morning with ceiling and visibility rapidly lowering to 800 ft. and one mile (1) or less with rain. Wind Easterly twelve (12) to twenty five (25) knots, increasing to twenty five (25) to thirty (30) knots. Sea moderate.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

## ORINANCE EXPENDITURE 14 - 500 lb. GP 88 - 5" HVAR's 24 - 3.5" rocket WP 8 - Armed Recco 7.420 - .50 caliber ammunition

#### 12 April

120820I HMS CONSTANCE (D-71) rejoined the formation having been on the Worthington patrol during the night.

1213141 Commenced launching aircraft for this days operation.

1217051 Detached the U.S.S. D.A. MUNRO (DE-422) for night patrol assignment in the Paengnyong-De and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft flew eighteen (18) sorties plus three (3) administrative flights. Six of these sorties were defensive. The weather was mainly overcast, ceiling 1,500 foot, visibility and ceiling becoming unlimited in the afternoon. Surface winds North to Northwest thirty (30) to thirty five (35) knots, decreasing in the afternoon. Seas six (6) to eight (8) feet. Target had low cloud coverage and poor visibility, throughout the morning.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE	MISSIONS
12 - 500 lb. GP 96 - 5" HVAR's	6 - CAP 6 - TARCAP
7.95050 caliber ammunition	6 - Armed Recco







## U.S.S. BAJROKO (CVE-115) Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

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24 APR 1952

13 April

130556I Launched six (6) aircraft for CAP against possible enemy air attack. This was based on CTE 95.15 dispatch 121300Z of April 1952. No attack materialized.

130910I The U.S.S. D. A. MUNRO (DE-422) rejoined the formation from the Worthington patrol.

131655I Detached HMNS PIET HEIN (D-805) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft flew forty one (41) sorties, one (1) aborted, and three (3) administrative flights this date. Twelve (12) of these were defensive. The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) conducted carrier qualifications during operations this date. The weather was good. Sky clear with visibility unrestricted. Sea moderate, decreasing by afternoon. Wind Northerly.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

#### ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE

7 - 1000 lb. GP

10 - 500 lb. GP

135 - 5" HVAR's

56 - 3.5" rocket WP

7 - Napalm

29.150 - .50 caliber ammunition

#### MISSIONS

12 - CAP

17 - TARCAP

12 - Anned Recco

14 April

140613I Commenced launching aircraft for the days operations.

140635I Commenced refueling HMS CONSTANCE (D-71).

140730I Captain C. S. DETHERING, USMCR, 030608/7302, while carrying out a routine TARCAP mission in an F4U-4 received enemy small arms fire from XC 766573, Kyo Dong area. The damage received by Captain DETMERING'S plane from this small aim fire was of such accuracy, as to necessitate the ditching of the aircraft at XC 720605, just Southeast of the island of Cho Do.







## U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

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RDH:ACL:ss CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: OOIS

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140748I Received report from RESCAP that Captain Carl S. DETMERING was picked up by "Dumbo How" and was uninjured.

VMA-312 aircraft flew twenty eight (28) sorties, one (1) aborted, and one (1) administrative flight. Ten (10) of these sorties were defensive. The weather was clear becoming cloudy in the afternoon. Frontal passage in late afternoon from west to East, giving rain and reduced visability. Sea moderate.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE	<u>MISSIONS</u>
6 - 1000 lb. GP	10 - CAP
96 - 5" HVAR's	10 - TARCAP
48 - 3.5" rockets WP	6 - Armed Recco
13 - Napalm	2 - Sp <b>o</b> t
30,21050 caliber ammunition	-

#### 15 April

150612I Commenced launching sircraft for the days operations.

150646I Refueled U.S.S. D. A. MUNRO (DE-422) via close-in method.

150752I HMS CONSTANCE (D-71) returned from Worthington and joined the formation.

151205I Captain Carl S. DETMERING, USMCR, 030608/7302, arrived from k-16 in good health and in good spirits.

1517121 Detached the U.S.S. D. A. MUNRO (DE-422) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of forty six (46) sorties this date. Forteen (14) of these were defensive. The weather was good throughout the day with ceiling scattered to broken. Visibility was unrestricted. Sea moderate.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

# ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE 9 - 1000 1b. GP 14 - 500 1b. GP 14 - TARCAP 14 - TARCAP 18 - Armed Recco 253 - 5" HVAR's 22,790 - .50 caliber ammunition



16 April

# U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

RDH: ACL: ss CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 0015

24 APR 1952

## DECLASSIFIED

160606I Commenced the days operations with a twelve (12) plane Napalm and rocket strike on the Wolsa Ri area.

160725I The U.S.S. D. A. MUNRO (DE-422) returned from the Worthington patrol to rejoin the formation.

161710I Detached HMNS PIET HEIN (D-805) to carry out night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft flew thirty five (35) sorties plus three (3) administrative hops. Ten (10) of these sorties were defensive. The weather was fair with haze from surface to clouds. Visibility lowering by noon to two (2) to five (5) miles over ship and target area. Wind increasing to twenty five (25) to thirty two (32) knots by mid-afternoon. Sea slight becoming moderate to rough.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

OR DNANCE EXPENDITURE	<u>MISSIONS</u>
4 - 1000 lb. GP 8 - 500 lb. GP 22 - Napalm 239 - 5" HVAR's 28,09050 caliber ammunition	10 - CAP 10 - TARCAP 7 - Armed Recco 8 - Strike

### 17 April

1712011 HMNS PIET HEIN (D-805) returned to the formation from the Worthington patrol.

171313I Commenced launching aircraft for the days operations.

1716011 Detached the HMS CONSTANCE (D-71) for night patrol assignments in the Paengnyong-Do and Kirin-Do area.

VMA-312 aircraft flew a total of twenty six (26) sorties this date. Six (6) of these were defensive. The weather fair. Visibility was reduced to two (2) miles, due to dust, improving to over ten (10) miles in the afternoon, with unlimited ceiling. Wing Northwest, twenty (20) to thirty (30) knots, deminishing to fifteen (15) to twenty (20) knots. Seas diminishing from twelve (12) to five (5) feet by noon.







## U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

## RDH: ACL: ss CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 00/5

# 24 APR 1952

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

## ORINANCE EXPENDITURE

## MISSIONS

14 - 1000 lb. GP

6 - Napalm

134 - 5" HVAR's

19,875 - .50 caliber ammunition

6 - CAP

6 - TARCAP

14 - Armed Recco

### 18 April

180545I Commenced launching aircraft to start the days operations, hoping to establish record for the number of combat sorties flown from CVE type carriers.

180636I Commenced refueling U.S.S. D. A. MUNRO (DE-422).

180915I HMS CONSTANCE (D-71) returned to the formation from the Worthington patrol.

1 1812001 Commenced retiring to the South, Pt. Oboe moving 173°T at six (6) knots.

The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) with the U.S.S. D. A. MUNRO (DE-422), 1819111 HMS CONSTANCE (D-71) and HMNS PIET HEIN (D-805) in company, retired from the area at 18.5 knots on course 1730T.

182100I Shifted command TE 95.11 to HMS GLORY.

182205I Detached the U.S.S. D. A. MUNRO (DE-422) to carry out mission assigned.

> VMA-312 aircraft flew eighty (80) sorties plus two (2) aborted flights for this days operations. Eighteen (18) of these flights were defensive. The weather was good with unlimited ceiling. Slight haze holding visibility to six (6) to ten (10) miles. CAVU over target area. Winds Northwest backing to Southwest fourteen (14) to five (5) knots. Seas slight.

VMA-312 aircraft accomplished the following:

#### OR INANCE EXPENDITURE

14 - 1000 lb. GP

73 - 500 lb. GP

8 - 100 lb. GP

3 - M83 (Butterfly bomb)

23 - Napalm

435 - 5" HVAR's 40 - 3.5" rocket WP

62,200 - .50 caliber ammunition

## MISSIONS

18 - CAP

22 - TARCAP

19 - Armed Recco

19 - Strike

2 - Spot





RDH: ACL: 88 CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 0015

## DECLASSIFIED 24 APR 1952

19 April

1912221 Detached HMS CONSTANCE (D-71) and HMNS PIET HEIN (D-805) to return to Sasebo. The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) maintaining course and speed for Kobe to transfer VMA-312 to U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29).

### PART III - PERFORMANCE OF OR DNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

- (A) Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment.
- 1. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.
- 2. A total of seventy-eight (78) HVAR and sixteen (16) WP rockets failed to fire.
- 3. Nine (9) 500 lb. GP duds were reported, four (4) of these bombs were armed with tail arming only using AN-M101A2 fuzes. Five (5) bombs were armed with AN-M139Al nose fuze and AN-M101A2 tail fuze. All planes except one (1) returned with arming wires. Three (3) 1000 GP duds were reported. Two (2) were fuzed with AN-M139Al fuzes. and AN-M102A2 tail fuzes. One (1) was armed with AN-MK 219 nose fuze with Daisy Cutter extension and AN-M102A2 tail fuze. Two (2) early air bursts were reported with T-91 fuzes. Bombs were released at approximately three thousand (3000) feet and functioned around one thousand (1000) feet.
- 4. Seven (7) type F-51 Napalm tanks and one (1) MK-77 bomb failed to ignite. Two (2) planes dropping type F-51 tanks failed to return arming wires. All arming solenoids checked out satisfactorily.
- 5. One (1) 500 lb. GP bemb was released between the catapult and forward end of the flight deck. The bomb tail struck the underneath side of the aircraft, tumbled forward and landed in water forward of the forecastle. The plane continued in flight and landed at a land base. As a consequence, the aircraft has not been examined to determine cause of release.







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(B) Ammunition Expenditure

1. During the operating period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended:

## BY VMA-312 AIRCRAFT

5" HVAR	1,602
3. 125MP	200
100 lb, GP	8
500 lb. GP	146
1000 lb. GP	59
Napalm, MK-77 bembs	28
Napalm, Type F-51 tanks	52
500 lb. Frag. Clusters	
(Butterfly)	3
.50 caliber ammunition	227,550
	•

## FUZE EXPENDITURES

AN-MK219 -																47
T-91	-	_		_	_	-	_	_	_	-	_	-	-	-	_	51
AN-M1.03A1	-	_	_	-	_	_	-	_	_	_	-	_	-	-	_	15
AN-M139A1	_	-	-	-	-	-	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_		53
AN-M140A1	-	_		_	-	-	-	_	_	-	_	-	-	_	_	35
an - 146 -	-	_	_	_	-	_	_		-		_	_	-	_	_	3
AN-M100A2	_	_	_	_		_	_	-	_	-	_	-	_	_	_	8
SALOLM-NA	-	_	-	-	_	_			_	_	_	_	_	_	_	138
an-miozaz	-	_	_	-	_	**	_	_	_	-	_	-	_	-	_	55
M-116A1 -	-	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	_		_	8
M-117A1 -	_	-	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	_	_	_	_	_	_	- 4

## BY U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)

20MM	_	-	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	_	_	_	_	-	-	0
4QMM	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	_	-	_	_	_	-	_	_	_	0

## PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

- (A) Own Battle Damage
  - 1. None of the ships of the Task Element sustained battle damage.
- 2. For damage sustained by aircraft, see Naval Air Warfare Report (OPNAV 338.5 revised 4-51) submitted for this operating period.







# U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-118) Care of Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

## DECLASSIFIED

RDH:ACL:ss CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: OO!5

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## (B) Battle Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

- l. Ships of this Task Element inflicted no damage on the enemy while operating as part of screen during the period covered by this Element.
- 2. For battle damage inflicted on the enemy by aircraft of this Task Element, see Naval Air Warfare Report (OPNAV 338.5 revised 3-51), submitted for this operating period.

#### PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

- (A) Personnel Performance
  - 1. Personnel performance was considered to be excellent.
- (B) Casualties
  - 1. No casualties were received.
- (C) Personnel requirements
- 1. Previous comments made in Action Report dated 3 March, serial 003 are considered to be still valid.

## PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (A) Comments
- l. It is believed that the Ground Control Intercept net in this area is adequate to give sufficient warning in time to permit the Combat Air Patrol to be employed in many auxilary capacities such as RESCAP, Weather Reconnaissance, TBM CAP, Helicopter CAP, Crippled Plane CAP, Gun Tracking Drills, CIC Intercept Drills, and etc. The employment of the CAP in this manner greatly facilitates the overcoming of the daily operational problems and keeps up the crews battle efficiency.
- 2. It was noted during all four (4) combat cruises off the West Coast of Korea, that on several occasions, when one of the ships aircraft was placed in an emergency status, all other aircraft within the immediate area came up on the guard frequency, transmitting advice and asking questions at such a rate as to impede rescue operations and the dissemination of information to the ships controler, the bridge and JOC Korea.
- 3. It is felt that the primary mission of TE 95.11, that of maintaining a coastwise and seaward blockade of the West Korean, in conjunction with TE 95.12 is most efficiently realized by employing the aircraft available in the accomplishment of CAP, TARCAP, Reconnaissance, and Spotting missions as set forth in CTF 95.1 OpSig 284.



U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)

Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

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## (B) Recommendations

- l. It is recommended that a squadron policy be established that during such emergencies (refer PART VI, para. (A), subpara. 2), the flight leader or, in his absence, his wingman make all transmissions. All other aircraft remain silent unless called. If distances are far enough to necessitate a relay station, the flight leader or, in his absence, his wingman will designate the plane to act in this capacity or the Combat Air Patrol may be vectored in close to the scene upon request of the Officer in Charge at the scene through ships controler.
- 2. It is strongly recommended that over enthusiasm be guarded against in the employment of aircraft on strike missions for the purpose of neutralizing reported invasion preparations against secondary islands off the west Coast of Korea. Intelligence to date pertaining to invasion threats has proved to be meager and inaccurate. While these reported threats must not be ignored, an all out concentrated effort should be based on current positive intelligence preferably from own reconnaissance. This is meant in no manner to belittle the efforts on the part of Western Korean Intelligence organizations. On the contrary, a feeling of gratitude and respect is felt for these agencies engaged in this work in this theater. However, it should be realized that the elapsed time necessary for the dissemination of intelligence information, and the mobility of enemy troops and equipment are major factors and must be given appropriate consideration.

R. D. HOGLE Captain, USN

Commanding Officer

#### DISTRIBUTION

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## U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) C/O FLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

## DECLASSIFIED

### FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 14 APRIL 1952

SUNRISE 0608

SUNSET 1917

H.W.I.M.T	COMP	MISSION	LAUNCH	TAND	<u>AMN4O</u>	ruei.
Al	2	CAP	0615	0815	Note 1	380 Gals
A2	2	TARCAP	0615	0815	Note 4	380 Gals
A3	4	COAST RECCO (SE)	0615	0815	Note 5	380 Gals
B4	2	CAP	0800	1000	Note 1	380 Gals
B5	2	TARCAP		1000	Note 1	380 Gals
C6	2	CAP	0945	1145	Note 1	380 Gals
<b>C7</b>	2	TARCAP	0945	1145	Note 4	380 Gals
C8	2	SPOT	0945	1145	Note 1	380 Gals
D9	2	CAP	1130	1330	Note 1	380 Gals
D10	2	TARCAP	1130	1330	Note 4	380 Gals
B11	4	RIVER RECCO	1130	1330	Note 5	380 Gals
E12	2 2 2	CAP	1315	1515	Note 1	380 Gals
E13		TARCAP	1315	1515	Note 4	380 Gals
E14		ROAD RECCO	1315	1515	Note 5	380 Gals
F15	2	Cap	1500	1700	Note 1	380 Gals
F16	2	Tarcap	1500	1700	Note 4	380 Gals
G17	2	CAP	1645	1845	Note 1	380 Gals
G18	2	TARCAP	1645	1845	Note 4	380 Gals
G19	4	COAST RECCO (SC)	1645	1845	Note 5	380 Gals

NOTE 1 - All A/C full load .50 cal. ammo.

2 - 500# GP D/C - 1/100 tail - 8 HVAR

3 - 500# GP - VT nose - Inst. tail - 8 HVAR

4 - Napalm - 8 HVAR

5 - 1000# GP VT nose - Inst. tail - 8 WP

6 - Maintain 2 A/C condition 11 after each launch from one half hour before sunrise until sunset. One A/C each CAP flight with ADSKI mounted.

APPROVED:

SUBMITTED

R. M. ALLISON, CDR, USN OPERATIONS OFFICER

J. C. COULTHARD, LCDR, USN AIR OPERATIONS OFFICER



#### U. S. S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) PLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO

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From:

Commanding Officer

To:

Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Via: Commander Air Force. Pacific Fleet

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Report of Hunter/Killer Operations 8-12 December 1952

Encl:

(1) Task Organization

(2) Summary of Operations I Brief descriptive Narrative

(3A) Tabulated weather data

(3B) Tabulated Evaluation Submarine Attacks

16-8

- 1. ASW Hunter/Killer Operations were conducted 8-12 December 1952 in assigned San Diego operating areas in accordance with:
  - a. Commander First Fleet restricted dispatch 152004Z of October 1952.
  - b. U.S.S. BAIROKO Operation Order No. 5-52 dtd 24 November 1952.

### Comments and Recommendations

- a. Naval Operations
  - (1) Surface

#### Comment

Turn signals were used in most cases to maneuver the force into the wind for launch or recovery of aircraft and the Screen was not recriented to the new course. Screen protection to the carrier was thereby decreased. Training of CIC and ship control personnel of the various Screening Ships would have been accelerated if Corpen signals had been used.

## Comment (Commanding Officer U.S.S. BAIROKO)

Turn signals were employed mainly (1) for simplicity (2) on the assumption that the SS danger area was in the direction of the screen axis.

#### Recommendation

That Corpen signals be used to the maximum extent possible in Hunter/Killer training exercises to provide additional training opportunities for the personnel of the Screening Ships.



#### Comment

Numerous surface craft were encountered when operating in the Eastern pertion of the operating area. These contacts required checking by the airborne teams and as a result the teams spent too much time investigating contacts that were not involved in the exercise. Furthermore the force had to be maneuvered at times to avoid these contacts while trying to conduct air operations.

### Recommendation

ASW Hunter Killer exercises in the San Diego area should be scheduled and conducted in the Western most portion, as far as practicable.





## (2) Special Tactics

#### Comment

The use of the diving light at night by the submarines to provide the attacking ships of the SAU with a reference for evaluation of the run was quite effective. The light could not be seen unless a "Good" or "Excellent" attack was made, so that a ship making a poor attack could not use the light as a reference for reattack (thus placing the submarine at a disadvantage).

#### Recommendation

The continued use of the diving light by the submarines to aid the attacking ships in making an evaluation is indicated.





## (3) Anti Submarine

## DECLASSIFIED

#### (a) Surface

#### Comment

In one instance the REDFISH stayed at periscope depth after it was apparent that the WILTSIE had commenced an attack run. The WILTSIE did not attack because of safety considerations. The REDFISH Commanding Officer later stated that he was aware of the attack, and that it would have been satisfactory for the WILTSIE to continue as he intended to wait as long as possible before going down, but would have been safely out of the way.

## Recommendation

Attacking vessels should continue to be most careful in the interpretation and observance of safety precautions when working with the submarines. Submarine Commanding Officers should not take advantage of the attacking destroyers natural reluctance to press an attack home while a periscope is showing, and should go down as soon as it becomes apparent that they are being attacked.

#### Comment

The wisdom of maneuvering a SAU by turn signals frequently when entering a submarine contact area was amply demonstrated during the week. These turn signals have merit both defensive and offensively. In event 5 SAU-1 was executing a 40 degree turn to the right when BBB signal was received from CHARR by the WILTSIE on her port beam. This turn was an excellent defensive maneuver for the WILTSIE the port hand ship in the SAU. The CHEVALIER as center ship of the SAU turned toward the REDFISH and shortly after received BBB's from her. Sonar contact was almost immediately gained by CHEVALIER. The executed turn assisted the CHEVALIER to get set for an attack. The frequent turns also prevented the sub from ascertaining the base search course and picking an escape course midway between two ships of a SAU.

The series of turn signals were in addition to weaving, which was ordered upon approaching the contact area. Weaving may be considered entirely defensive, however, while the turn maneuvers are both offensive and defensive.







#### Recommendation

That stress be placed on the high defensive and offensive merit of a SAU executing frequent turn signals when approaching a submarine contact area.

## (b) Aircraft

#### Comment

Aircraft teams were not relieved on station at all times, and an insufficient period was allowed for turnover of information to the relieving team. Continuous surveillance of the search area must be maintained or submarine contacts may be missed as was the case in at least one instance.

### Recommendation

All teams be relieved on station regardless of whether a contact is held or not, and sufficient time be allowed for complete turnover of information. The carrier element should be turned out of the wind between launch and recovery (if necessary to maintain a track or position) in order to allow sufficient time for proper aircraft relief on station.

#### Comment

It has been the policy of the BAIROKO in the past to require that the search teams be held under radar surveillance at all times thus limiting the flexibility of the teams. Continuous radio contact has also been required. Safety considerations and the ASW evaluator's need for continuous information as to the location of the teams indicated the above policy. It is now felt that the continued radar surveillance of aircraft is no longer necessary as long as the aircraft can maintain positive radio contact with the Group Combat Information Center, and as long as the ASW evaluator is kept advised of the position of the team when beyond the ship's radar surveillance.

#### Recommendation

That the aircraft teams be allowed greater freedom of movement by not requiring them to be held under radar surveillance at all times as long as positive radio communications (either VHF or MHF) are established and maintained.





#### (c) Submarine

#### Comment

The term General Submarine Instructions is misleading in its connotations and it is believed that the term should be changed to General Submarine Restrictions which is more descriptive of the limitations imposed on the submarines maneuvers.

#### Recommendation

Change the term General Submarine Instructions to General Submarine Restrictions.

#### (d) Air Surface

#### Comment

Aircraft by their mere presence in the area of submarine operations are a mental hazard and a constant potential threat to the submarine commanding officer. This fact is well known and was exploited in full during search phases of the exercises in this operation. However, in a few cases, once the SAU had made contact the aircraft were allowed to continue on their search plan and did not remain in the general vicinity of the contact. During daylight hours particularly, an ASW air patrol working with and in the vicinity of the SAU might very possibly prevent a submarine from remaining at or returning to periscope depth for an attack. A well placed depth charge on a submarine at or near periscope depth would undoubtedly drive the submarine deep and force him at least to a less efficient method of firing at the SAU. This is particularly important because of the complete lack of offensive capability which the submarine has against aircraft, and the agressive offensive tactics which submarines are new employing against ASW ships as opposed to the passive defensive tactics of the past war.

#### Recommendation

Even after the SAU has definitely established contact with the submarine, the ASW air team should be maintained on patrol in the general vicinity to provide additional aid and protection to the ships of the SAU.

#### Comment

Due to the artificialities of the exercises, and in some cases the short period of time allowed between events,







particularly the first two days, it was very difficult to obtain a good separation between the carrier element and the submarines. As a result most of the contacts were made by the screen, and the aircraft did not enter into the picture at all.

#### Recommendation

Events should be scheduled with sufficient time allowed so that the force is adequately separated from the submarines. If this is done, the original contact will probably be made by the aircraft and there will be a greater number of opportunities for aircraft and the SAU to practice the very important phase of passing the contact area control from the aircraft to the SAU. Furthermore, the time consuming process of repositioning the main force to recommence the event would be shortened, thereby allowing even more time and opportunities for surface-aircraft coordination.





#### (4) Submarine

## **DECLASSIFIED**

#### (a) Offensive

#### Comment

In events 4 and 5, the submarines were employed in team tactics at an initial distance of 6,000 yards between submarines. In event 4 both submarines attacked the CVE plus one DD of the screen within a short period. In event 5, three attacks (2 on one DD) were made by the two submarines on a three ship SAU. Had each submarine been successful in its attacks, it is doubtful if the third DD would have remained in the vicinity. The employment of submarines in groups of two or more is a constantly improving tactic in the interest of mutual support and concentration of fire power. While a single submarine would probably attempt initially to evade a three ship SAU, it is almost a certainty that two submarines operating as a team would make every effort to deliver nearly simultaneous attacks on a three ship SAU.

### Recommendation

Officers in Tactical Command and the Screen Commanders should be aware of the increased emphasis on team tactics to be used by the submarines, and the use of a four ship SAU should be seriously considered. SAU Commanders should become increasingly alert for simultaneous attacks as the datum point is approached, and be prepared to split the SAU on very short notice in order to handle the double threat presented.

#### (b) Defensive

#### Comment

The lack of effective evasion devices to assist the submarines in breaking contact was again felt. Only FTS's and FTC's both of which are known to be of little value, were available. Commander Escort Squadron Three reported that in at least two SAU actions the submarine's evasive measures were not effective.





#### Recommendation

Submarines operating in training exercises should be permitted to use advanced evasion devices to the maximum extent possible. It is not considered sufficient that such aids for evasion should be available for use under strictly controlled conditions. Every opportunity should be taken to provide the various submarine units practical experience in their use, and to acquaint participating surface ships with the characteristics of such devices. Possibly a peacetime sinking device could be incorporated for security in lieu of attempting recovery.

## Comment

Event 9, a 24 hour transit exercise wherein the submarines were required to travel a distance of 180 miles, was beyond the capability of either the CHARR or the REDFISH. A 14 Sono-buoy barrier placed across the estimated track near the starting point was not effective, but heavy air cover maintained along the estimated track during the problem held the REDFISH down almost continuously, and forced the CHARR to proceed largely on battery and snorkel. Inasmuch as the initial departure area and the final destination of the submarines were known, and both the departure time and time of completion were previously established, a relatively small area was involved, and it was fairly easy to saturate that area with air cover.

#### Recommendation

It is recommended that future exercises of this nature allow the submarines more latitude of action in order to provide a more realistic problem for the submarines. In order to accomplish this it would appear necessary to allow the submarines a larger area of required location at the commencement of the problem, with the carrier element located 50 to 60 miles away from the submarines initial point at starting time.





## (5) Combat Information Center

## DECLASSIFIED

### Comment

The Combat Information Center on occasion would not leave aircraft on a contact long enough to complete evaluation, but would vector the team to continue search or return to ship in order to carry out recovery schedule.

## Recommendation

Airborne teams should be given full opportunity to develop all contacts, and contact development should receive precedence over maintaining a prescribed search plan. Recovery schedules should be modified if practicable.



## (6) Electronics Countermeasures

## **DECLASSIFIED**

#### (a) RADCM

### Comment

RADCM in the form of intercept exercises produced meager results. At the commencement of each exercise radar silence condition One was put into effect for the first ten minutes of each fifteen minutes beginning on the hour and continuing until completion of the exercise. A target ship was placed at 10 to 15 thousand yards on the beam on parallel course. Few RENT reports were received, and in only a few cases was it possible to plot in the position of the target ship based upon RENT reports received.

#### Recommendation

All units take immediate steps to insure that all equipment is in the best material condition possible, and that RARM exercises be conducted at every possible opportunity.





## (6) Electronics Countermeasures

## **DECLASSIFIED**

#### (a) RADCM

### Comment

RADCM in the form of intercept exercises produced meager results. At the commencement of each exercise radar silence condition One was put into effect for the first ten minutes of each fifteen minutes beginning on the hour and continuing until completion of the exercise. A target ship was placed at 10 to 15 thousand yards on the beam on parallel course. Few RENT reports were received, and in only a few cases was it possible to plot in the position of the target ship based upon RENT reports received.

#### Recommendation

All units take immediate steps to insure that all equipment is in the best material condition possible, and that RARM exercises be conducted at every possible opportunity.





## (7) Seamanship and Navigation

## Comment

Under adverse weather conditions, navigational positions may vary widely between the various ships of the Group. If one definite reference position is not established it is difficult to carry out the exercises in the areas as scheduled.

### Recommendation

The OTC should establish a best estimated reference position for use by the entire group at least once each day or prior to each exercise, and carry out the exercise in relation to that established reference point.





### b. Communications

## DECLASSIFIED

#### (1) General

#### Comment

Radio communications difficulties and equipment failures were prevalent during all phases of this operation. The communication checks scheduled in the operation order were not sufficient to insure reliable Task Group communications.

#### Recommendation

Conduct comprehensive communication checks involving, where feasible, the entire Task Group and commencing 48 hours prior to start of scheduled exercises. These checks should be continued until all units have their equipment operating properly, and have an assured capability of satisfactorily meeting all anticipated communication demands.

#### Comment

The number of circuits that the task group was required to guard or be prepared to come up on was considered excessive. A minimum amount of "backing up" of circuits was possible, thus decreasing reliability appreciably. The number and type of circuits to be used presents quite a problem when the destroyer element assigned is composed of mixed DD's and DE's with variations in the amount and type of communication equipment available.

#### Recommendation

That a Communications Officer planning conference be held prior to preparation of the basic communication plan with a view toward writing a communication plan within the effective capacity of all units, stressing the guarding of the minimum number of circuits possible rather than the maximum number that might possibly be used.





#### (2) Radio

#### (a) CW

## DECLASSIFIED

#### Comment

Circuit discipline and procedure on Task Group Common was below standard. A shortage of properly trained personnel, plus an absence of positive control considerably reduced the speed of this circuit. A need for closer supervision is indicated.

## Recommendation

Added emphasis must be placed on training those lower rated men currently required to occupy supervisory billets. Only knowledge and experience will create the confidence necessary to properly man a busy circuit.

#### (b) Voice

#### Comment

It was noted that many ships failed to take adequate steps to reduce feed back and background noise, which in some cases almost completely blocked out transmissions.

### Recommendation

Implement Bridge and CIC noise level reduction programs. Reemphasize (to all personnel concerned) the importance of handset and speaker volume control.

#### Comment

In spite of specific instructions to use plain language in contact reports, the use of specialized terms such as "goblin" and "sinker" from ACP 165 was noted on several occasions. The meaning of these and other specialized code words from ACP 165 is not a matter of common knowledge to all destroyer personnel, and their use results in some confusion and their exact meaning is ascertained only after searching hurriedly through ACP 165.

#### Recommendation

That plain language be used for initial contact reports. That ACP 165 be the subject of additional training in all units which might be assigned to H/K duties.

## (3) Visual

## Comment

The inability to clear traffic with reasonable speed when Nancy equipment was used, continues to point out the need for intensive training in this phase of visual communications.

### Recommendation

Require the establishment and furtherance of Nancy (in port) drill circuits.





#### C. Personnel

## (1) Adequacy

#### Comment

During this operation the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) was designated as UTC and a staff was not on board to conduct the exercises. In the preparation for and in the carrying out of the operation it became apparent that the present allowance of officers for a Hunter/Killer CVE is not sufficient to permit adequate planning and execution of this type of operation concurrently with proper performance of assigned ship board duties. This condition is most noticeable in the Operations Department especially in connection with the preparation of the Operation Order, necessary liaison with other units assigned, and the actual conduct of the operation. The lack of sufficient qualified personnel to adequately perform the additional duties on the bridge in connection with OTC responsibilities also became very apparent, particularly when unexpected situations developed. The JOOD was assigned primarily as Tactical Communicator and secondarily to his regular duties. He was also required (1) to keep a communication and a raid Status Board, (2) maintain a Tactical Status Board and Plot, and (3) supervise the CCE-sub circuit in the absence of the submarine liaison officer. It was learned that these duties could not adequately be performed by the JOOD without special intensive training. One additional LCDR was assigned on temparary duty in the Operations Department to aid in preparation of the Operation Order, to assist in liaison and especially to provide necessary additional help in carrying out CIC and ASW evaluator functions. It is felt that the following officers are necessary to carry out adequately the functions of the Operations Department in conducting a Hunter Killer Exercise without

CDR - Operations
LCDR - Ass't Operation - Air Operations
LCDR - ASW Officer - CIC
LT - CIC - ASW

4 LTJG - Air Controllers (One alternates Air Plot Watch)

3 ENS - Junior CIC watch Officers

1 LT - Air Intelligence

1 LT - Communications
1 LTJG - Aerologist

a staff on board.

6 ENS - CWO





#### Recommendation

A comparison of the present officer allowance of the Operations Department CVE type, with the recommended allowance set forth above indicates the need for two additional officers, a LCDR and a LTJG, if the CVE is to carry out Hunter Killer Operations without a Staff on board. It is recommended that the CVE officer allowance be modified accordingly.

#### Comment

The submarine liaison officer aboard during this exercise aided the UTC materially in the efficient control of the submarines.

### Recommendation

An experienced submarine liaison officer should be assigned the OTC for all Hunter Killer exercises being conducted without Staff supervision.





## (2) Training

## DECLASSIFIED

#### Comment

An officer from each ship of Des Div Ill was aboard the BAIROKO to act as observer during the Hunter Killer operation, and it is believed that those officers were able to gain valuable information concerning the coordination required between the CVE and the destroyers assigned in this type of an operation. The BAIROKO was not able to send any officers to the destroyers or submarines for observation of their operations during this period, but it is intended to do so if the opportunity arises.

## Recommendation

It is felt that the practice of exchanging officers between various types provides very valuable training, and it is recommended that continued emphasis be placed upon this program.





## 3. Summary of Recommendations

- a. Corpen signals be used for maneuvering into or out of the wind incident to Air Operations to provide maximum training for screen.
- b. ASW Hunter Killer exercises in the San Diego area be scheduled and conducted in the Western most portion of the operating area.
- c. Submarines continue to use diving lights at night to aid attacking ships in making an evaluation.
- d. Submarines go down as soon as it becomes apparent that they are under attack and not delay at periscope depth thus causing destroyers to break off attack in the interest of safety.
- e. Stress be placed on the high defensive and offensive merit of a SAU executing frequent turn signals when approaching a submarine contact area.
- f. Aircraft teams be relieved on station if at all practicable.
- g. Requirement for continuous radar surveillance of airborne teams be eliminated if good radio communication exists.
- h. Change the term "General Submarine Instructions" to "General Submarine Restrictions".
- i. Maintain the airborne team in general vicinity of the SAU when surface action is in progress.
- j. Schedule and carry out events with sufficient time between events to permit good separation between Carrier Element and submarines.
- k. OTC and SAU Commanders be cognizant of fact that submarines may be operating as a team, and that present submarine doctrine places increased emphasis on offensive action.
- 1. Submarines be permitted to use advanced evasion devises to the massimum extent possible.
- m. Submarine transit exercises be set up to allow submarines a larger operating area and more latitude of action.
- n. Airborne teams be given full opportunity to develop all contacts.







- o. Continued heavy emphasis be placed on ECM training and exercises.
- p. OTC establish best estimated reference position for use of entire group in conducting each exercise.
- q. Conduct comprehensive communication checks at least 48 hours prior to commencing operation and continue until all communications are satisfactorily established.
- r. Communication officers hold planning conference prior to writing communication plan with view toward the resultant communications plan being mutually satisfactory and the simplest possible under the circumstances.
- s. Added emphasis be placed on training the lower rated communication personnel now required to occupy supervisory billets.
- t. Implement bridge and CIC noise level reduction programs.
- u. Stress the use of plain language for initial contact reports on tactical circuits.
- v. Establishment of and emphasis on Nancy in-port drills.
- w. Increase allowance of operations department officers by one (1) LCDR, and one (1) LTJG if CVE is to conduct Hunter/Killer operations without a staff aboard.
- x. Assign submarine liaison officer to aid OTC when CVE conducting Hunter/Killer operations without a Staff aboard.
- y. Continue the program of exchanging officers on a temporary basis between various types in order to further mutual understanding of problems involved in Hunter/Killer operations.



20

#### DI STRIBUTION

By Air Mail to:			
CNO (Op 31) CincPacFlt ComSubPac	(2) (2) (2)	(orig. via COMAIRPAC)	
By Mail To:			
CinClantFlt ComAirLant ComHukLant ComDesLant ComOpDevFor CO, SurAsDevDet CO, VX-1 OinC USNAVSUBSCOL,NewLon. ComDesRon 1 ComDesRon 5 ComDesRon 7 ComDesRon 9 ComDesRon 13 ComDesRon 15 ComDesRon 17 ComCortDesRon 17 ComCortRon 7 ComGortRon 9 ComCortRon 11 ComDesRon 2 ComDesRon 2 ComDesRon 3 ComSubFlot 1 ComSubRon 3 ComSubDiv 31 ComSubDiv 32  By Guard Mail To:	(1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1	CommestSeaFron (1) ComMestSeaFron (1) ComAlSeaFron (1) ComHawSeaFron (1) ComNavMarianas (1) ComNavPhil (1) ComNavFe (1) ComCarDiv 1 (1) ComCarDiv 5 (1) ComCarDiv 15 (2) ComCarDiv 15 (2) ComFairAlameda (1) ComFairSeattle (1) ComFairJapan (1) ComFairJapan (1) ComFairWing 1 (1) ComFairWing 2 (1) ComFairWing 4 (1) ComFairWing 6 (1) ComFairWing 14 (1) ComDesFlot 1 (1) ComDesFlot 3 (1) ComDesDiv 32 (1) U.S.S. ROMBACH (DV-364) (1)	
ComAirPac ComCruDesPac Con.TraComPac CO, FLESONARSCOL SHIEGO CO, FAIRBETUPAC ComFirstFlt ComCarDiv 17 ComDesRon 11 ComCortRon 3 ComDesDiv 111 ComSubFlot 1	(2) (2) (2) (2) (1) (2) (1) (1) (1)	ComsubDiv 52 CO, U.S.S. WILTSIE (DD-716) CO, U.S.S. THEODORE E. CHANDLER (DD-717) CO, U.S.S. HAMNER (DD-718) CO, U.S.S. CHEVALIER (DDR-806) CO, U.S.S. FECHTELER (DD-870) CO, U.S.S. GEORGE (DE-697) CO, AirAsRon 23 (VS-23) CO, USS REDFISH (SS-395) CO, USS CHARR (SS-328)	(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)



					•
11.5	Hunt	er/Kille	er Group	CAPT L. T. MORSE	(1488)
	(a)	11.50	CARRIER ELEMENT	CAPT L. T. MORSE	(1488) 1 CVE
			BAIROKO (CVE-115) VS-23 Helicopter Unit Plane Guard Destroyers	CAPT L. T. MORSE CDR J. C. ZIRKLE	(1488) (5409) 18 TBM
			riale duard bestroyers	as designated	
	(b)	11.51	DESTROYER FLEMENT	CAPT C. M. DALTON	(1163)
			CemDesRon 11	CAPT C. M. DALTON	(1163)
			DesDiv 111 WILTSIE (DD-716) THEODORE E. CHANDLER (DD-717)		4 DD (4036) (5612)
			HAMNER (DD-718) CHEVALIER (DDR-806)		(3951) (4417)
			FECHTELER (DD-870)	CDR F. GRIME Jr.	(5412) 1 DD
			ComCortRon 3	CDR M. S. SCHMIDLI	NG (2886)
			CortRon 3 GEORGE (DE-697)	LCOR C. E. MCMULLE	1 DE N (10476)
			ROMBACH (DE-364)	LCDR W. T. DAVERN	(9379) l DE
	(c)	11.52	SUBMARINE ELEMENT	CDR B. A. CLAREY	(2653) 2 SS
		·	REDFISH (SS-395) CHARR (SS-328)	LCDR J. P. BIENIA LCDR R. B. POAGE	



Enclosure (1)



Event 1 Unopposed sortie from San Diego.

080640U - 081400U (7 hours, 20 min.) Duration

Narrative The sortie was completed by 0809000. Circular screen formed. The FECHTELER joined the screen at 11200 from Long Beach. Formed bent-line screen 206 at 13300.





Event 2 Exercise 15-3. Task Group search for and Hunter/Killer Operations against submarines in a general area.

<u>Duration</u> 0814000 to 0823000 (9 hours).

Results
SS contacts - 6 (3 air, 2 sonar, 1 surface, visual).
Destroyer Attacks - 32 (9 excellent, 1 good, 17 fair, 5 poor).
Submarine Attacks - 5 (2 excellent, 2 good, 1 fair).

#### Narrative

- 1400 Exercise commenced. The Task Group proceeded with bent-line screen. Launched and maintained 2 VAW-VA teams airborne throughout the exercise (search plan 4 MB). Numerous radar contacts were made and investigated by the A/C, however none were developed into SS contacts.
- Initial contact with SS occured when the CHARR made two successive attacks on the BAIROKO and the CHEVALIER.

  SAU-1 was detached as the Task Group turned away.

  SAU-1 remained separated from the force and in the contact area for the remainder of the exercise, during which time, 17 attacks were made. Contact was lost 10 times, and regained through the use of Operation Tomato, area and spiral searches. At 2103 SAU-1 ceased making attacks, and surfaced the submarine. The CHARR conducted 5 (4 DD, 1 CVE) attacks during this 7 hour period. A/C search and attack teams did not contribute to the results of SAU-1's operations.
- SS REDFISH visually sighted the ship's masts after first sighting smoke from one ship. With periscope and radar (SV) mast up, the REDFISH tracked and attempted to close the T.G. At 1700 A/C closed to 700 yards without detecting the REDFISH who was in position to observe launching operations aboard the CVE. At 1741 the REDFISH surfaced, but submerged again at 1745 as A/C closed. Attack aircraft were unable to make any contacts following radar contact by the GUPPY.
- 1810 The GEORGE sighted a light ahead of the ROMBACH which was investigated and reported to be a flare. At this time the GEORGE heard BBB on its sonar, signifying attack by SS. The GEORGE gained sonar contact at 1820 and C.T.G. 11.5 directed detachment of a 3 ship SAU. SAU-2 conducted repeated attacks on the REDFISH during the next 2 hours, at which time contact was lost. A/C search and attack teams did not contribute to the results of SAU-2's operation.





Event 3 Night Steaming and ECM Exercise.

<u>Duration</u> 082300 - 090500 (6 hours.)

Narrative The U.S.S. HAMNER was designated as target ship. Radar silence condition one was set to be effective for the first ten minutes of each fifteen commencing on the hour. Twenty four reports were requested from the 3 reporting ships, for a total of 72 possible RENT reports. Fifteen reports (or 19%) were received and two reports did not include bearings.





Event 4 Exercise 15-1. Task Group Transit of Submarine Patrol Area.

<u>Duration</u> 090800U - 091100U ( 3 hours ).

Results Submarine Contacts - 2 (sonar).

Destroyer attacks - 21 (4 excellent, 3 good, 4 fair,

3 poor. 7 not evaluated).

Submarine attacks - 2 (1 fair, 1 excellent).

#### <u>Narrative</u>

- O800 The Task Group proceeded with bent-line screen and 2 search and attack teams airborne throughout the exercise. "Submarines" submerged and positioned themselves for coordinated attack. At O917, the CHARR sighted a DD and sent a contact report to the REDFISH, whereupon both SS commenced approach.
- O937 The CHAN DLFR made initial contact with REDFISH when she sighted a green flare. The CHANDLER commenced an urgent attack, as the REDFISH simulated an attack on the BAIROKO (evaluated fair). SAU-1 was designated and dispatched. Initial sonar contact with the REDFISH was made by the GEORGE at 0953 and SAU-1 attacked and reattacked the REDFISH until 1119 when the OTC directed "Cease Exercise". A/C played no contributing part in SAU-1's operation.
- The WILTSIE (in the screen) made initial sonar contact on the CHARR and commenced an urgent attack as the CHARR conducted a simulated attack on the BAIROKO (evaluated excellent). The WILTSIE broke off reattack on the CHARR as the subs periscope remained visible. At 1044 the CHARR simulated an attack on the WILTSIE (evaluated excellent), as the WILTSIE commenced a deliberate attack. The WILTSIE continued single ship attacks on the CHARR until the end of the exercise at 1119. Only 3 DD attacks were completed. (1 excellent, 2 poor). A/C search and attack teams played no contributing part in the WILTSIE's operation.





Event 5 Exercise 15-3. Task Group search for and Hunter/Killer operations against submarines in a general area.

<u>Duration</u> 091200U - 092300U (11 hours).

Results Submarine contacts - 13 (9 air, 4 sonar).

Air attacks - 1

Destroyer attacks - 8

#### Narrative

1200 The Task Group continued with a bent-line screen formation, and 2 search and attack teams airborne conducting search plan 4 MB throughout the exercise.

The CHARR and REDFISH submerged, the CHARR to snorkel and the REDFISH to simulate snorkeling by remaining at periscope depth with periscopes and SV mast extended. A GUPPY A/C made a series of radar contacts, but due to sea return was unable to hold until an attack A/C reached scene. At 1520 following one of these intermittent radar contact the GUPPY visually sighted the CHARR at 1000 yards and the attack A/C made an immediate class A attack (evaluated successful).

1523 Upon receipt of the attack report from the A/C, the OTC directed SAU-1 to be formed and detached. SAU-1 formed abreast, separation 3000 yards, and proceeded to contact area, receiving an "on top" mark from the A/C at 1537. Two minutes later CTU 11.51.1 assumed command of the contact area and started Spiral Search Plan 7H. Shortly thereafter the REDFISH simulated firing torpedoes into the left DD of the SAU (the WILTSIE) as she turned toward the SS. The REDFISH then turned away, presented stern tubes and simulated firing 2 MK 28 homing torpedoes at the WILTSIE. The CHEVALIER and the CHANDLER commenced weaving when the WILTSIE was detached. At 1557 the CHARR simulated an attack on the CHEVALIER and at 1558 sonar contact was gained on both the REDFISH and the CHARR by the WILTSIE and CHEVALIER respectively. The REDFISH fired a false target shell at this time, however, SAU-1 was able to hold contact on both Submarines until they were ordered to break off attacks and surface the submarines at 1620.

1636-1645 The submarines were surfaced and the entire group was repositioned to recommence the exercise.





An attack plane made radar and then visual contact on submarine but due to malfunctioning of searchlight, no attack was made. The aircraft were unable to develop any further contacts and the submarines were unable to close to attack the force as the exercise ended at 2300. The sea state and searchlight malfunctions contributed largely to the inability of aircraft to locate and successfully investigate suspicious radar contacts.





Event 6 Night steaming and ECM Exercises.

<u>Duration</u> 092300U - 100500U (6 hours).

Narrative
The CHEVALIER and the HAMNER acted as target ships.
Radar silence Condition One was set as in Event 3.
Twenty four RENT reports were requested from the 3 ships, a total of 72 possible reports. Sixteen reports (or 22%) were received. One report did not include bearings.





Event 7 Exercise 15-3. Task Group Search for and Hunter/ Killer Operations against submarines in a general area.

<u>Duration</u> 100800U - 102200U (14 hours).

Results
Submarine contacts 7 (3 sonar, 4 air).
Sonobuoy patterns 1
Destroyer attacks 16

#### Narrative

- 0800 The first launch was delayed due to weather (fog).
- 0930 Launched 2 search and attack teams (search plan 4 MB).
- 1318 The REDFISH made visual contact on the force and at 1330 a GUPPY A/C made radar contact on a submarine 8 miles ahead of the screen. This information was reported to the other team, located nearer the contact. The second GUPPY gained and then lost radar contact but saw the submarine submerge.
- 1339 SAU-1 was detached, and at 1346 reported "Contact Hot". Transfer of information between A/C and SAU Commander was effected, and at 1359 Operation RADISH was started with 2 DD's while the third began an Operation Tomato. The ROMBACH made contact at 1404 and SAU-1 conducted a series of 2 coordinated attacks before losing contact at 1420. Operation Tomato was conducted and the ROMBACH regained contact after which four successive attacks were made on the REDFISH prior to her surfacing at 1511.
- 1530 The problem resumed and from 1530 1920 the A/C received and investigated 3 radar contacts, and attempted unsuccessfully to confirm them with searchlight. It was not until 1920 that an attack plane dropped a sono-buoy pattern to prove its observation. The sonobuoy pattern produced no substantiating information and both A/C teams resumed normal search plan at 1936. Earlier during this period the REDFISH observed a searchlight probing the water off his port bow.
- 2030 The CHARR sighted the Task Group bearing 238 distance 9 miles and commenced an approach.
- 2032 Attack A/C made four search-light runs following radar contacts by the GUPPY, but failed to sight the submarine.





- The REDFISH made radar contact on an A/C closing. She turned on a submerged floodlight on the bow which was visually sighted by the aircraft, however the A/C was unable to identify due to in-operative searchlight.
- Aircraft were ordered to investigate a contact bearing 340 distance 12 miles which was identified as a submarine on the surface, course 190 speed 10 knots. At 2205 the GEORGE made radar contact on a surfaced submarine which was identified by the A/C as the REDFISH as the problem ended.





Event 8 Night steaming and ECM Exercises.

<u>Duration</u> 102300U - 110500U (6 hours).

Narrative The U.S.S. HAMNER acted target ship.

Radar silence Condition One was set as for previous ECM Exercises. Twenty four RENT reports were requested from each of the 3 ships taking part, a total of 72 possible reports. 26 reports (or 36%) were received, and several fixes were obtained.



Event 9 Exercise 15-2 Task Group Search for and Hunter/Killer operation against submarines.

<u>Duration</u> 110800U - 120800U (24 hours).

Results Submarine contacts - 17 (12 air, 5 sonar).

Air attacks - 2 Sonobuoy patterns - 5 Destroyer attacks - 8

#### Narrative

The exercise commenced with the REDFISH located within 0800 a circle 30 miles in diameter, 170 miles from its destination, while the CHARR was located within a similar circle, but 188 miles from the same destination. The centers of each circle were 18 miles apart and the Task Group was located within a circle 25 miles in diameter whose center was midway between the centers of the submarine circles. Two search and attack teams were launched to drop and patrol a sonobuoy barrier pattern. This pattern consisted of 14 sonobuoys spaced 2 miles apart and extending along a tangent to the near edge of the REDFISH's circle. This drop was completed by 0825, but there were no indications of submarine transit of the pattern. There was one unsubstantiated report of belllike noises on one sonobuoy.

- O830 Between completion of the initial sonobuoy drop and 1830, numerous radar contacts were made by A/C teams but, although sonobuoy patterns were dropped on two separate occasions, no contacts were developed.
- 1830 The aircraft picked up a radar contact which immediately disappeared and was evaluated as a submarine. A sonobuoy pattern was laid at point of submergence and although no cavitation was heard, machinery noises were identified at 1835.
- 1844 SAU-1 composed of HAMNER, CHANDLER and WILTSIE, was detached to investigate contact held by aircraft. Contact was established with the aircraft and information was exchanged.





- 1948 The REDFISH made contact on approaching SAU-1 and shortly after went down to 200 feet. As SAU-1 entered the contact area command, the WILTSIE was detached to investigate possible sonar contact to East of estimated datum point while the CHANDLER and HAMNER continued on to the datum.
- The WILTSIE evaluated the contact as a submarine and commenced D/C attack. From 2006 to 2016 the WILTSIE completed 3 attacks against the REDFISH. (One excellent, one fair, and one poor). At 2014 the HAMNER was directed to assist the WILTSIE while the CHANDLER conducted an area search. The WILTSIE and the HAMNER conducted coordinated attacks reporting contact "hot" until 2021. The aircraft were conducting a box area search during the above action.
- 2032 Contact was lost by SAU-1, and after commencement of Operation Tomato contact was reported "cold." At 2108 SAU-1 commenced an area search and resumed weaving. SAU-1 continued to search without success until 0013 when it was directed to rejoin the force and investigate a surface contact enroute which a search team had discovered but had been unable to develop. This contact was eventually evaluated as weather and SAU-1 rejoined the force at 0352.
- 0005 An airborne team made radar contact at 8 miles from the force and investigated without success. The contact was evaluated as a submarine. Future developments proved this contact to be the CHARR. SAU-2 composed of the ROMBACH and the GEORGE were detached to investigate the above contact. At 0046 SAU-2 marked datum time and commenced Operation Tomato which was completed without contact. At Oll5 the aircraft working with SAU-2 made contact again and were investigating while SAU-2 commenced Operation Radish. At 0204 SAU-2 ceased Operation Radish and proceeded to investigate the contact held by the aircraft. SAU-2 passed the new datum point at 0230 and commenced another Operation Radish., From 0300. when CHARR recommenced snorkeling, until 0626 when SAU-1 relieved SAU-2 the GEORGE held intermittent radar and sonar contact on the CHARR at ranges varying from 3 miles to 1400 yards, but could not identify due to lack of illumination. Aircraft teams vectored to the scene were not effective due to radio and radar failures. The GEORGE also was having only intermittent sonar operation, and the CHARR did not take full evasive measures because of non-metalic return on sonar contact.





- O600 SAU-1 composed of the WILTSIE and the HAMNER were detached to replace SAU-2 which was now composed of only the GEORGE due to detachment of the ROMBACH at 0400. SAU-1 relieved SAU-2 at 0626 and was immediately attacked by the CHARR. The HAMNER and the WILTSIE completed 4 D/C attacks and 1 ahead thrown weapons attack. At 0705 SAU-1 broke off the attacks and surfaced the CHARR.
- The REDFISH submerged due to approaching aircraft and at 0649 a class "A" attack was delivered ahead of wake by attack aircraft. Two practice depth charges were dropped, followed by a 5 buoy sonobuoy pattern. No cavitation was received from the sonobuoy pattern, and the team resumed search pattern at 0712. No SAU was sent to this contact due to approaching end of exercise.
- 0800 End of Event 9.
- 0804 REDFISH surfaced.





### WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING HUNTER/KILLER OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD 8 DECEMBER THROUGH 12 DECEMBER 1952

Event No.	Date/Time (Uncle)	Position (32° N. Lat.)	SKY	CEIL.	VIS.	WIND	SEA	REMARKS
1	Underway from Har	bor	B <b>ro</b> ken	3500	15	E 8	Slt.	
2	08/1400-2200	118-119°W.	Setd.	Unl.	10	N.N.W.	Mod.	
3	08/2300 <b>-</b> 09/0500	118-1200W.	Clear	Unl.	10	15 N.N.W. 18	Mod.	<b>-</b>
4	09/0800-1100	120°W.	Clear	Unl.	8	N.N.W. 18	Mod.	Lgt. Haze
5	09/1200-2300	120°W.	Clear	Unl.	10	N.N.W. 15	Mod.	
6	09/2400-	120 <b>°</b> W.	Clear	Ųnl.	10	N. 20	Mod.	
	10/0300 10/0300-0500		Broken	Unl.	2	N. 20	Mod.	Fog. & Stratus.
7	10/0800-1009	122°W.	Broken	600	3	N. 18	Mod.	Fog & Stratus.
	1000-1400 1400-2200	122 <b>°</b> W. 121 <b>°</b> W.	Broken Broken	-		N. 16 N.N.W. 18	Mod.	Wind to 25
8	10/2300-	121°W.	Broken	Unl.	8	$N_1N_1v_1$	Mod.	Max. Wind 26
9	11/0500 11/0800-1100 11/1200-1400 11/1500-1900 11/1900-12/0500 12/0500-0800	122°W. 122°W. 121°W. 121°W. 119°W. 118°W.	Sctd. Broken Cléar Clear Clear	Unl. 800 Unl. Unl. Unl.	10 10 10	22 N.W. 18 N.W. 18 N.W. 18 N.N.W.	Mod. Mod. 10 Mod.	Max. Wind 26  Slight Haze Slight Haze
Fly-a	-way 12/1000U		Clear	Unl.	2	N. 10	Mod.	Slight Haze

Enclosure





### TABULATED EVALUATION OF SUBMARINE TORPEDO ATTACKS

DATE/TIME	EVENT NO.	SUBM ARINE	TARGET	SUBMARINE'S EVALUATION
081448	2	CHARR	BAIROKO	FAIR
081502	2	CHARR	CHEVALLUR	EXCELLENT
081517	2	CHARR	CHEVALIER	EXCELLENT
081758	2	CHARR	UNK DD	GOOD
081811	2	CHARR	UNK DD	GOOD
081814	2	REDFISH	UNK DD	EXCELLENT
090942	4 *	REDFISH	BAI POKO	FAIR
091040	4 *	CHARR	BAIROKO	EXCELLENT
091044	4 *	CHARR	WILTSIE	EXCELLENT .
091549	5 *	REDFISH	WILTSIE	FAIR
091552	5 *	REDFISH	WILTSIE	EXCELLENT
091557	5 *	CHARR	CHEVALIER	GOOD

<sup>\*</sup> The two submarines operated as a team during all of EVENTS 4 and 5

Enclosure 3(B)



U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) c/o Fluet Post Office San Francisco, California

In reply refer to: 6 / 1/7 LTM:PIM:ss

CVE-115/10 Ser: 0113

10 June 1953

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

Germanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1

Chief of Naval Operations

Via:

(1) Commander Task Group 95.1

(2) Commander Task Force 95

(3) Commander SEVENTH Float

(4) Commander Naval Forces. Far East

(5) Commander in Chief. Pacific Fleet

Subj:

Action Report 14 May through 21 May 1953; submission of

Ref:

(a) Art. 0705 Navy Regulations

(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

(d) CfG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

DECLASSIFIED

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule - P. 17

(2) Weather Summary - Pile

- 1. In accordance with references (a) through (d), the action report of Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 14 May through 21 May 1953 is submitted. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 14 May until 2100 21 May 1953.
- 2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

Part I - General Narrative.

Part II - Chronological Order of Events.

Part III - Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equip-

ment, including ammunition expenditures.

Part IV - Summary of own and enemy battle damage. - Personnel performance and casualties.

Part VI - Special comments on doctrine and operational procedures.

3. Information concerning aircraft performance is contained in greater detail in the Naval Air Warfare reports for May 1953, submitted by VMA-312, in accordance with OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1.

### PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

(A) During the period 14 May through 21 May 1953, the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) under the command of Captain L. T. MORSE, USN, 62712/1310, with Marine Aircraft Squadron VMA-312 embarked, operated as part of the U.S. SEVENTH Float in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 21001 14 May to 21001 21 May 1953. At this time, the command of the Task Unit shifted to the



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SECURITY INFORMATION

Commanding Officer of the HMS OCEAN. During this reporting period, Task Unit 95.1.1 consisted of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) and a daily maximum of four (4) United Nations escort vessels. The following ships operated in Task Unit 95.1.1 during this patrol:

HMS COSSACK (DD-57)

HMCS CRUSADER (DD-228)

U.S.S. THOMAS (DD-883)

U.S.S. HIGBEE (DD-806)

U.S.S. TAYLOR (DDE-468)

Normally, only three ships were available for screening purposes daily, since the fourth ship was provided nightly to CTU 95.1.2 for patrols along enemy held coastline.

- (B) Mission. To aid in enforcing the blockade of the West Coast of Korea, south of Latitude 39° 35' N., to prevent ingress or egress, mining, or supply or reinforcement by sea; to aid in the defense of the occupied West Coast islands, to provide air support to U.N. Naval Forces, and to contribute to the interdiction effort against enemy land forces.
- (C) The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) sailed independently from Sasebo, Japan at 0600I 14 May as directed by CTG 95.1 dispatch 130515Z of May. At 0900I, the HMS COCKADE joined the formation to act as escort until rendezvous with HMS GLORY that evening. Lew ceilings in area George, and instrument flying weather at Itazuke Air Force Base, forced cancellation of the firing exercises scheduled for 1000I. At 2100I the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) assumed the duties of CTU 95.1.1. Rendezvous was effected with the HMS GLORY at 2125I and the HMS COCKADE was detached to accompany her to Sasebo. HMCS CRUSADER and the U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND joined the Task Unit at 0038I 15 May.
- (D) At 0530I, 15 May, the Task Unit commenced dawn to dusk air operations, operating in the vicinity of 37° 30' N. and 124° 30' E. and retiring southward during the night. The position of Pt. Obce, normally located about thirty five (35) miles off the coast of North Korca, was changed daily to reduce the flying time to the target area and to avoid a consistent morning position. Normally, eight (8) launches were made daily at one hour and forty five minute intervals, with six (6) aircraft in each launch. A two (2) plane CAP was provided on each launch and the four (4) strike aircraft flew missions as assigned. One flight of four (4) aircraft was assigned daily to CTU 95.1.2 for TARCAF while the remaining flights attacked pre-briefed targets. A conference was held each day around 1700 to review the results of the days strikes and to discuss the next day's schedule. On the 16th of May, U.S. Army members of the Fifth Partisan Infantry Regiment flow aboard by C.O.D. aircraft, to brief all personnel concerned in preparation of close air support for a raid to be conducted at dawn on the 18th.



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- (E) Flying weather was good during this patrol with the exception of one and one half  $(\frac{1}{2})$  days when rain, fog, and low visibility curtailed operations. On several occasions, haze conditions over the target area, made effective target determination difficult. A more detailed weather summary is included as enclosure (2).
- (F) No indication of increased military activity was evident during this period. Attempts by the enemy to transport personnel and material by water were un-reported, therefore no effort was requested nor expended to curtail such activities. Aircraft reconnaissance and intelligence received from other sources indicated no concerted effort on the part of the enemy to attack the U.N. centrolled islands off the Korean West Coast. However, isolated and relatively small concentrations of troops throughout the area were hit as soon as their presence was indicated. Considerable evidence of new installations of coastal defense weapons in the Taedong Estuary was reported. Three (3) emergency TARCAPS were requested by Task Unit 95.1.4, to suppress shore fire originating from uncharted gun positions. All targets of military significance in this area are extremely well camouflaged. No movement of men or material was noted during daylight hours. Three (3) flights, which supplied close air support for Partisan raids. were the only aircraft to sight troops and military vehicles moving during this period in the area south of the Tacdong Estuary. In the area surrounding the Taedong Estuary, considerable buildup of coastal defense artillery was evidenced by the increased fire on patrolling vessels from caves along the enemy coastlines. Serties in this area were conducted to conform with Fifth Air Force Sabre sweeps and were limited accordingly. Considerable flak was encountered during these missions.
- (G) No enemy aircraft were encountered by aircraft of Task Unit 95.1.1 during this patrol. Although casualties to enemy troops were inflicted, no accurate assessment can be made at this time. Later Partisan reports are expected to supply some of this information. Part II of this report contains a flight-by-flight assessment of damage inflicted. The following summary is an itemized listing of damage submitted for easy reference:

TARGET	DAMAGED	DESTROYED
Buildings Gun Positions	15 5	120 6
Suppl <b>y Sh</b> elters Warehouses	4 1	24 1
Gun Caves Revetted Buildings	4 2	
Road Bridges Tractors	1	



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(H) Aircraft of this unit were airborne from dawn to dusk each day when weather permitted. VMa-312 pilots flew an average of two (2) sorties per day. A summary of hours and sorties flown is included below.

TYPE	NO. SORTIES	HOURS
CAP	72	147.2
Strikes	111	213.6
Armed Recco.	25	49.6
ngs	2	3.6
Tarcap	20	37.9
CAS (	25 Total: ,255	<u>53.7</u> 505.6

### TART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

#### 14 May

0600I Underway from Bucy 18, Sasebo.

0900I Rendezvoused with the HMS COCKADE.

1000I Anti-aircraft firing scheduled for this time was cancelled when unfavorable flying conditions at Itazuke AFB prevented the tew plane from effecting the rendezvous.

12321 Four (4) Squadron aircraft from Itami AFB were recovered.

2100I Captain L. T. MORSE, USN, 62712/1310, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) assumed command of Task Unit 95.1.1.

2125I Rendezvous with the HMS GIORY was effected, and the HMS COCKADE was detached to escert her to Sasebo, The U.S.S. H. J. THOMAS (DDR-883) was detached by the GIORY at this time to act as escert for the BAIROKO.

### 15 May

0038I The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DIR-742) and HMCS CRUSAGER (DIE-228) rendezvoused with the formation enroute to area Nan.

0530I Commanced air operations. Launched event "A" consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft were assigned the primary target of gun positions on the shoreline of Taedong Bay. The pilots reported that the gun positions were hit, but no damage assement was reported.




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- 0725I Launched event "B" consisting of six (6) F4U's. The feur (4) strike aircraft were assigned a troop concentration in a village mear Haeju as a primary target. This target was bembed and a read bridge leading into the village was damaged. No further assessment of the damage was made.
- O855I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft were assigned the Han River recco. as a primary mission. The flight destroyed two, and damaged one revetted building in the Haeju area, and destroyed two and damaged one building on the South Coast of Taadong Bay.
- 1040I Launched event "D", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a truck park North of Hasju. The area was well covered with bombs and napalm, but no damage assessment was made.
- 12051 Detached the HMCS CRUSADER to proceed on Whitbread patrol.
- 1225I Launched event "E", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft were assigned to Task Unit 95.1.4 as TARCAP. The flight attacked gun positions in the Taedong Estuary. No damage assessment was made, however, the pilots reported the positions well covered by their attacks.
- 12501 HMS COSSACK rejoined the formation from Whitbread patrol.
- 1410I Launched event "F", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a troop concentration northeast of Choppeki Point and destroyed ten (10) buildings.
- 1555I Launched event "G", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike alreraft attacked a troop concentration on the coast south of Cho-do and destroyed four (4) buildings.
- 1745I Launched event "H", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a rail bridge north of Haeju and inflicted one (1) railcut.
- 1930I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

### <u>16 May</u>

- 02001 The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DIR-742) was detached for fueling.
- 0530I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a village housing troops in the Cho-do area. Eleven buildings were destroyed in this buildup area and an undetermined number of casualties were inflicted on enemy troops.



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- 0710I Launched event "B", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft conducted a Hanchon recco. A troop concentration north of Chinnampo was attacked and nine (9) buildings were destroyed. Two (2) gun positions in this area were damaged.
- 0815I The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND rejoined the formation.
- 0900I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a road bridge east of Choppeki point. The bridge was not damaged, but two (2) road cuts were inflicted.
- 0930I HMCS CRUSAUER rejoined the formation from Whitbread patrol.
- 1000I The U.S.S HIGBEE (DDR-806), joined the unit and relieved the U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DDR-742), who was detached to COMDESRON-5 to proceed as he directed.
- Launched event "D", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. Two (2) air-craft were assigned to Task Unit 95.1.2 for the purpose of gunfire spotting. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked gun positions in caves along the coastline south of Choppeki point. Seven (7) small buildings were destroyed and two (2) caves were closed by bombing.
- 12001 The U.S.S. THOMAS (DIR-883) was detached to proceed on Whitbread patrol.
- 1230I Launched event "E", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft conducted a Han River recco. A troop concentration in a village at the mouth of the Han River was attacked. Eleven (11) buildings were destroyed in the attack.
- 1415I Launched event "F", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a transformer west of Haeju. Six thousand (6000) pounds of bombs were delivered in the attack with an assessment of only slight damage to the transformer reported.
- 1600I Launched event "G", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a command post in the Taedong Bay area. Slight damage was inflicted. The position proved to be well entrenched and flak was quite intense.
- 1745I Launched event "H", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a troop housing area south of Haeju. No damage assessment was made.
- 1930I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.





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### 17 May

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- O545I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft provided close air support for the Fifth Partisan Regiment. Under positive control of the ground observers, the flight destroyed four (4) mortar positions and closed one (1) cave. The assault area was a peninsula north of Kyodong-do in the Han River Estuary.
- O659I Launched event "B", consisting of four (4) F4U's, to relieve the close air support circraft on station. This flight knocked out one (1) gun position that was firing on the Partisan withdrawal. North Korean troops were strafed and bombed repeatedly by the aircraft. Flak was light but accurate over the assault area.
- O812I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft provided close air support for the final stages of the Partisan raid. The flight expended its remaining ordnance on "Little Moscow", the Communist party headquarters in the assault area.
- 0927I Launched event "D", consisting of six (6) F4U's. Four (4) strike aircraft were assigned to Task Unit 95.1.4 as TARCAP. The aircraft made repeated runs on gun positions in the Taedong Estuary. Flak was encountered and no damage assessment was made.
- 1040I All airborne aircraft were diverted to K-6 for landing. A rapidly forming fog forced cancellation of air operations.
- 12001 The U.S.S. THOMAS (DIR-683) rejoined the formation from Whitbread patrol. The U.S.S. HIGBEE (DIR-806) was detached to proceed on Whitbread patrol.

### 18 May

- 1055I The eleven (11) aircraft diverted the previous day departed K-6 to attack a command post, supply depot and troops quartered in a village in the Choppeki Point area. Fight (8) buildings were destroyed in the target area.
- 12301 The U.S.S. HIGBEE (DIR-806) rejoined from Whitbread patrol.
- 1253I Seven (7) of the strike alreraft were recovered. The remaining four (4) were diverted to K-6. Fog and haze made carrier operations impractical and air operations were cancelled for the remainder of the day.



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- 13901 The U.S.S. THOMAS (DDR-883) was detached to proceed on Whitbread patrol.
- 1800I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

#### 19 May

- O530I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) FLU's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a command post in the Haeju Bay area and thirteen buildings were destroyed.
- 0700I Launched event "B", consisting of six (6) FAU's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a command post and a gun position ten (10) miles from Haeju in the Bay area. Five (5) buildings were destroyed and the gun position was well covered by rockets and strafing.
- O800I The U.S.S. TAYLOR (DDE-468) reported to Task Unit 95.1.1 for Operational Control.
- 0858I Launched event "C", which consisted of two (2) F4U's for combat air patrol.
- 1036I Launched event "D", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft made attacks on a radar station and the surrounding buildings located on Choppeki Point. The area was well covered, but no damage assessment was made.
- 1045I Recovered the aircraft that were diverted to K-6 the previous day.
- 1130I The U.S.S. THOMAS (DDR-883) rejoined the formation from Whitbread patrol.
- 1145I HMS COSSACK was detached to proceed on Whitbread patrol and to assume on 20 May the duties of CTU 95.1.2 and OTC West Coast Koroa.
- 1227I Launched event "E", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked and damaged two (2) gun positions in the Taedong Bay area. One (1) road bridge in the area was also damaged.
- 1237I Captain LUDDEN, VMA-312 pilot, was severely shaken and his aircraft received overhaul damage as a result of a barrier crash. Scheduled recoveries were suspended while the overturned aircraft was removed from the flight deck and the deck was readied to receive orbiting aircraft.



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- 1425I Launched event "F", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft conducted a Hanchon recco. A warehouse area fifteen (15) miles west of Pyongyang was attacked and seven (7) buildings and one (1) warehouse was destroyed. One warehouse was damaged.
- 1555I Launched event "G", consisting of six (6) FAU's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked strong points on the northern coast of Choppeki Point. This strike was requested by the First Partisan Regiment which was to make a raid in that area the following day. Twenty one (21) small buildings in the area were destroyed and one (1) rovetted large building was left afire.
- 1743I Launched event "H", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft were assigned to Task Unit 95.1.4 as TARCAP. Gun positions in the Taedong Estuary were attacked and no damage assessment was made because of flak.
- 1930I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

### <u>20 May</u>


- 0200I The U.S.S. HIGBER (DDR-806) was detached to fuel inshore and return.
- O531I Launched event "A", consisting of ten (10) F4U's. Four (4) aircraft were assigned as close air support to cover the withdrawal of the raid by the First Partisan Regiment. The assault area, northwest of Kirin-do, was well covered by Napalm, one hundred (100) pound bombs with daisy-cutter fusing, and strafing. The other four (4) aircraft attacked a troop concentration and gun position on the coast of Taedong Bay. One (1) gun position and one (1) mortar position were wiped out.
- O618I Launched event "B", consisting of four (4) F4U's. The flight was assigned as close air support in the same area. The flight reported that twenty six (26) buildings in the assault area were destroyed.
- O812I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) FAU's. Four (4) aircraft were assigned to Task Unit 95.1.4 as TARCAP. Gun positions along the Taedong Estuary were attacked, but flak made damage assessment hazardous.
- 09501 The U.S.S. HIGBER rejoined the formation.

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
- 1009I Launched event "D", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) aircraft conducted a Han River recco. Four (4) buildings were destroyed and two (2) gun positions were damaged by this flight.
- 1200I HMCS CRUSADER was detached to proceed on Whitbread patrol.
- 1226I Launched event "E", consisting of four (4) FAU's. The four (4) aircraft attacked troop concentrations in a village east of Choppeki Point. Seven (7) buildings were destroyed and six (6) buildings were damaged in this area.
- 1617I Launched a deck load strike consisting of ten (10) FAU's. One (1) flight of four (4) aircraft made a Han River recco. Eleven (11) buildings were destroyed and eight (8) were damaged in the Haeju area. One (1) secondary explosion was reported near the communist party headquarters "Little Moscow" south of Haeju. The other four (4) aircraft attacked gun positions and caves in the Chodo area, while acting as TARCAP for Task Unit 95.1.4. Two (2) caves were closed and three (3) 107AM gun positions were destroyed.
- 1930I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

### 21 May

- 0529I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked troops and gun positions in the Haeju area. Six (6) buildings were destroyed and one (1) gun position was damaged.
- O634I Launched event "B", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft were assigned to Task Unit 95.1.4 as TARCAP. Gun positions were attacked in the Taedong Estuary. Rain in the target area made target selection and damage assessment difficult.
- O929I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) FAU's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked the Communist Party headquarters of "Little Moscow" south of Haeju. Nine (9) buildings were destroyed and three (3) were damaged.
- 0930I HMCS CRUSADER rejoined the formation from Whitbread patrol.
- 1112I Launched event "D", consisting of six (6) F4U's. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked a command post and troop area thirty miles west of Haeju. Four (4) buildings were destroyed and five (5) were damaged.



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- 1439I Launched event "E", consisting of ten (10) F4U's. All aircraft were to proceed to K-6 via the target area. Targets of opportunity were hit in the Han River Estuary. Occasional rain and low ceilings made target selection difficult, however, two (2) villages known to be housing troops were attacked and left burning.
- 1600I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course enroute to Sasebo to rendezvous at about 2100I with the HMS OCEAN.
- 21001 Relieved as CTU 95.1.1 by HMS OC MAN.
- 2230I Rendezvoused with HMS OCEAN and detached the U.S.S. HIGB $_{\infty}$  to join HMS OCEAN.

### 22 May

- 0900I Heavy seas and high wind prevailed throughout the night. HECS CRUSADER detached to rejoin Task Unit 95.1.1.
- 1130I Inclement weather prevented conduct of scheduled gunnery firing practice. Continued and increased winds and seas reduced SOA preventing arrival Sasebo as scheduled.
- 2130I Anchored 5300 yds. bearing 295° T. from Sasebo Harbor entrance to enter and berth buoy 18 first light 23 May 1953.

### PART III - REMARKS ON PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL

- (A) Performance of Ordnance Equipment and Material.
- 1. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.
- 2. Listed below are the malfunctions encountered during this period:
  - a. 50 Cal. Gun Malfunctions.
    - (1) Three (3) failures to extract. (Rust in chamber).
    - (2) Two (2) telescoped rounds.
  - b. 20MM Gun Malfunctions.
    - (1) One faulty Solenoid.
    - (2) Five snubbed rounds.
    - (3) One Hyd. failure.
    - (4) One Phanger Ing broken.

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- (5) One jam in Food Mechanism.
- (6) One Link Chute jam.
- (7) One broken Cannon Plug.
- (8) One round exploded in Feed Mechanism causing extensive damage to Gun and Wing.
- c. Hung Rockets 3.25 6 total.
  - (1) Three broken Pigtails.
  - (2) Two duds.
  - (3) One electric failure.
- d. Hung Rockets 5.00 HVAR 6 total.
  - (I) One Pigtail broken.
  - (2) Two faulty Igniters.
  - (3) Three Pigtails dropped out.
- e. Hung Bombs 2 total.
  - (1) Two 100 lb. bombs electric failure.
- f. Did Bombs 2 total.
  - (1) One 500 lb. bomb faulty arming circuit.
  - (2) One 100 lb. bomb faulty arming circuit.
- g. Dud Napalm 1 total.
  - (1) Faulty arming circuit.
- (B) Ammunition Expenditures.
- 1. During the period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended:

### BY VMA-312 AIRCRAFT

1000# GP			 	-41	_	31
500# GP						76
250# GP						<b>3</b> පි
						412
260# F <del>r</del> ag						52
Napalm			 	-	_	62
5" HVAR				_	-	173
3.25" WP		<del>-</del>	 	-	-	256
20MM Rds.	-		 	-	-	28 <b>,3</b> 00
50 Cal. F	lds.		 	_	_	29,100



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### BY U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)

40MM - - - - - - - 11 (Exercise "Saint Barbara")

### PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

- (A) Own Battle Damage.
  - 1. None to vessel.
  - 2. One aircraft received two hits by small arms fire.
- (B) Battle Damage Inflicted on Enemy.
  - 1. Ships of this unit inflicted no damage on the enemy.
- 2. During this period of combat operations, the aircraft of this unit inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

TARGET	DAMAGE	DESTROYE D
Buildings Gun Positions Supply Shelters Caves Revetted Buildings Troop Shelters Road Bridges Warehouses	15 5 4 4 2 3 1	120 6 24
Tractors	$ar{ exttt{i}}$	

### PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

#### (A) Personnel.

- 1. Morale was high as the BAIROKO shifted from ASW training to action "on the line." All hands turned to with zeal to meet the increased demands and tempo which coincided with our change of mission.
- 2. The personnel strength of squadron and ship's company was as listed below:

<u> </u>	<u>MA-312</u>	BAIROKO
Officers:	35	68
enlisted men:	161	794



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#### (B) Recreation.

1. A daily newspaper, The BAIROKO News, was distributed to the ships in the screen on the guard mail trips. A brief summary of VMA-312 action was included to keep all hands abreast of the Checkerboard Squadron's activities.

### (C) Divine Services.

- 1. Protestant Morning Devotions were held each day at 0740. Catholic Rosary was said each day at 1605 in the crew's library. Bible Classes met three (3) times a week at 1900. Catholic Mass was said on the Hangar Deck, Thursday 14 May 1953 at 0500.
- 2. On Sunday 17 May 1953, two (2) Catholic Chaplains of ships in company and the Protestant Chaplain of the BAIROKO were exchanged to permit a variety of services aboard all ships. Masses were held on three (3) ships, with transfer being made by helicopter. The Canadian ship HMCS CRUSADER provided the services of a Catholic Priest.

#### (D) Casualties.

- 1. There were no personnel casualties during this patrol.
- 2. Air Department.
- a. During this period of operations, the catapults were used to launch 245 aircraft. The average wind over the deck was 27 knots. The total expenditure of material by the catapults was six (6) launching bridles (one missed the bridle catcher; the balance were normal wear). Normal wear on one cross-deck pendant necessitated replacement. There was one barrier crash which resulted in no damage to the gear, but one barrier cable and one supporting pendant were replaced. The H-4 catapult was out of commission for thirty (30) minutes on the 21st of May when the tension jacks failed to operate properly. The locking pin had slipped out of the piston in the locking assembly. The H-4 catapult was out of commission for approximately five (5) hours on the same date. The control valve failed to re-cock due to improper spindle settings. Repairs consisted of bleeding the pressure from the machine and making the proper spindle settings.

### 3. Engineering Department.

a. SPS-6B Radar: During low ceiling weather conditions when operating at approximately 40 miles from land, CIC was unable to pick up land on the AN/SPS-6B radar, but detected an aircraft at the range of 107 miles. This phenomenom was accredited to atmospheric conditions.





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b. TCK Radio Transmitter: The motor generator of the TCK transmitter started amoking when the transmitter was turned on. Plate voltage was 400 volts. When the plate voltage was decreased to Zero (0), the motor generator ran normally, but it started to smoke again when the plate voltage rheostat was advenced to one half the normal operating load. The trouble was determined to have resulted from a short in the field coil of the 500 volt generator system.

4. Other departments experienced no casualties.

### PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### (A) Air Department.

l. The aircraft assigned to VMA-312 are considered to be in poor material condition for the mission they are expected to perform. Discrepancies repeatedly appear which can be directly attributed to their age. The following tabulated listing of the tour, month in present tour and total hours in service is included.

TOUR	MONTH IN TOUR	TOTAL HOURS
3 2	2	1548
2	17	1172
3	1	1015
3	1 1 7	2386
3	7	1426
3	7	<b>1</b> 516
4 -	દ	1389
2	6	965
<b>3</b> .	7 8 6 1 6	1163
4"		<b>179</b> 0
3 3 3 4 2 3 4 3	13 10	<b>27</b> 09 ~
3	jo	1290
4:	15	1713
4	11	1054
3	9	2003
3	4	1109
4	4 1 0	2091
4 3 3 4 3 3 4 2	0	1537
3	3 10	1254
4	10	1507
	15	10 <b>72</b>
4 <sup>-</sup> 3 2	16	1919
3	1	1404
2	12	1621
		* x4 50



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### (B) Operations Department.

- 1. ECM: Passive ECM Training was conducted daily. Intercepts from enemy radars were unlikely in view of the location of the operating area. However, considerable training of operators was accomplished by intercepting our own force radars. Comparison of these interceptions with known own force radars, enabled instructor and ECM Officer to criticize trainees constructively in their determination of the characteristics of friendly radar.
- 2. CIC: Due to the demand for VHF frequency guards and the shortage of TDQ transmitters (4), air control of the CAP was maintained via AN/ARC-1. Though this is a good standby, it is considered that air control communications should be conducted using the standard TDQ-RCK transmitter/receiver to afford increased control range. Radar reception was handicapped due to atmospheric conditions and the close proximity of land. Use of STC, increased antenna rotation rate and short pulse width improved the reception. False echoes were frequencly encountered. On one occasion, an aircraft flying over the Chinese mainland was picked up at 107 miles on the SPS-63. Tracking via IFF at distances greater than 100 miles was common.
- 3. Air Operations: The Marine Attack Squadron VMA-312 embarked with only twenty six (26) pilots. This number, reduced to twenty three (23) by rotation at the end of the patrol, limited the number of daily sorties. Although targets and aircraft were available, fatigue considerations normally limited assignment of pilots to two (2) combat sorties  $(4\frac{1}{2}-5)$  hours) per day.

Recommendation: In order to meet operational committments, it is recommended that squadrons engaged in active combat operations be main-tained at full allowance until relieved.

### (C) Supply Department.

1. There was an unusually high usage of fuel tanks, droppable, stock number R-62-T-70075 during this patrol. The quantity of tanks carried was based on the usage experienced during line operations in 1952. The number of tanks proved to be ample, but the "N" Kits containing the necessary attachments were incomplete. The lug, part number NAF-312351-1 or R62-L-682500, was missing and it was impossible to equip all aircraft with replacement tanks. This necessitated continued switching of tanks and attachment fittings to all aircraft requiring the additional fuel load.

L. T. MORSE

L. T. MORSE Captain, USN

Commanding Officer

AIR OFERACIONS SCHEDULE 16 May 1953

CHANGE OF THE			16	May 1953		•
SUNRISE	- 0532				SUNSET - 1	
EVENT	LAUNCH	<u>L N D</u>	A/C	MISSION	Ad-MO	REMARKS
Al.	0530	0720	2	CAP	NOTE A	
A2	0530	0720	4	TARCAP	NOTE B (2 A/C)	
	7,0	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	•	4	NOTE C (2 A/C)	note 3
В3	0715	0905	2	CAP	NOTE A	
B4	0715	0905	4	STRIKE	NOIE D	NOTE 4
C5	0900	1050	2	CAP	NOTE A	
c6	0900	1050	4		NOTE E (2 A/C)	
					NOTE C (2 A/C)	NOTE 5
<b>ס</b> ק	1045	1235	2	CAP	NOTE A	
DS	1045	1235	4	Strike	NOTE F (2 A/C)	
D85	1045	1235	2	AIRSPOT	NOTE C (2 A/C) NOTE A	NOTE 6
رمب	1047	رومد	2.	VIIMPLOY	NOIE A	
E9	12 <b>3</b> 0	1420	2	CAP	NOTE A	
ElO	1230	1420	4	H.N-RECCO	NOTE E $(2 \text{ A/C})$	
					NOTE C (2 A/C)	Nore 7
Fll	1415	1605	2	CAP	NOTE A	
F12	1415	1605	4	Strike	NOTE G	NOTE 8
G13	1600	1750	2	CAP	NOTE A	
G14	1600	1750	4	STRIKE	NOTE F	NOTE 9
H15	1745	1915	2	C'AP	NOTE A	
н16	1745	1915	4	Strike	NOTE D (2 A/C)	
					NOTE C (2 A/C)	NOTE 10
NOTES:	1. Fuel all 2. Rescue M	L //C full (it - all	inter CAP A/	mal plus 100 ga C.	l. in belly tank	•
Targers	:3. Troops i	_	1.		XC 9973	
	4. Road Bri				XC 8635	
	5. Supplies		-	in village.	XC 8995	
	7. Supplies				XC 6921 BS 5393	
	8. Transfor		, ps 111	**************************************	YC 0822	
	9. C.F. and	-	tion.		XC 6319	
	10. Troops	in villag	G.		YB 3799	
Ammo	611 6 <i>/c 4</i>	ull MG Am	T1.0			WEIGHS.
Ammo: A B				ag. DC/ND		,800# 265#
_	• 1 Napalm		.cog II	-e- min		,365# ,916#
			- 6 10	00# GP inst/.01		,015#
	<ul> <li>1 500# GI</li> </ul>	inst/.01	- 4 2	50# GP inst/.01	_	<b>,</b> 3∞#
				GP inst/.l	15	015#
· ·	• 1 500# GF	' inst/.02	5 - 4	250# GP inst/.0	15	,300#

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### DECLASSIFIED

U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

AEROLOGY

Weather Summary Yellow Sea

14-21 May, 1953

During the first two days operations, the weather was exceptionally good, except for haze. The pressure rose steadily the first four days as a high pressure cell moved southeastward from Siberia. The high lingered over the Japanese Islands pushing a wedge of extremely stable air over Korea, causing heavy fog on the entire operating area commencing about 1000I 17 May. By morning of the 18th, fog had become patchy, but low stratus overcast and poor visibility, resulted in cancellation of all strikes from the ship that day. Pressure remained nearly steady at 1018 mbs. from early morning of the 18th until the afternoon of the 20th. Wind was southeasterly, averaging 12 knots. By mid-afternoon 20 May, the pressure began to fall slowly and the wind increased in velocity from the southeast. About 1400 21 May, rain began and wind increased to 30 knots.

The average sky cover was six tenths. Forty three hours of the first 3 days were clear. Advection fog covered the operating area for 16 hours 17 May and 6 hours 18 May. Except in fog, and low stratus 18 May, the ceiling was 5000 feet or better. Visibility averaged 8 miles except during fog; haze being the primary restriction. The maximum wind was southeast 30 knots; minimum wind southwest 2 knots, and average velocity 12 knots southeast predominate. There were no surface frontal passages. Relative humidity averaged 90%. Maximum temperature was 62 degrees F., minimum 49 degrees F., and average sea temperature was 55 degrees F. The state of the sea was slight with no swell.

Enclosure (2)





ITM:PIM:se CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 0113 10 June 1953

### DISTRIBUTION LIST:

CNO	_	
	2	Advance
CTG 95.1	8	
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CO, VMA-312	ī	
CO, U.S.S. RENDOVA (CVE-114)	î	
CO, U.S.S. BADDENG STRAIT (CVE-116)	i	
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CO, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVI-29)	1	
COMNOTS IN YOKERN	1	

DECLACONIE

U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

In reply refer LIM:PIM:ss CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 0117 16 June 1953

From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1

To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 94

1: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1 (2) Commander Task Force 95

(2) Commander Task Force 95 (3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS DOD DIR 5200.10

(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 30 May through 8 June 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) Art. 0705 Navy Regulations (b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

(c) CINCPACFLT INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule  $-P_{1}/9$ 

(2) Westher Summary - P, 20

1. In accordance with reference (a) through (d), the Action Report of Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 30 May through 8 June 1953 is submitted. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 30 May until 2100 8 June 1953.

2. This report is divided into aix parts, as follows:

Part I - General Narrative.

Part II - Chronological Order of Events.

Part III - Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditures.

Part IV - Summary of own and enemy battle damage.

Part V - Personnel performance and casualties.

Part VI - Special comments on doctrine and operational procedures.

3. Information concerning aircraft performance is contained in greater detail in the Naval Air Warfare reports for May 1953 and June 1953 submitted by VMA-312 in accordance with OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1.

### PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

(A) During the period 30 May through 8 June 1953, the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), under the command of Captain L. T. MORSE, USN, 62712/1310, with Marine Attack Squadron VMA-312 embarked, operated as part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 21001 30 May until 21001 8 June 1953. The Commanding Officer of HMS OCEAN assumed command of the Task Unit at 21001 8 June 1953 and the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) proceeded independently to Kobe, Japan, to offload VMA-312 and to embark VMA-332. During this reporting period, Task Unit 95.1.1 consisted of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)

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and a daily minimum of three (3) United Nations escort vessels. The following ships operated in Task Unit 95.1.1 during this patrol:

HMS COCKADE (DD-34) HMCS CRUSADER (DD-228) HMS CONCORD (DD-03)

U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760) U.S.S. CHEVALLER (DDR-805) U.S.S. HIGBEE (DD-806)

Normally three (3) ships were available for screening purposes daily, since one ship was provided at all times to CTU 95.1.2 for Whitbread Patrol along the enemy held coastline. Ships were assigned to this patrol in daily retation and usually were detached about mid-day.

- (B) <u>Mission</u>. To aid in enforcing the blockade of the West Coast of Korea south of Latitude 39° 35' N., to prevent ingress or egress, mining, or supply or reinforcement by sea; to aid in the defense of the occupied West Coast Islands; to provide air support to U. N. Naval Forces, and to contribute to the interdiction effort against enemy land forces.
- (C) The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) sailed from Sasebo, in company with HMS CONCORD, 0530I 30 May in accordance with the directions of CFG 95.1 dispatch 280350I of May. Enroute to area Nan, gunnery and window dropping exercises were conducted. The ship expended a total of two thousand, two hundred and thirty four (2,234) rounds of 40MM ammunition while firing at a towed sleeve. At 2100I, the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) assumed the duties of CTU 95.1.1. Task Unit 95.1.1 at this time was composed of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), HMS CONCORD and the U.S.S. H. J. THOMASON (DD-760) which had joined the formation at 1021I. Rendezvous with HMS OCEAN was effected at 2330I and her escort, HMS COCKADE, joined the Task Unit.
- (D) At 0500I 31 May, the Task Unit commenced air operations against the enemy. For the remainder of this patrol, the Task Unit operated in the vicinity of 37° 50' N. and 124° 10' E. Daily changes in the position of Point Obos were made to avoid a consistent morning position and to close the intended targets. The normal operating schedule provided for seven (7) launches of six (6) aircraft daily. All sorties were provided with pre-briefed targets and all sorties during this patrol, except four, were of an offensive nature. A division of aircraft was assigned daily to CTU 95.1.4 as TARCAP and a daily recconnaissance of the Han River Estuary was conducted. The enemy coastline from the mouth of the Taedong Gang north to Hanchon was reccoed every other day when F-86 Sabre sweeps were in the vicinity.
- (E) Flying weather was good only two (2) days of this patrol. All flight activities were cancelled completely for a period of two (2) days. Low ceilings, light rain and haze, both in target area and in the carrier operating area, prevented maximum utilization of the aircraft throughout most of the patrol.



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- (F) No indication of increased activity on the part of the enemy was noted during this patrol. Shipping continued to be non-existent by day and therefore no effort was expended in control of shipping. Targets and information were supplied this command by the four (4) active Partisan Infantry Regiments; lst, 2nd, 5th and 6th. Although all units appeared to be actively collecting information, reports from the First Partisan Infantry Regiment came in with the greater regularity. Partisan reports and descripting of pilots provided evidence to support the belief that small garrisons are maintained in most of the villages in this area. None of these garrisons appear to be particularly large or active and perform primarily police duties. The most worthwhile targets are located in the inland area north of the town of Haeju. In this area there are troops and supplies. The coastline targets consist principally of well entrenched gun positions and are less vulnerable than the inland targets.
- (G) No enemy aircraft were encountered by aircraft of this Task Unit during the patrol. Part II of this report contains a flight by flight assessment of damage inflicted on enemy ground targets. The following is a summary of damage based on pilot assessment and reports from Partisan Regiments:

TARGET	DESTROYED	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Buildings Ravetted Buildings	194 12	88 3
Supply Sheds Vehicles	8 1 Truck	í 1 Truck
Gun positions Enemy Troops	3 40 KIA	8
Boats	1	15 WIA 4
Oxen Tunnels	2 0	0 1
Radio Station	1	0

### Secondary Explosions - 2

(H) Aircraft of this unit were scheduled for forty two (42) sorties a day and were airborne from dawn to dusk each day that weather permitted. Each pilot flew two (2) sorties daily in order to fulfill this schedule. A summary of hours and sorties is included below:

TYPE	NO. SORTIES	HOURS
STRIKES TARCAP Armed Rocco. CAP Weather Recco.	165 24 39 2 2	309.2 54.9 88.6 2.1 4.4
	<del>232</del>	459.2



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Sixteen (16) sorties were assigned to JOC TADC for Close Air Support along the Eighth Army front, but no controllers or targets were provided. These flights attacked pre-briefed targets in West Korea.

### PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

### 30 May

- O530I Underway with the HMS CONCORD under operational control in accordance with the directions of CTF 95.1 dispatch 280350Z of May.
- 08371 Recovered ten (10) aircraft from Itami Air Force Base.
- 0930I Commenced gunnery exercises in area Guorge.
- 1002I The U.S.S. THOMASON (DER-760) joined the formation.
- 1045I Completed gunnery exercises. The ship fired upon a towed sleeve for a total of twenty (20) HOW type runs. The total expenditures of 40MM ammunition was 2,234 rounds.
- 1100I The ship launched eight (8) direcraft to conduct a window dropping exercise.
- 1135I Aircraft completed dropping pre-cut window and tracking and evaluation drills were conducted.
- 1205I Completed window dropping exercise.
- 1245I Recovered eight (8) aircraft.
- 13151 The ship conducted an atomic defense drill.
- 14001 Secured from atomic defense drill.
- 21001 The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), U.S.S. THOMASON and the HMS CONCORD assumed the designation of Task Unit 95.1.1.
- 2330I Made rendezvous with the HMS OCEAN, HMS COCKADE and U.S.S. FAYTOR, HMS COCKADE joined Task Unit.

#### <u>31 May</u>

- O500I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) aircraft. The four (4) strike aircraft attacked trucks and troops in the Taedong Bay area. 500 ft. ceilings with rain showers blanketed the target area. The attack was made at low level and no assessment of damage was made.
- 0515I Effected personnel and mail transfer by high line from HMS COCKADE.
- 0645I Recovered event "A" and suspended air operations in view of the unfavorable flying weather.

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1115I Transfered Captain SCHANZE to the HMS CONCORD.

12001 HMS CONCORD was detached to Whitbread Patrol.

1430I U.S.S. HIGBEE rejoined from Whitbread Patrol.

1930I Retired on a southerly course for the night to return at 0530I to conduct air operations.

#### <u>l June</u>

- O515I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) FAU:s. A-l flight of two (2) aircraft attacked troops in a village south of Haeju with Napalm and destroyed six (6) buildings. A-2 flight of four (4) aircraft struck troops in a village in the came area and destroyed fourteen (14) buildings with Napalm and strafing attacks.
- O7001 Launched event "B", consisting of six (6) F4U's. B-3 flight of two (2) aircraft, attacked two (2) villages south of Changyon with 500 lb. bombs and VT rockets. Fires were started and an estimated six (6) buildings were destroyed. B-4 flight of four (4) aircraft, supplied TARCAP for the 95.1.2 in the Taedong area. Nine (9) gun positions were hit and heavy damage was assessed.
- OS42I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. C-5 flight of two (2) aircraft, attacked troops in a village south of Haeju and destroyed two (2) buildings with rockets and Napalm. C-6 flight of four (4) aircraft, conducted a Han River Recco. and destroyed six (6) buildings and damaged two (2) boats.
- 1027I Launched event "D", consisting of five (5) F4U's. D-7 flight of two (2) aircraft, attacked shelters and gun positions on Choppeki point and damaged six (6) buildings. D-8 flight of three (3) aircraft, struck at revetted buildings southwest of Haeju, destroying three of the buildings.
- 1046I Two (2) aircraft of Charlie flight were diverted to K-6. One aircraft suffered a damaged wing when the port wing cannon exploded.
- 1230I HMS CONCORD rejoined from Whitbread Patrol and HMS COCKADE was datached to Whitbread Patrol.
- 1232I Recovered two (2) C.O.D. aircraft from K-3.
- 1344I Launched event "E", consisting of six (6) F4U's. E-9 flight, consisting of two (2) aircraft, attacked troops in a village on Choppeki Point. Six (6) buildings were damaged with Napalm and WP Rockets. E-10 flight of four (4) aircraft, struck troops and gun positions west of Chinnampo with 1000# daisy cutter fuzed bombs. Ten (10) buildings were destroyed and two (2) were damaged.



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- 1522I Launched event "F", consisting of six (6) F4U's. F-11 flight of two (2) aircraft, attacked troops in a village on Choppeki Point and left five (5) buildings burning. F-12 flight of four (4) aircraft struck troops in a village in the Chodo area and damaged ten (10) buildings.
- 1715I Launched event "G", consisting of seven (7) F4U's. G-14 flight of four (4) aircraft, attacked troops in a village and supplies south of Changyon. After the attack, change was assessed as seven (7) buildings destroyed, and three (3) stacks of supplies were burning. G-14 flight of three (3) aircraft, also hit south of Changyon and destroyed five (5) buildings and damaged one (1) boat.
- 1915I Completed the days air operations and retired on a southerly course to return at 0530I to conduct air operations.

#### 2 June

- O715I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) F4U's. A-l flight of two (2) aircraft, attacked houses in a village destroying four (4) and damaging four (4) with five hundred pound bombs. A-2 flight of four (4) aircraft hit troops in a village destroying five (5) buildings and starting fires in a trench area. Both strikes were in the Changyon area.
- O850I Recovered event "A", and suspended air operations because of fog and low ceilings.
- 1013I The U.S.S. CHEVALIER (DIR-805) joined the Task Unit from CTG 95.1.
- 1040I The U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760) was detached for Whitbread Patrol.
- 11271 Recovered two (2) C.O.D. planes from K-3 with the HIGBEE's Chaplain aboard.
- 11401 The U.S.S. HIGBER (DDR-806) was detached for CHOP to COMDESRON-3.
- 12081 Launched the two (2) C.O.D. to return to K-3.
- 1400I HMS COCKADE rejoined from Whitbread Patrol.
- 1630I Launched a two (2) plane weather recco. flight. The fog closed in rapidly and the two (2) aircraft were diverted to K-6 for landing.

### <u>3 Juna</u>

The weather was unsuitable all day for air operations. Fog and low ceilings prevailed throughout the area. The Task Unit was exercised in surface maneuvers stressing low visibility station-keeping.



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#### <u>4 June</u>

- 0615I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) FAU's. A-1 flight of two (2) aircraft and A-2 flight of four (4) aircraft, made low level attacks on trenches and command posts east of Yongyon-myon. Hits were observed but lowering ceilings prohibited damage assessment.
- 0817I Recovered event "A", and suspended flight operations because of low callings and visibility in the carrier operating area.
- 11351 The U.S.S. CHEVALLER (DIR-805) was detached to CTU 95.1,2 for Whitbread Patrol.
- Resumed flight operations and launched event "D", consisting of six (6) F4U's. D-7 flight of two (2) aircraft, struck at troops in a village located north of Changyon. Three (3) buildings were destroyed and a secondary fire, presumably gasoline, was started by 500 poind and 250 pound bombs. D-8 flight of four (4) aircraft, acted as TARCAP for Task Unit 95.1.2 in the Cho-do area. Hits were secred with 1000 pound bombs and WP rockets on a group of 76MM gun positions.
- 1415I Recovered two (2) C.O.D. aircraft from K-3.
- 1454I Recovered event "D", and suspended flight operations due to low ceilings.
- Resumed flight operations and launched event "F", consisting of six (6) F4U's, and two (2) C.O.D. aircraft. F-11 flight of two (2) aircraft, attacked tranches and command posts southwest of Ongjin with bombs. No damage assessment was made on this attack. F-12 flight of four (4) aircraft, made attacks with Napalm and 500 pound bombs on buildings reported to be concealing junks. Four (4) buildings were destroyed in this area.
- 1742I Launched event "G", consisting of ten (10) F4U's. G-13 flight, of two (2) aircraft, hit a village with Napalm southeast of Ungjin and destroyed seven (7) buildings and damaged fifteen (15). G-14 flight of four (4) aircraft, made twelve (12) runs on pumps in a village near Pyong-chon expending 1000 pound bombs and HVAR's, but did not assess the damage. G-16 flight, of four (4) aircraft, worked over a village housing troops near Changyon. Four (4) buildings were destroyed with Napalm and WP nockets.
- 1730I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.



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### <u>5 June</u>

- O1001 The U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760) rejoined from Whitbread Patrol.
- O542I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) F4U's. A-l flight, of two (2) aircraft, struck troops in a village south of Changyon. Two (2) buildings were destroyed and two (2) buildings were damaged with Napalm and VP rockets. A-2 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked troops and a command post south of Sinch-on with Napalm and 500 pound bombs. Four (4) buildings were destroyed in this attack.
- O727I Launched event "B", consisting of six (6) F4U's. B-3 flight, of two (2) aircraft, hit trenches and a command post west of Changyon with 260 pound bombs and WP Reckets. The trench line was damaged in the attack. B-4 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked troops and command posts in the same area. This target was well covered with 1000 pound bombs and WP rockets, however no damage assessment was made.
- O912I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. C-5 flight of two (2) aircraft, again struck in the Changyon area on village housing North Korean Troops. One (1) house was totally destroyed and fifteen (15) were left aflame after the attack with Napalm. C-6 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked a village southwest of Changyon with Napalm and 500 pound bombs. Two (2) Oxen were killed and six (6) buildings were destroyed. The area was left aflame.
- 0930I Recovered G-15 flight, which consisted of four (4) aircraft returning from K-6. This flight made a hit and run attack on a village housing troops south of Haeju with 500 pound and 100 pound bembs and returned without assessing damage.
- 1030I HMCB CRUSADER (DD-228) joined the Unit from CTG 95.1 for operational control.
- 1043I HMS COCKADE was detached to CTG 95.1 for operational centrol.
- 1229I Launched event "D", consisting of six (6) F4U's. D-7 flight, of two (2) aircraft, attacked a command post southwest of Haeju with Napalm and WP mockets. The area was well covered, but damage assessment was not made. D-8 flight, of four (4) aircraft, hit storage buildings east of Yonan with 1000 pound bombs and Napalm. Four (4) buildings were destroyed and eight (8) were damaged in this attack.
- 1304I HMS CONCORD was detached for Whitbread Patrol.



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- 1309I U.S.S. CHEVALIER rejoined from Whitbread Patrol.
- 1414I Launched event "E", consisting of six (6) F4U's.
- 1600I Cancelled event "F", due to fog.
- 1605I Diverted E-9 flight of two (2) to K-6. E-10 flight made an attack on troops in a village southwest of Haeju. A total of cleven (11) buildings were destroyed with Napalm by this flight of four aircraft.
- 1730I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

#### 6 June

- 0600I Fog in the carrier operating area delayed the first sorties.
- 06201 HMS CONCORD rejoined from Whitbread Patrol.
- 0648I HCMS CRUS. DER was detached to Whitbread Patrol.
- O740I Launched events "A" and "B", consisting of ten (10) F4U's. A-1 flight of two (2) aircraft attacked a troop concentration and command post south of Haoju with Napalm and 260 pound fragmentation bombs. Five (5) buildings were left burning in this area. A-2 flight of four (4) aircraft, struck a strong point of coastal defense damaging a revotted building and a smallboat. B-4 flight of four (4) aircraft hit troops in a village southwest of Changyon and destroyed eight (2) buildings with 500 pound bombs.
- 0929I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. C-5 flight, of two (2) aircraft, attacked trenches and a command post west of Changyon. The damage inflicted on the enemy was not assessed. C-6 flight of four (4) aircraft as TARCAP for CTU 95.1.4, hit gun positions southwest of Chinnampo. Ground fire made damage assessment impractical, but one gun position was reported destroyed.
- 1124I Launched event "D", consisting of six (6) F4U's. D-7 flight of two (2) aircraft, attacked troops and a command post southeast of Ongjin. No damage assessment of the attack was made. D-8 flight, of four (4) aircraft hit at troops and trucks located southeast of Chaeryong. Five (5) buildings were destroyed and trucks were strafed as they dispersed.
- 1138I Recevered B-3 flight made up of four (4) aircraft from K-6. This flight had made an attack on stores and supplies located southwest of Changyon. Gun positions were well covered in the area by strafing and five (5) stacks of supplies were left aflame.



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- 1259I Launched event "E", consisting of eight (6) F4U's. E-9 flight of four (4) aircraft, struck a village housing troops southwest of Changyon. Four (4) buildings were possibly destroyed and two (2) more positively destroyed. E-10 flight of three (3) aircraft, (one aircraft aborted with a rough running engine), attacked trucks and supplies in the area west of Anak. One truck and one revetted building was destroyed with 500 pound bombs and HVAR's.
- 1415I Fog and low ceilings in the operating area temperarily delayed air operations.
- 1620I Resumed air operations by launching event "F", consisting of six (6) F4U's. F-11 flight, of two (2) aircraft, attacked gun positions west of Changyon. Three (3) bunkers were damaged and a trench line was destroyed with a 500 pound bomb and HVAR's. F-12 flight of four (4) aircraft, hit at troops in a village west of Anak with two (2) Napalm and two (2) 500 pound bombs plus twenty eight (28) HVAR's. No damage assessment was made.
- 1726I Launched event "G", consisting of six (6) F4U's. G-13 flight, of two (2) aircraft, hit a village due west of Chaeryong with one (1) 500 pound bomb, and fourteen (14) HVAR's. One (1) building was left burning. G-14 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked troops in a village southwest of Changyon with Napalm, 500 pound bombs and HVAR's. Eight (8) buildings were destroyed in this attack and two (2) more were damaged.
- 1930I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

#### 7 June

- Fog and low ceilings prevailed from 00011 until 06001. This cendition delayed the scheduled air operations for one (1) hour.
- 07001. Launched event "A", consisting of ten (10) F4U's. A-2 flight, of eight (8) aircraft, attacked the command post of the "21st NKA Brigade" southwest of Ongjin. Assessment of the attack by the pilots and of the photos taken by the A-1 flight, indicated that the installation was 75% destroyed.
- 0843I Launched event "B", consisting of six (6) F4U's. B-3 flight, of two (2) aircraft, struck the village of Ongjin. No damage assessment was made. B-4 flight, of four (4) aircraft, was unable to hit its primary target while acting as TARCAP because of bad weather in that area. This flight also attacked the village of Ongjin, destroying sevent(7) buildings, and damaging four (4) more.



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- 1032I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. C-5 flight, of two (2) sircraft, was unable to hit its primary target due to weather and attacked trenches and a gun position west of Haeju. Three (3) buildings were destroyed and three (3) were damaged. C-6 flight, of four (4) aircraft, hit the same target as the "A" event, when its primary target was obscured by weather. No further damage assessment was accomplished.
- 1200I HMCS CRUSADER rejoined the Unit from Whitbread Fatrol.
- 12001 U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760) was detached for Whitbread Patrol.
- 13201 Received a request from JCC Korea for Close Air Support along the Eighth Army front.
- IAIII Launched event "D", consisting of eight (8) FAU's. This flight was assigned to Watchcase as CAS along the MIR. No targets were provided in the bombline area and the flight conducted armed recco. The ordnance load was expended on the command post of the 21st NKA Brigade. No damage assessment was made.
- 1513I Launched the E-10 flight, of event "2", consisting of four (4) F4U's. This flight reported to Watchcase for CAS, but no targets were provided. As an armed recco. flight, they then destroyed three (3) buildings and damaged two (2) buildings and two (2) tunnels, ten (10) miles north of Haeju.
- 1602I Launched the remaining four (4) aircraft of event "E", consisting of the E-10-5 flight. No targets were provided for CAS and the flight hit targets of opportunity. Three (3) revetted buildings were destroyed and two (2) gun positions were damaged on the Ongjin peninsula.
- 1930I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

#### 8 June

O556I Launched event "A", consisting of six (6) FAU's. A-1 flight, of two (2) circraft, attacked troops in a village south of Changyon. Three (3) buildings were destroyed and two (2) damaged in the attack. A-2 flight, of four (4) circraft, were directed to JOC TADO for CAS along the MIR. No targets were provided and the flight hit its pre-briefed target of revetted buildings in the village of Ongjin. Seven (7) buildings were destroyed by Napalm and 500 pound bombs.



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
- O7471 Launched event "B", consisting of six (6) F4U's. B-3 flight, consisting of two (2) aircraft, attacked a radio station southwest of Changyon. The radio station and seven (7) surrounding buildings were destroyed and a secondary explosion was observed. B-4 flight, of four (4) aircraft, assigned as CAS on the bombline, was provided no targets and returned to act as TARCAP for CTU 95.1.4. In the attack in the Chodo area, three (3) buildings were destroyed and two (2) were damaged.
- O929I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. C-5 flight, of two (2) aircraft, struck a gun and a command post west of Anak. Six (6) houses were damaged and the area was well covered. C-6 flight, of four (4) aircraft, were not assigned targets as CAS along the bombline and hit their pre-briefed targets west of Changyon. Five (5) buildings were destroyed and six (6) were damaged in a village and gun position.
- 1225I Launched event "D", consisting of ten (10) F4U's. D-7 flight of two (2) aircraft, attacked a command post south of Yonan and reported the target well covered, but conducted no damage assessment. D-8 and D-10 flight each consisting of four (4) aircraft, were sent to K-6 via the target area for further flight to Itami AFB. Both flights hit pre-briefed targets in the Haeju estuary. No damage assessment was made.
- 1230I The U.S.S. THOMASON (DD-760) rejoined from Whitbread Patrol and the U.S.S. CHEVALIER (DDR-605) was detached to Whitbread Patrol.
- 1425I Launched event "E", consisting of seven (7) F4U's. E-12 flight attacked coastal guns, southeast of Ongjin, damaging two (2). E-14 hit troops in a village in the same area and destroyed six (6) buildings.
- 1630I Retired on a southerly course to effect a rendezvous with the HMS OCEAN.
- 21001 The Commanding Officer of the HMS OCEAN assumed duties of CTU 95.1.1.
- 21301 Made rendezvous with the HMS OCEAN and detached all ships to the command of CTU 95.1.1. The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) commenced steaming independently enroute Kobe, Japan.

## PART III - REMARKS ON FERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL

- (A) Performance of Ordnance Equipment and Material.
- 1. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.







2. Listed below are the malfunctions encountered during this period:

a,	20MM Guns.				
	(1) Broken Firing Pin		5		
	(2) Faulty Round	_	í		
	(3) Broken Sear	_	ī		
	(4) Broken Cannon Plug	-	2		
	(5) Link Chute Stoppage	_	3		
	(6) Broken Firing Pin Plunger	-	2 3 1 6	-	
	(7) Snubbed Rounds	_			
	(8) Broken Breech Block Lock	-	1		
	(9) Faulty Charger	-	5 1		
	(10) Faulty Feeder Mechanism	-	1		
b.	.50 Caliber Guns.				
	(1) Out of time and headspace	_	4		
	(2) Link Chute stoppage.	-	2		
	(3) Ruptured Rounds	-	4		
	(4) Failure to eject	_	2		
c.	Hung 5" HVAR Rockets.				
	(1) Faulty Rocket ALRO 14A Launce	her	_	5	
	(2) Faulty Igniter, AERO 14A Lau		-	2	
	(3) Faulty Igniter, MK-9 Launche			5 2 3 2	
	(4) Returned un-plugged on airca	raft	_	2	
₫.	Hung 3.25" WP Rockets.				
	(1) Faulty Rocket, AERO 14A Laur	cher		5	
	(2) Faulty Igniter, AERO LAA Lau		_	5 2	
	(3) Faulty Rocket, MK-9 Launcher		-	11	
	(4) Faulty Ignitor, MK-9 Launche	∍r	-	3	
	(5) Cut Pigtail, MK-9 Launcher	1	-	3 2 2	
	(6) Electrical Failure in aircra	aft	+	2	
е.	Hung 260# Frag.				
	(1) Faulty MK-55 Bomb Rack	1			
f.	Hung 100# GP Bomb.				
	(1) Faulty AERO 14A Bomb Rack -	1			
g•	Dud Napalm.				
	(1) Undetermined (Arming Wires H	leturne	d)	-	1



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- h. Dud 1000# GP Bombs.
  - (1) Electrical Failure in Arming Circuit 1
     (2) Undertermined (Arming Wires Returned) 1
- i. Dud 100# GP Bombs.
  - (1) Electrical Short in Arming Circuit 2
- (B) Ammunition Expenditures.
- 1. During the period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended:

#### BY VMA-312 AIRCRAFT

1000# GP	40
500# GP	87
250# GP	4Ò
100;# GP	424
260# Frag	48
Napalm	65
5" HVAR	346
3.25" WP	491
20MM Rds	30,600
50 Cal. Rds	18,800

### BY U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)

40MM -----2,231 (Fired at Towed Sleeve)

## PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

- (A) Own Battle Damage.
  - 1. None to vessel.
  - 2. Two aircraft received hits by small arms fire.
- (B) Battle Damage Inflicted on Enemy.
  - 1. Ships of this unit inflicted no damage on the enemy.
- 2. During this period of combat operations, the aircraft of this this unit inflicted the following damage on the enemy:



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TARGET	DESTROYED	<u>DAMAGED</u>
Buildings Revetted Buildings Supply Sheds	194 12 8	88 <b>3</b>
Supply Sheds Vehicles Gun Positions	l Truck	l Truck 8
Enemy Troops	40 KIA	15 WIA
Boats	1	4
0xen	2	Ò
Tunnels	O	1
Radio Station	1	0

#### PART V - PERSONNEL PARFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

#### (A) Personnel.

- 1. Morale was high during the second patrol on the line.
- 2. The personnel strength of squadron and ship's company was as listed below:

	<u>VMA-312</u>	BAIROKO
Officers:	33	69
Enlisted Men:	160	796

#### (B) Recreation.

- 1. The following activities for Welfare and Recreation were available during this period:
- a. A daily newspaper, the Bairoko News, was distributed to ships in the scroen with the guard mail trips.
  - b. The crew's library was open each evening until taps.
  - c. Eight (8) movies were shown on the hangar deck.

#### (C) Divine Services:

- 1. Protestant Morning Devotions were held each morning at 0740. Catholic Rosary was said each day at 1605 in the crew's library. Bible Classes met three times a week at 1900.
- 2. Sundays, 31 May and 7 June, Protestant Divine Service was held in the crew's library at 0900, followed by Cathelic Rosary.





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- (D) Casualties Personnel.
  - 1. There were no personnel casualties due to enemy action.
- 2. Only two (2) injuries occured which are worthy of note. The first was a crushed terminal phalynx of the left thumb which resulted from a man trying to lower a bomb cart into the catwalk without assistance. The other injury resulted when a man's foot was run over by the port wheel of an F4U. No bones were broken, but soft tissue damage was moderate. A return to full duty is not expected for approximately three (3) weeks.
  - (E) Casualties Material.
    - 1. Engineering.
      - a. Main Propulsion, Auxiliaries and Electrical Equipment.
- (1) Developed minor leaks in four handhole plugs on the economizer header of No. 3 boiler. Temporary repairs were effected underway, using sheet asbestes gasket material which proved satisfactory. No other casualties occured to main propulsion plant, auxiliaries or electrical equipment during this operation. Routine maintenance and upkeep was accomplished underway.
  - b. Damage Control.
    - (1) No damage or failures occured.
  - c. Electronics.
- (1) DBF-1 VHF direction finder: The output voltage from the AN/URD-2 Antenna assembly used with the DBF-1 direction finder was determined to be low, indicating that the genimometer driving motor, B-401, was running below its rated RPM. Being unable to obtain a floating crane, due to weather conditions in port, in order to reach this otherwise inaccessible antenna for repairs, this equipment was inoperative during the operating period.
- (2) AN/SPS-6B: Air Search Radar: Due to a defective short pulse forming network 2103, the magnetron output current is limited to seven (7) milamperes. The operation of the radar is satisfactory in long pulse. However, this condition is considered very critical since the long pulse is formed by a segment of the network 2103.

#### PART VI - COMMENTS .ND RECOMMENDATIONS

- (A) Operations Department,
  - 1. Air Operations.






ITM:PDM:ss CVE-115/10/Al2 Ser: Oll7

a. Total daily sorties were limited by the inadequate number of pilots attached to VMA-312. The patrol began with twenty three (23) pilots available, and ended with nineteen (19).

b. A total of thirty two (32) aircraft were assigned to JOC TADO for CAS along the Eighth Army Front on the 7th and 8th of June. The weather along the MIR prevented employment of these aircraft. The weather information as a rule tends to be about two (2) hours old when it reaches this Task Unit. It is felt that a more rapid means of transmission, for example the Radar Reporting Net, of weather information in instances such as call CAS would eliminate needless deployment of aircraft.

#### (B) Air Department.

- 1. The second period on the line for the ship with the squadron embarked marked the last time on the line for the Checkerboard Squadron. Safety on the flight deck was stressed and no personnel casualties, other than two (2) minor ones, resulted.
- 2. As reported in the last action Report, the age of the aircraft again caused maintenance difficulties. With the acquisition of four (4) new replacement VHF units, however, the radio maintenance difficulties decreased considerably. The ordnance racks on the aircraft caused loading difficulties for Air Department as well as for squadron personnel. Thirteen (13) aircraft, when originally received on board, were judged incapable by the squadron of carrying certain types of aircraft loading as follows:
- a. Thirteen (13) aircraft not capable of carrying a 1000 pound bomb A premature drop of a 1000 pound bomb from the Mark 8 Mod. 2 center rack during a catapult shot in March of 1953, severely damaged the horizontal stabilizer of the aircraft. This resulted in a RUIM and the discontinued use by the squadron of this rack for a 1000 pound bomb. Mark 51 Mod. 12 racks were ordered as replacements, but as yet, have not been received.
- b. Two aircraft not capable of carrying full wing rocket loading This was traced to wiring difficulties and was corrected by by-passing the present wiring during this period on the line.
- c. One (1) aircraft not capable of carrying wing bomb loading This also was traced to wiring difficulties and was corrected by by-passing the present wiring during this period on the line.
- 3. The helicopter had more than its share of troubles during this period. Due to outstanding maintenance by the Unit embarked, the helicopter was grounded for approximately one day only during operations. The day before the ship was to sail, the helicopter became operative after being



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# DECLASSIFIED

ACCC for four (4) days due to the lack of a driven bell assembly. That afternoon, a test flight saw the helicopter again grounded as a main retor hit a hawk causing replacement of all the main rotor blades. On 4 June, it was found necessary to change the tail rotor gear box and both magnetos. As there were no spare magnetos on board, this necessitated the grounding of the helicopter until the magnetos were cleaned, re-adjusted and tested. It is recommended that all Section Baker allowance material for CVE's operating out of Sasebo be checked carefully to ensure that it is complete.

4. No deck run launches were made during this patrol. Relatively light winds and heavy aircraft gross weights dictated the use of catapults for all launches. The arresting gear and catapult machinery gave trouble—free service during this patrol. Two hundred and forty (240) catapult launchings with an average wind of twenty nino (29) knots resulted in the expenditure of seven (7) bridles. Two hundred and forty four (244) landings were effected with an average wind of twenty seven (27) knots across the deck. Three (3) cross deck arresting pendents were replaced during this patrol.

#### (C) Supply Department.

- 1. The Supply Department continued to function at a pace required by the demands of operations on the line. No difficulties were encountered except as noted in paragraph four (4).
- 2. The following were ACCG at the dates indicated, and all items were received rendering aircraft operational prior to the commencement of corations 30 May.

Date	<u>Aircraft</u>	Bureau No.	Quantity	Stock No.	Nomenclature
19 May	F4U-4B	62916	l ea.	R82-CV-VS-52013-2	Wing Assy.
21 May	F4U-4B	62916	l ea.	re3-cv-vs-34326	Valve
25 May	H03 <b>S-1</b>	123141	l ea.	R82-SKY-5535061	Bell Assy.

3. The following item which was in short supply the previous operation was obtained prior to 30 May from NDS Sasebo:

30 Ea. "N" Kits with two lugs ea.

These kits were used to attach the droppable fuel tanks to the Corsairs.

4. The aviation supply ship, U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8), will meet us on 27 June. Our last replenishment from the JUPITER was on the 14th of May. Reliance for items in short supply was on the "COD" zircraft. It is felt that more frequent replenishment periods from the JUPITER is required or greater use of the "COD" aircraft and the over-burdened communication system will be necessary. Replenishment from the JUPITER after each



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operation would be highly desirable. Depletion of even common items of stock without source of supply is greatly affecting the service which the Supply Department is expected to provide and which it desires to furnish.

- (D) Medical Department.
- l. Fifteen (15) patients were admitted to sick bay during this period. Forty man-days or approximately 2.7 days per admission were spent in sick bay. The only cases which may have been related were three (3) cases of acute conjuntivitis which improved rapidly on penicillin opthalmic ointment.
- 2. One patient was received from the U.S.S. HIGBEE (DER-806) via high line for medical observation.
- 3. Only three cases of veneraal disease were diagnosed during this period. One was urethritis acute due to gonococcus, one chancroid, and one non-gonococcic urethritis. Twenty two cases were reported for the previous month. This gives an incidence of 2.1% which is less than 50% of the reported 4.5% average for the fleet.
  - 4. No pilots were grounded for medical reasons.
- 5. An average of thirty (30) men a day have visited sick call. The majority of complaints are mild upper respiratory complaints.
  - 6. The health and morale of the crew are exceptionally good.

L. T. MORSE

A2	0600	0750	e DECI	STRIKE	1 A/C A 4 A/C B 4 A/C C	YC058023 CP	BEARLUN D JEWSON OBRIEN BEARD GAUSE ORR CLINTON VESPER PERRY
<b>B</b> 3	0745	0935	2	STRIKE	1 A/C D	<b>XC72</b> 0288	GRAY
B4	0745	0935	4	TARCAP	1 A/C B 1 A/C E	TIV XC695557 GUN POSIT	KURFESS COOPER COUWAY GUNNESCH STOCUM
C <b>5</b>	0930	1115	2	STRIKE	1 A/C F 1 A/C B	XC723258	JEMSON THOMAS
c6	0930	1115	4	Hanchon Recco	4 A/C E	GOV HDATRS XD924153 guns in cav	
D7	1300	1450	2	strike	1 A/C G 1 A/C B	YC230128	LYONS
DS	1300	1450	4	STRIKE	4 A/C H	SUPPLIES YC226131 RR BRIDGE	OBRIEN MCQUAY PERRY STOCUM GUNNESCH
E9	1445	1635	2	STRIKE	1 A/C G 1 A/C B	YB <b>34897</b> 0 TI V	CLINTON GAUSE
E10	1445	1635	4	STRIKE	4 Mc I	YC4011268 BRIDGE	COOPER VESPER BEARD THOMAS
Fll	1630	1815	2	STRIKE	1 A/C B 1 A/C G	YB <b>2</b> 069 <b>7</b> 8 TIV	LYONS KURFESS
F12	1630	1815	4	STRIKE	4 N/C B	YC328157	LUDDEN CONWAY VETTER TOPE
NOTE:		lall A . A/C fi			. <b>plus</b> 100 g	al. in belly	tank.
:Olma	A. SAR B. 1 N C. 1 1 D. SAR E. 1 5 F. SAR G. SAR H. 1 5	1 - 4 26 1AP - 6 1000# DO 1 - 6 100# 0/1 1 - 6 F	60 Fra HVAR C/ND 100# 1-5 - 00# in IVAR	g. DC/ND - 2 250# 1 DC/ND 6 100 ins st/.1 - 6 100 # 1	st/.l nst/.l		WEIGHT 14,887 15,340 15,310 14,525 15,015 14,525 14,675 15,015
	I. 15	00# ins	t/.01	- 6 100# 1	nat/.01	CHICAGO HALFON	15.015

20



LTM:PDM:ss CVE-115/10/A12 Ser:

#### WEATHER SULMARY

Yellow Sea

May 31 to June 8 1953

A large low pressure cell covering Manchuria, Korea, Yellow Sea, Japan Sea and the Southern Japanese Islands persisted during the entire operating period. The Polar front remained well to the North of Korea. A quasi-stationary front, oscillating North and South along the South coast of Japan, across the east China sea, and trailing into central China had frequent, and regular, open wave cyclone developments. These open waves traveled along the front at verying speeds (10-30 knots) pushing the front into the Yellow Sea about every other day, causing low ceilings and poor visibility, accompanied with fog patches and occasional rain showers. After the passage of Typhoon "Judy" along the Scuthern Japanese Islands, 6 June, a weak high pressure cell emerged from the depths of China, bringing clearing skys and unlimited visibility.

The average sky cover was eight tenths. On 1, 7, and 8 June, during daylight hours, the ceiling and visibility were unlimited. There were fog patches five hours 31 May, 15 hours 2 June, 18 hours 3 June, and 14 hours on 6 June. It rained 5 hours, intermittently, on 31 May, 2 hours on 1 June (early morning), and sprinkled early morning 1 June, 4 June and evening of 6 June. The average relative humidity was 93 por cent. The highest daily average was 99 per cent on 2 June and the lowest 95 per cent on 8 June. Except in fog and rain visibility was absolutely unlimited. The highest wind velocity was Southeasr 29 knots on 3 June, and the lowest 2 knots from South on 6 June. The average wind velocity was 13 knots. There was a warm frontal passage at 0400Z and a cold frontal passage at 0900Z 31 May. The maximum temperature observed was 65 degrees and the minimum temperature was 55 degrees. The average daily sea temperature rose from 55 degrees on 31 May to 61 degrees on 7 June. The state of the sea was slight. A low southerly swell was caused from "Judy", otherwise unknown.

Enclosure (2)

PETERNAL MEDITALISM

U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115) c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

850. In reply refer to EO:PIM:as CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 0126 17 Jul 1953

Commanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 From:

Chief of Naval Operations To:

(1) Commander Task Group 95.1 Via: (2) Commander Task Force 95

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

DOD DIR 5200.10

(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet

(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East

(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report 17 June through 26 June 1953; submission of

(a) Art. 0705 Navy Regulations Ref:

(b) OPNAW INSTRUCTION 3480.4

(c) CINCPACFLE INSTRUCTION 3480.1A

(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

(1) Sample Air Schedule

(2) Weather Summary

1. In accordance with references (a) through (d), the Action Report of Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 17 June through 26 June 1953 is submitted. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115), was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 17 June until 2100 26 June 1953.

This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

General Narrative. Part I

Chronological Order of Events.

Remarks on performance of ordnance, material and equip-Part III -

ment, including ammunition expenditures.

Summary of own and enemy battle damage. Part IV

Personnel performance and casualties. Part V

Special comments on doctrine and operational procedures. Part VI

3. Information concerning aircraft performance is contained in greater detail in the Naval Air Warfare reports for June 1953 submitted by VMA-332 in accordance with OFNAV INSTRUCTION 3400.1.

#### PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

(A) During the period 17 June through 26 June 1953, the U.S.S. BALROKO (CVE-115), under the command of Captain EMMET O'BETRNE, USN, 63251/1310, with Marine Attack Squadron VMA-332 embarked, operated as part of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 21001 17 June until 21001 26 June 1953, at which time the Commanding Officer, HMS OCEAN, assumed these duties and the

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## SECURITY INFORMATION

U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) proceeded independently to Sasebo, Japan for replenishment. During this reporting period, Task Unit 95.1.1 consisted of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) and a daily minimum of three (3) United Nations destroyers. The following ships operated as part of Task Unit 95.1.1 during the period of this patrol:

HMS CONCORD (DD-03) HMCS HURON (DD-224) U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DDR-743) U.S.S. PRESTON (DD-795)

No more than three (3) of the above screening vessels were in company at one time, while on occasion, the number was reduced to two (2) when a destroyer was detached on special mission or to proceed inshore for mail and fuel. However, when the situation permitted, the destroyers were fueled by the carrier for training purposes and to permit the maximum number of screen ships available at all times.

- (B) Mission. To aid in enforcing the blockade of the West Coast of Korea south of Latitude 39° 35° N., to prevent ingress or egress, mining and supply or reinforcement by sea; to aid in the defense of the occupied West Coast Islands; to provide air support to U.N. Naval Forces and to contribute to the interdiction effort against enemy land forces.
- (C) The U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115) sailed from Sasebo, Japan in company with HMS CONCORD (DD-03), 0500I 17 June, in accordance with instructions contained in CTG 95.1 dispatch 150402Z of June 1953. Due to the necessity for conducting refresher carrier landings enroute to the operating area, window dropping and gunnery exercises were not scheduled. However, due to fog, low ceilings and visibility, air operations were cancelled. At 2100I 17 June, the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115) assumed the duties of CTU 95.1.1. Task Unit 95.1.1 at this time was composed of the U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115), the U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DD-743), the U.S.S. PRESTOM (DD-795) and HMS CONCORD (DD-03).
- (D) Heavy fog, with ceiling and visibility zero, delayed commencement of air operations until 180511. The Task Unit operated in the vicinity of 37° 20' N. and 124° 40' E. during this patrol, retiring on a southerly course each night. The normal operating schedule provided for seven (7) launches of night (8) aircraft. In compliance with a directive from the COM7thFLT, maximum effort was provided for close air support along the bombline. Although coverage of the assigned area was reduced somewhat, TARCAP, the Hanchon Recco and call missions were provided on all occasions when weather permitted. Strikes and recco's were conducted when CAS sorties were not utilized by TACP's and were released to attack pre-briefed targets in West Koroa.
- (E) Two hundred fifty six (256) scheduled sorties were not launched due to extremely poor flying weather throughout most of this patrol. Several attempts were made to launch strikes when ceiling and visibility in the operating area was acceptable, however, the majority of these were unable to



locate or make satisfactory attacks in the target area because of worse conditions prevailing over the land areas. Flying was suspended three days completely, while early morning and late afternoon fog delayed or curtailed all but one day's air operations. A chronological weather summary is included as enclosure (2).

- (F) Many factors played important roles in the conduct of operations during this patrol. The extremely poor flying weather undoubtedly had the greatest effect, however a new squadron, reduced aircraft availability, application of maximum effort to CAS and the mass evacuation of friendly held islands by the Partisan Infantry Regiments, their families and refugees contributed measurably to the shaping of events. Marine Attack Squadron Three Thirty Two (VMA-332) relieved VMA-312 at Kobe, on 10 June, during the replanishment period. The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) returned to action on 18 June with the pilots of VMA-332 making their first carrier launch (strikes over enemy territory), since 25 April. A period of indectrination and familiarization of pilots with the area and with communications and operating procedures ensued. One serious accident occurred involving the loss of a Coraair at son, when the pilot hit the ramp and careened off the ship on the port side aft. The pilot was recovered by the helicopter and suffered only shock, minor abrasions and contusions. The loss of aircraft as a result of two barrior crashes and hard landings severely reduced the availability. As a result of directives from higher authority to expend maximum effort on CAS along the bombline, sorties were limited to required TARCAPS, Recco's and call missions, plus strike and recconnaissance along coastal areas of West Korea. The evacuation of the PIR from positions, on friendly held islands along the coast, considerably reduced the source of fresh and accurate target information. This factor coupled with the pilots unfamiliarity with the area and the low ceiling and visibility prevailing during most of this patrol, forced intelligence personnel to rely heavily on CCRAK (Combined Covert Recoonnaissance Activities, Korea) reports in order to provide pilots with pre-briefed targets suitable for attack.
- (G) No enemy aircraft were encountered by aircraft of this Task Unit during the patrol. Part II of this report contains a flight by flight assessment of damage inflicted on enemy ground targets. The following is a summary of damage based on pilot assessment and reports from Partisan Regiments:

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Large Boat 80' X 15'	1	0
Small Boats	3	0
Buildings (Troop Local	tions) 39	26
Revetted Buildings	5	2
Trucks	ĺ	0
Gun Positions	4	9
Bridges	1	1
Enemy Casualties	un-assessed	un-assessed



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(H) Aircraft of this unit were scheduled for four hundred and ninety four (494) sorties during the patrol. In addition to the two hundred and fifty six (256) sorties cancelled by weather, forty eight (48) were cancelled because of reduced aircraft availability. A summary of hours and sorties flown is included below:

TYPE	NO. OF SORTLES	HOURS
Close Air Support STRIKES Armed Recco TARCAP	12 * 113 25 34	31.5 229.8 58.6 74.2
CAP Total:	- <del>7</del> 1 <del>9</del> 0	12.2 406.3

\* - This represents the actual number of sorties utilized by the front line controllers. All other flights assigned to CAS were released to hit pro-briefed targets.

#### PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

#### 17 June

- O500I Underway from Sasebo in company with HMS CONCORD in accordance with the directions of CTG 95.1 dispatch 150402Z of June.
- 11481 Recovered four (4) squadron F4U's from Itazuka Air Force Base.
- 1200I Refresher landings scheduled for this time were cancelled because of fog.
- 21001 The Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) assumed the duties of CTU 95.1.1.
- 21531 Rendezvoused with HMS OCEAN and assumed operational control of the U.S.S. SOUTHERLIND (DDR-743) and the U.S.S. PRESTON (DD-795).
- 22001 Resumed course for area Nan to commence air operations at 05301 on 18 June.

#### 18 Jung

- O530I The air operations were delayed at this time because of wide-spread fog in the operating area.
- O851I Launched event "A", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. A-1 flight, of four (4) aircraft, was despatched to JOC TADC for CAS along the bombline. No targets were supplied and these aircraft hit a pre-briefed target consisting of troops in the village of Yonan. Two (2) buildings were destroyed in the attack. A-2 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked a transformer west of Haeju with 1000# bombs and HVAR's. No damage assessment was made because of low ceilings.

- 1054I Launched event "B", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. B-3 flight was sent to JCC TADC for CAS, but attacked a pre-briefed target southeast of Yonan when TADC supplied no targets. Hits were made on this target, a gun position, but no damage assessment was made because low ceilings made such action hazardous. B-4 flight, of four (4) aircraft, struck a pre-briefed target of troops in a village south of Kyomip'o. Four (4) buildings were destroyed in the village.
- 1204I Recovered two (2) C.O.D. aircraft from K-18.
- 1300I HMS CONCORD was detached to rendezvous with the HMS TYNE to deliver mail and to refuel inshore.
- 1305I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's and (2) C.O.D. TBM's. C-6 flight, of six (6) aircraft, conducted close air support along the bombline scoring good hits on a hilltop position under Mosquito control.
- 1450I Launchod event "D", consisting of four (4) F4U's. This flight conducted a Han River Recco and also attacked a camouflaged landing strip south of Haeju, scoring a direct hit on the strip and demaging an adjacent building.
- 1736I Recovered event "D", and cancelled operations because of fog in the area of carrier operations.
- 1832I HMS CONCORD rejoined the formation from inshore.
- 1900I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a scutherly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0530I the following day.

#### 19 June

- 05301 Fog in the operating area delayed the first launch.
- O639I Launched event "A", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. A-1 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked troops in a village west of Yonan. Seven (7) buildings were destroyed in the attack. A-2 flight, consisting of four (4) aircraft, struck a gas dump north of Haeju. The area was well covered but poor weather prevented accurate assessment of damage.
- OS411 Launched event "B", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. B-2 flight, of four (4) aircraft, reported to TARC as close air support, but no targets were made available. This flight attacked troops southeast of Haeju, destroying one (1) revetted building. B-4 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked gun positions and barracks while acting as TARCAP for CTU 95.1.4. Four (4) buildings were destroyed and the gun position was damaged.

- 1040I Launched event "C", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. C-5 flight, of four (4) aircraft, reported to TADC as CAS, but no targets were made available. This flight struck troops in a village east of Yonan. The area was well covered. C-6 flight, of four (4) aircraft, conducted a Hanchon Recco. This flight made attacks on gun positions, road bridges and troops in a village northwest of Chinnamp'o. No damage assessment was made because weather conditions made such action hazardous.
- 1200I The U.S.S. PRESTON was detached to fuel inshore and rejoin the formation.
- 13151 Recovered one (1) F4U and one C.O.D. from K-6.
- 13201 Weather conditions in the target area dictated a delay in flight operations.
- 1427I Launched one (1) C.O.D. aircraft and two (2) F4U escorts for K-6.
- 1503I Launched flight D-7, consisting of four (4) FAU's. The flight reported to TADC for CAS but attacked troops and trenches south of Yonan When released by TADC for lack of targets. One (1) building was damaged in this attack.
- 1553I Launched flight E-9, consisting of four (4) FAU's. This flight also reported for CAS, but was released to attack its pre-briefed target located west of Yonan. A village housing troops was attacked and the area was well covered, but no damage assessment was made because of low ceilings in the target area.
- 1655I Launched flight F-11, consisting of five (5) F4U's. This flight was unable to work as close air support because of weather. A village west of Changyon was attacked and seven (7) buildings were damaged, while three (3) were destroyed.
- 1841I Recovered all airborns aircraft and suspended flight operations for the day.
- 1900I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0530I the following day.

#### <u>20 June</u>

- 0200I The U.S.S. PRESTON rejoined the Task Unit from fueling inshore.
- 0530I Air operations were delayed due to fog, low ceilings and drizzle in the target and operating area.
- 1400I Launched Thumbtack One (1) flight, of four (4) F4U's, as CAP and weather recco.



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- 14101 The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND came alongside for refueling.
- 14351 The ships doctor was transferred by helicopter to the U.S.S. PRESTON.
- 1600I The CAP flight was recovered and the ship's doctor returned by helicopter from the U.S.S. PRESTON.
- 1700I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0530I the following day.

#### <u>21 Juno</u>


- 0530I Air operations were delayed due to fog in the operating area.
- OSIOI Launched event "B", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. B-3 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked a gun position and a village housing troops while acting as TARCAP for CTU 95.1.4. The gun position was well covered, three (3) houses in the village were destroyed and two (2) were damaged. B-4 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked the same village destroying one building and damaging three (3) more.
- 1010I Launched event "C", consisting of ten (10) FAU's. C-5 flight, of four (4) aircraft, also TARCAP, attacked troops in a village west of Anak. Anti-aircraft fire prevented damage assessment. C-6 flight, of four (4) aircraft, operating in the TARCAP area, hit at troops in a village southwest of Chinnampo. The village was well covered and three (3) buildings were destroyed in the attack.
- 1015T The U.S.S. PRESTON came alongside the U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115) for refueling.
- 1205I Launched event "D", consisting of seven (7) F4U's. D-7 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked gun positions and villages west of Anak. Two (2) gun positions were well covered and one (1) building was destroyed in the village. D-8 flight, of three (3) aircraft, acted as TARCAP for CTU 95.1.4. One gun position was damaged in attacks made on shore batteries in the Taedong Estuary.
- 1406I Launched event "E", consisting of five (5) F4U's, E-9 flight, of five (5) aircraft, conducted an armed recomnaissance in the Changyon area. Two (2) villages were attacked; seven (7) buildings (including two (2) revetted) were destroyed and three (3) were damaged. This flight originally reported for close air support, but no targets were assigned.
- 1605I Launched event "F", consisting of six (6) F4U's. F-12 flight, of six (6) sircraft, reported to Norseman Control along the bombline for radar control bombing. Twelve (12) runs were made above the overcast and therefore no assessment of the damage was possible.



- 1620I Captain KUHN, USMCR, was severely shaken, when his aircraft flew into the ramp, while making a carrier landing. The landing gear was wiped out and the aircraft slid off the flight deck on the port side and into the water. Captain KUHN was rescued by the holicopter. He suffered no serious injuries but was in a mild state of shock.
- 1747I Launched event "G", consisting of four (4) F4U's. G-13 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked a gun position southwest of Yonan after being released from close air support. No damage assessment was made of the attack because of anti-aircraft fire. Lieutenant Colonel BERTELING, Commanding Officer of VMA-332, received 37MM hit in vertical stabilizer of his aircraft and he and his wingman proceeded to K-6 for landing.
- 1917I Recovered event "G" and Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0530I the following day.
- 2000I Task Unit 95.1.1 conducted exercise "Saint Barbara."

#### 22 June

- Isomehad event "A", consisting of seven (7) F4U's. A-1 flight, of three (3) aircraft, struck at troops in a village south of Yonan after being released from CAS. Three (3) buildings were destroyed in the village. A-2 flight, of four (4) aircraft, reported to Watchcase for CAS but no targets were assigned. A gun position southeast of Yonan was damaged by this flight.
- 0722I Launched event 'B", consisting of five (5) F4U's. B-4 flight, of five (5) aircraft, hit a trench area east of Haeju when weather prevented CAS along the bombline. The trench area was well covered, but no damage assessment was made because of the lack of time and fuel.
- 07411 HMS CONCORD was detached to fuel inshore.
- 09051 Two (2) aircraft of event "B" were diverted to K-6 because of hung ordnance.
- O924I Launched event "C", consisting of six (6) F4U's. Event "C" struck pre-briefed targets east of Haeju when weather prevented CAS along the bombline. No damage assessment was made. An arresting gear casualty forced diversion of this flight to K-6.
- 0934I The casualty to the arresting gear assembly, (a frozen sheave on number one arresting gear engine) necessitated cancellation of further air operations until such time as repairs could be effected.
- 14051 HMS CONCORD rejoined the formation.
- 1830I Cancelled all air operations for the day. Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0530I the following day.



#### 23 June

- 0627I Launched event "B", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. B-3 flight, of eight (8) aircraft, were unable to reach target because of bad weather and returned to the ship.
- 11271 Launched event "D", consisting of seven (7) F4U's. D-7 flight, of three (3) aircraft, reported to CTU 95.1.4 as TARCAP. One gun position was damaged while another was well covered. D-S flight, of four (4) aircraft, also hit two (2) Jun positions in the TARCAP area. A direct hit was scored on one position while no damage assessment was made on the other.
- 14001 The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND came alongside for fueling.
- 1442I Launched event "E", consisting of seven (7) F4U's. E-9 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked a group of small beats west of Anak.

  Three (3) small beats were destroyed and one gun position in the same area was hit with the remaining ordnance. E-10 flight, of three (3) aircraft, attacked a gun position in the same area; the position was well covered and considered to be badly damaged.
- 1456I Recovered ten (10) F4U's from K-6.
- 16211 Launched event "F", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. F-ll flight, of eight (8) aircraft, attacked four (4) 76MM gan positions on Chemido which were menacing friendly islands in the Haeju Bay area. Four (4) of the gun positions were destroyed and a trench area was well covered with Napalm and HVAR's. CTU 95.1.6 assessed the attack and reported all objectives destroyed.
- 1714I HMCS HURON joined the formation from CTG 95.1.
- 1725I HMS CONCORD was detached to the operational control of CTG 95.1.
- launched event "G", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. G-13 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked primary target of troops in villages southwest of Changyon. No damage assessment was made of this attack because of low ceilings. This flight discovered a beat, length eighty (80) feet, beam fifteen (15) feet, in an inlet north of Choppeki point. The boat was destroyed with five hundred (500) and one hundred (100) pound bombs. A secondary explosion occured. G-14 flight, of four (4) aircraft, destroyed three (3) revetted buildings in the same area southwest of Changyon.
- 2000I Recovered "G" flight. Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0530I the following day.



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#### <u> 24 Juna</u>

- 0515I Waather along the MIR prevented CAS Operations.
- O523I Launched event "A", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. One aircraft aborted because of a rough running engine. A-1 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked a road bridge southwest of Changyon. The road bridge area was well covered and one truck which was hidden in the area was damaged. A-2 flight, of three (3) aircraft, was anable to reach its target area because of weather and returned after jettisoning its ordnance load.
- 0725I Launched event "B", consisting of eight (8) F4U's. B-3 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked troops in a village northwest of Sinchon. Two (2) buildings were destroyed. B-4 flight, of four (4) aircraft, damaged a gun position south of Yonan.
- 0939I Launched event "C", consisting of four (4) F40 s. U-6 flight, of four (4) Aircraft, conducted a Hanchon Recco. A road bridge northwest of Chimampo was damaged.
- 1025I Launched event "D", consisting of four (4) F4U's. D-8 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked a gun position southeast of Haeju. Anti-aircraft fire prevented assessment of damage.
- 13001 Launched event "E", consisting of four (4) F4U's. E-9 flight, of four (4) aircraft, attacked troops in a village southwest of Chinnampo damaging eight (8) buildings.
- 1305I Launched two (2) fly-away duds for K-6. Fog in the operating area prevented further air operations for the day.
- 13301 The PRESTON came alongside for fueling.
- 17001 The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND was detached to proceed on a special ECM mission.
- 1800I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0530I the following day.

#### 25 Jung

- 03151 U.S.S. SOUTHERLIND rejoined from special mission.
- O4OOI HMCS HURON was detached to fuel inshore.
- 11021 HMCS HURCN rejoined the unit from inshers. The weather in the target and operating area prevented air operations. Fog, drizale and low ceilings prevailed throughout the day.



#### 26 June

- 0500I Fog in the operating area delayed air operations.
- 1220I The U.S.S. PRESTON came alongside for fueling and personnel transfer.
- 1440I The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND came alongside for fueling and personnel transfer.
- 1500I Air operations were cancelled because of the inclement weather (fog and drizzle) and the Task Unit departed the operating area.
- 21.001 The Commanding Officer, HMS OCEAN, assumed the duties of CTU 95.1.1.
- 23011 Rendezvoused with HMS OCEAN and detached the U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND and U.S.S. PRESTON to HMS OCEAN.
- 23151 The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) proceeded enroute Sasebo via area George with HMCS HURON in company.

## PART III - REMARKS ON PERFORMANCE OF ORINANCE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL

- (A) Performance of Ordnance Equipment and Material.
- 1. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.
- 2. Listed below are the malfunctions oncountered during this period:

#### a. Wing Guns.

(1) Broken Sear		1
(2) Failure to charge	· 🖚	7
(3) Link jams	-	4
(4) Feeder troubles		4
(5) Failure to feed	ma ,	1
(6) Failures to extract	-	5
(7) Faulty Timing and Headspacing	-	3
(8) Electrical Wiring trouble	-	2

#### b. Rockets - Failure to fire.

(1) Pigtails blown out	-	12
(2) Broken Pigtails	-	4
(3) Electrical troubles		2





#### c. Bomb Malfunctions.

(1) 1000# GP released manually	_	J
(Sway braces too tight)		
(2) 500# GP torn off at end of cata-		
pult, when the bridal caught the		
sway braces and tore off a pylon		1
(3) Outer panel loads hung		
(A Electrical trouble - 2 Pilot error)	-	6

#### d. Dud Ordnance.

(1)	511	HVAR's	(Cause	unknown	)		8
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#### (B) Ammunition Expenditures.

1. During the period covered by this report, the following ord-nance was expended:


#### DY VMA-332 AIRCRAFT

1000# GP	ខ
500# GP	151
250# GP	192
100# GP	479
Napalm	6
5" HVAR	364
3.25" WP	30
20MM Rds	
50 Cal. Rds	20,575

### PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

- (A) Own Battle Damage.
  - 1. None to vessel.
- 2. One aircraft received a hit in vertical stabilizer as a result of 37MM anti-aircraft fire. One aircraft received a hit by small arms fire.
  - (B) Battle Damage Inflicted on Enemy.
    - 1. Ships of this unit inflicted no damage on the enemy.





2. During this period of combat operations, the aircraft of this unit inflicted the following damage on the enemy:

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Large Boat 30' X 15'	1	0
Small Boats	3	0
Buildings (Troop Locations)	39	<b>2</b> 6
Revetted Buildings	5	2
Trucks	1	0
Gun Positions	4	9
Bridges	1	ì
Enemy Casualties	un-assessed	un-asseased

#### PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

#### (A) Personnel.

- 1. Morale was high during this patrol on the line.
- 2. The personnel strength of squadron and ship's company was as listed below:

	<u>VIIA-332</u>	BAIROKO
Officers:	48	68
Enlisted Men:	190	<b>79</b> 8

### (B) Recreation.

1. The following activities for Welfare and Recreation were available during this period:

a. A daily newspaper, the BAIROKO News, was distributed to ships in the screen with the Guard Mail trips.

- b. The crew's library was open each evening until taps.
- c. Movies were held nightly on the Mess Deck and in the Wardroom.

#### (C) Divine Services.

- 1. Protestant Morning Devotions were held each morning at 0740. Catholic Rosary was said each day at 1605 in the library and Bible Classes met three (3) times a week at 1900.
- 2. On Sunday 21 June, Protestant Divine Service was held in the crew's library at 0900, followed by Catholic Rosary. Latter Day Saints service was held at 1400 in the library.



- (D) Casualties Personnel.
  - 1. There were no personnel casualties due to enemy action.
- 2. The pilot whose plane struck the after end of the flight deck and continued over the port side of the ship suffered the only injury of this patrol. Injuries consisted of multiple abrasions, contusions and minor lacerations. The pilot suffered no ill effects from being under water for approximately one-half minute, but was grounded for the remainder of the patrol.
  - (E) Casualties Material.
    - 1. Engineering.
      - a. Main Propulsion, Auxiliaries and Electrical Equipment.
- (1) Leaks developed in three handhole plugs on the economizer header of No. three (3) boiler. Temporary repairs were effected underway, using sheet asbestos gasket material which proved satisfactory.
- (2) No. 1 and 2 Turbo-generators were limited to 300 KW load to limit the temperature rise to 70° C. due to exhaust blower bearing trouble. Exhaust blower 2-76-1 was limited to low speed operation to reduce the possibility of a bearing failure. The electrical load was shifted to No. 3 and 4 Turbo-generators on completion of this patrol and blower repairs were made.
  - b. Damage Control.
    - (1) No damage or failures occurred.
  - c. Electronics.
- (1) AN/SPS-68 Air Search Radar During a period of four (4) days, five (5) crystals and three (3) TR tubes were replaced in the AN/SPS-6B Radar. The reason for the rapid burning out of these units has not yet been determined. However, the operation of the Radar is satisfactory at the present time, having been in operation over two (2) days since the last TR tube was replaced.
- (2) TCK Radio Transmitter One TCK Transmitter was inoperative this cruise due to a defective field coil in the motor generator set. Immediately prior to departure for the operating area, a field coil was received aboard from supply channels, but was not the right coil, although the stock number on the requisition and invoice were correct.
- (3) The SP altitude Determining Radar continued to be incoperative throughout the patrol.



### PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### (A) Operations Department.

#### 1. Air Operations.

a. A daily flight schedule consisting of fifty six (56) sorties was standard for this patrol. All sorties, other than those assigned CTU 95.1.4 for daily TARCAP and the Hanchon Recco, were assigned for close air support missions along the Eighth Army front. However, only twelve (12) of these CAS sorties were utilized by the front line controllers. The maximum effort provided by shore based units as well as TF 77 evidently taxed the control facilities necessitating the release, to hit pre-briefed targets, of all flights they were unable to control. Inclement weather throughout most of this patrol was also considered to have considerably limited complete utilization of sorties available. Consequently, a total of seventy six (76) sorties reported for CAS during the patrol and sixty four (64) were released by the TACPs to strike pre-briefed targets in northwest Korea.

b. The aircraft and pilot complement, twenty four (24) and forty (40) respectively, at the beginning of the patrol was assumed to be ample to support a daily schedule of fifty six (56) sorties. The loss, however, of one aircraft over the side, two (2) more by barrier crashes and the rendering of three (3) aircraft unfit for carrier operations due to structural damage caused by hard landings and/or metal fatique soon reduced the number of aircraft available for combat to eighteen (18). The percent availability of these remaining aircraft coupled with unsuitable weather necessitated a great amount of re-scheduling and cancellation of scheduled missions in order to effectively employ the aircraft. As a result of this reduced availability, plus the unusually poor weather conditions, five (5) TARCAP missions (20 sorties), fifty five (55) CAS missions (217 sorties) and three (3) Hanchon Recco missions (12 sorties) were not launched. Included below is a daily breakdown of air operations for this patrol.

SORTTES	SCHEDULED	FLOWN	weather <u>canceljed</u>	AVAILABILITY CANCELLED
18 June 19 June	<b>5</b> 6 <b>5</b> 6	26 37	24 8	1 <u>1</u>
20 June 21 June	56 58	40	52 8	0 <b>1</b> 0
22 June 23 June	56 58	18 38 27	32 18 16	0 2 13
24 June 25 June 26 June	56 56 42	0	56 42	0
TOTALS:	494	190	256	48

Percentage of scheduled sorties cancelled due to weather - 51.8%.
Percentage of scheduled sorties cancelled due to availability - 9.7%
Percentage of scheduled sorties permitted by the weather that were cancelled because of low availability of aircraft - 20.1%

## SECURITY INFORMATION

#### 2. Electronics Counter-measures (Passive).

a. As in the past, considerable effort was expended to increase the training of personnel and gain experience in all aspects of passive electronics countermeasures. Daily EMCON orders, and intermittent (time sharing) plans were placed in effect to familiarize personnel of all ships in the Task Unit with the proceedures and problems involved and to permit ECM intercepts of enemy coastal radar installations. Much value was received from . this program and several contacts of enemy radars were reported. An error in the tabulated characteristic for PRF of a British early warning radar was discovered only after considerable effort was expended to positively establish a particular contact as a new enemy installation. Several bearings were obtained and verified by ships in the Task Unit after which a destroyer was detached on special mission to obtain cross bearings. These were obtained leading to the conviction a new installation had been discovered, however, it was learned later that a British Cruiser operating in the near vicinity of the point of intercoption was operating a radar with a TRF not as listed, but instead its characteristics were similar to those obtained by intercept. This error has been reported and should cause no difficulties in the future.

RECOMMENDATION: A careful study be made of the characteristics of friendly radars listed in all pertinent instructions and reports, to eliminate the possibility of future occurrences of this nature.

#### (B) Air Department.

#### 1. General.

a. This period on the line was a shakedown period for Marine Attack Squadron VMA-332, and it marked the first time that a majority of the officers and men had lived aboard ship in other than a transient or training status. None of the pilots had made a carrier landing for approximately one and one half (1½) months and weather accompanying Typhoon "Judy" had permitted only the minimum number of field carrier landing practices during the squadron's week at Itami prior to their coming aboard. The squadron had relieved Marine attack Squadron VMA-312, of all aircraft, tools, records, etc., the previous in-port period and with the whole-hearted cooperation and earnestness on their part rapidly adjusted themselves to the ship's routine on the line. Two (2) major difficulties demanded the attention of all concerned.

#### 2. Maintenance.

a. The aircraft received were a disappointment to the squadron. As reported in the BAIROKO's first Action Report, this tour forward, these aircraft have had many flight hours, considerable service tours and their age makes satisfactory availability difficult. There were two (2) barrier crashes, four (4) aircraft were damaged due to hard landings and one (1) aircraft hit the ramp and went over the side. One of the barrier crashes and one of the hard landings resulted in major overhauls. Five replacement aircraft, for the two (2) needing major overhaul, two (2) flown to K-6 and one lost at sea, were requested from the First Marine Air Wing. On 25 June

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squadron and Marine Air Group Twelve (12) pilots were to fly the aircraft aboard from K-6, but extremely unfavorable weather prevented their delivery until 27 June enroute to Sasebo. These conditions, together with the fact that squadron maintenance personnel were inexperienced with and not organized for shipboard maintenance, resulted in low aircraft availability.

#### 3. Ordnance.

a. Almost every flight had alreraft returning with hung one hundred (100) pound bombs or rockets. Four (4) aircraft were sent to K-6 as a result of hung 250# bombs. One 500# bomb was dropped during a catapult launch on the H-4 catapult, apparently as a result of the bridle striking the Mark-C bomb shackle, tearing it loose from the aircraft and causing the bomb to drop. The bomb hit the ramp and was deflected into the water. A number of the hung rockets, particularly in the first days of the tour, were attributed to personnel inexperience since insertion of the rocket pigtails was faulty. Contributing to this is the poor design of the pigtail on the old type HVAR Rocket and the difficulty of properly inserting the pigtail into the wing on the FAU-AB aircraft.

#### 4. Material.

a. On 22 June 1953, after the sixth landing of the day on the number one arresting unit, the first small sheave on the after side of the movable crosshead failed. The lubrication by the automatic lubricator appeared to be normal both before and after the failure. It was determined to necessary at this time to replace all small sheaves and shafts and approximately ton and one half hours were required to remove the movable crosshead and effect the repair. As a preventive measure, a new automatic lubricator was installed. The small sheaves on this unit had been replaced on 3 April 1952 and had a total of 1211 landings before failure. No direct cause for failure was found, but an indirect cause is the exceedingly hard usage given the Mark-IV arresting units by AF Aircraft operated by this ship in the previous months in the forward area.

b. It is recommended that CVE's operating AF aircraft be given priority on the installation of the Mark-V arresting gear.

#### (C) Supply Department.

1. The Supply Department continued to function at a pace required by the demands of operations on the line.

#### 2. The following were ACOG at the dates indicated:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	Bureau No.	Quantity	Stock No.	<u>Nomenclature</u>
6-17	F4U-4	698 <b>7</b> 0	2 Ea.	VS-43667	Clamp Assy.
6-17	F4U-4	698 <b>7</b> 0	6 Ea.	VS-43550	Clamp Assy.
6-21	F4U-4B	6 <b>2</b> 985	1 Ea.	R05-PV-151071	Cylindor Assy.

All the above aircraft were removed from the ACOG list prior to 24 June 1953.

## MECURITY INFORMATION

- 3. Aviation spares in many cases reached a zero balance or were below the low limit. As stated in the previous action report, this was to be expected because of the long period between replenishments from the aviation supply ship U.S.S. JUPITER (AVS-8). Only a small amount of material was brought aboard by the C.O.D. aircraft due to limitations of the carrying ability, material available at K-6, and cancellations of C.O.D. flights due to adverse weather conditions.
- 4. Recommendations for increased aviation supply availability have been made in the previous action report.
  - (D) Medical Department.
- 1. Sick call attendance during this patrol was higher than usual, with over forty (40) attending daily, however, only thirteen (13) patients were admitted to sick bay. As usual, the majority of cases are concerned with diseases of the upper respiratory tract.
- 2. Six cases of venereal disease developed during this period, four were urethritis due to genococcus, and two were chancroid.
- 3. One pilot was grounded because of minor injuries received as a result of his aircraft going over the side of the ship.
  - 4. The health and morals of the crew is excellent.

EMMET O'BELRNE

#### WEATHER SUMMARY

18-26 June 1953

RESTRICTED

The predominate feature of the weather was the dramatic role played by the quasi-stationary front oscillating north and south across the Yellow Sea as rythmic open waves formed along the front, presumably around Shanghai and further to the southwest.

On two occasions, 20 and 24 June, the cyclones deepened considerably and occluded moving very slowly east-northeastward into the Japan Sea. The centers of these systems all passed to the southward of the Oboe area, but left the target area well covered with multi-layer clouds, extremely low ceilings, rain, drizzle, fog and poor visibility, for twelve to twenty four hours after passing Oboe. The generally poor flying conditions can be attributed, and were accentuated, by high index conditions at the 500 millibar level.

The average sky cover was nine-tenths. Ceiling and visibility were unlimited from 1300I, 23rd June until 1400I, 24th June. The relling at all other times was variable from zero to 5000 feet or more and changed rapidly. There were fog patches: 4 hours 16th, 12 hours 19th, 2 hours 20th, 6 hours 24th, and all day 25th and 26th.

It rained intermittently 12 hours 19th, 2 hours 20th, 11 hours 22nd and sprinkled the forenoon of the 23rd and the afternoon of the 25th. The average relative humidity was 93%. The highest daily average was 99% on 25 and 26 June, and the lowest was 85% on 21 June. The highest wind velocity observed was from the East at 30 knots, 19 June, during the passage, to the southward, of an intensifying low pressure system. The average wind velocity was 12 knots, and the lowest, 2 knots from the south. The maximum temperature 73 degrees F; the minimum 63 degrees F., and the sea temperature averaged 65.5 F. The general state of the sea was slight to moderate.

1

Enclosure (2)

RESTRICTED

TIME		VISIBILITY
18 JUNE	CETLING AND REMARKS	1/8 mi.
0500 <b>I</b>	Zero, heavy fog.	10 mi.
06001	8001 - overcast.	1/8 mi.
0 <b>7001</b>	100' - overcast.	
08001	Thin obscuration, 20,000! - scattered.	1/4 mi.
0 <b>900I</b>	Thin obscuration, 20,000' - scattered.	6 mi.
16001	2001 - overcast.	1/8 m1.
1700I	20,000' - scattered.	3 mi.
18001	2001 - overcast.	1/2 ml.
1900I -	10,000! - overcast.	7 mi.
19 June	•	
	3.000* - overcast. Very hazy.	μπ.
0500I		7 mi.
0600I		7 mi.
12001	J, 400	7 mi.
1300 <b>I</b>	3,000' - overcast. Rain showers.	, ,
20 June		
0500I	500t - overcast. Drizzle.	1/2  mi.
06001	5001 - overcast. Rain.	1/2  mi.
0700I	800! - overcast. Rain.	l mi.
•	500' - overcast. Drizzle.	l mi.
0800I	800' - overcast.	7 mi.
09001	5001 - overcast. Fog.	l∌ mi.
10001		2 mi.
11001	The state of the s	l mi.
12001		1/8  mi.
1300I	2001 - obscured. Fog.	8 mi.
MOOI	800! - overcast. 400! - obscured. Fog and Drizzle.	1/2  mi
1430I	·•·	7 mi.
15001	800' - overcast.	8 mi.
16001	2001 - overcast.	10 mi.
1700I	800¹ → overcast.	TO MILE
<u> 21 June</u> -		
0500 <b>T</b>	1500'- scattered. 5000' overcast. Rain.	6 <b>mt.</b>
06001	15001- scattered. 50001 overcast. Rain.	10 mi.
07001	1500 - scattered. 5000 overcast. Rain N.E.	7 mi.
0800 <b>I</b>	15001- scattered, 20001 overcast.	7 mi.
09001	1000'- overcast.	10 mi.
10001	1000t - overcast.	10 m <b>i.</b>
11001	1000'- Broken.	10 <b>mi.</b>
12001	800° - Broken. Balloon.	10 <b>mi</b> .
1300I	8001 - Broken.	10 mi.
14001	1500'- Broken.	10 <b>mi.</b>
1500 <b>I</b>	1500'- scattered.	10 m1.
1600I	2000's Broken. 20,000's Broken	10 mì.
17001	2000: scattered, 20,000: Broken.	10 mi.
16001	1500'- scattered. 20,000'. scattered.	10 mi.
19001	1500'- scattered, 20,000', scattered.	10 mi.
2,002		

Very low ceilings over target area all day.

TIME	CEILING AND REMARKS	VISIBILITY
22 June		
05301	9000(- overcast.	lo mi.
	Ceiling lowered throughout the morning.	
14001	2000* - overcast	7 mi.
16001	1000t - light rain.	7 mi.
1700I	1000' - light rain.	7 mi.
18001	1000 -	8 mi.
19001	1000 - Drizzle.	o mr.
23 June	·	
0600 <b>I</b>	1000! - broken. 6,000! - broken. 20,000! scat	tered. 10 mi.
0 <b>700I</b>	1000' - broken. 6,000' - obscurred - overcast	. 10 mi.
<b>38001</b>	1000' - scattered. 6,000' - obscurred. overce	10 mi.
09001	1000! - scattered. 3000! - obscured 1000! - scattered. 2500! - obscured	10 mi.
10001	10007 - scattered. 2500? - obscured.	10 mi.
1100I 1200I	1000' - scattered. 2500' - obscured.	30 ma.
1300I	CAVU -	
24 June		
OFPOT	CAVU until -	
0530I 1400I	E. 2500* - obscured.	7 mi.
1500I	1500! - obscured.	6 m <b>i.</b>
1600I	4001 - obsoured.	6 mi.
17001	300' - obscuredFog.	3 mi.
13001	200' - obscured - Fog.	2 mi. 1/8 mi.
19001	Fog.	7,0 m.
25 June		·
05001	500' - overcast.	7 mi.
06001	500' - balloon. ceiling.	7 mi.
0700I	Fog.	1/8 mi. 10 mi.
08001	800' - scattered. 7,000' - scattered.	S ml.
09001	2000! - overcast.	1/4 mi.
10001	Fog. Fog.	1/8 mi.
1100I 1200I	Fog.	l mi.
13001	Fog.	1/3 mi.
14001	Fog.	1/4 mi.
15001	Balloon - ceiling 500.	7 mi. 7 mi.
16001	Balloon - ceiling 500:	7 mi.
17001	Estimated 5001. Rain.	7 ml.
18001	Estimated 500%. Rain.	l <del>1119-0</del>

TIME	CETLING AND REMARKS	VISIBILITY
26 June		
0400I 0500I 0600I 0700I 0800I 0900I 1000I 1100I 1200I	Ceiling and visibility zero. E. 7,000' - scattered. Fog. Ceiling and visibility zero. Ceiling and visibility zero. Ceiling and visibility zero. Fog. Ceiling 200' - Fog. Ceiling 400' - Fog. Ceiling 400' - Fog. Ceiling 500' - Haze.	1/2 mi. 1/4 mi. 1/8 mi. 4 mi. 4 mi. 5 mi.

4

DE CALLOS TALLED ON

U.S.S. BAIRONO (CVE-115) c/o Float Post Office San Francisco, California In reply refer to:

EO:PIM:ss CVE-115/10/A12 Ser: 0127 20 July 1953

From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Unit 95.1.1

Tot

Chief of Naval Operations

Via:

(1) Commander Task Group 95.1

(2) Commander Task Force 95

(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet

(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East (5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS: DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

850<sup>6</sup>

DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report 5 July through 14 July 1953; submission of

Ref:

(a) Art. 0705 Navy Regulations

(b) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

(c) CINCPACELT INSTRUCTION 3480.14

(d) CTG 95.1:OpOrder 2-52

Encl:

(1) Sample Air Schedule

(2) Weather Summary

- 1. In accordance with references (a) through (d), the Action Report of Task Unit 95.1.1 for the period 5 July through 14 July is submitted. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), was Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 from 2100 5 July until 2100 14 July 1953.
- 2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

Part I - General Narrative.

Part II - Chronological Order of Events.

Part III - Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equip-

ment, including ammunition expenditures.

Part IV - Summary of own and enemy battle damage.

Part V - Personnel performance and casualties.

Part VI - Special comments on doctrine and operational procedures.

3. Information concerning aircraft performance is contained in greater detail in the Naval Air Warfare reports for July 1953 submitted by VMA-332 in accordance with OFNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.1.

## PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE

(A) During the period 5 July through 14 July, the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), under the command of Captain EMMET O'BEINNE, USN, 63251/1310, with Marine Attack Squadron (VMA-332) embarked, operated as part of the U.S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115), relieved the Commanding Officer of HMS OCEAN as Commander Task Unit 95.1.1 at 2100 5 July and was in turn relieved of the duties as CTU 95.1.1 by the Commanding

2-AUC 1053

ORIGINAL



Officer HMS OCEAN at 2100 14 July 1953. During this reporting period, Task Unit 95.1.1 consisted of the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) and a deily minimum of three United Nations destroyers. The following ships operated as part of Task Unit 95.1.1 during the period of this patrol.

HMCS IROQUOIS (DD-217) U.S.S. BUCK (DD-761) U.S.S. PRESTON (DD-795)

U.S.S. CHEVALIER (DIR-805)
U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND (DDR-743)

- (B) <u>Mission</u>. To aid in enforcing the blockade of the west coast of Korea south of Latitude 39° 35' N., to prevent ingress or egress, mining, or supply and reinforcement by sea; to aid in the defense of the occupied west—coast islands; to provide air support to U.N. Naval Forces, and to contribute to the interdiction effort against enemy land forces.
- (C) The U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) sailed from Sasebo, Japan at 15001 4 July in accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 030738Z of July 1953. Departure was effected at this time to provide sea room for evasion of Typhoon 'Kit" and to insure arrival in the operating area on schedule. At 2100H 5 July, the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) assumed command of Task Unit 95.1.1 which consisted of the U.S.S. BUCK (DD-761), the U.S.S. PRESTON (DD-795) and the U.S.S. CHEVALIER (DDR-805).
- (D) Three or four destroyers were in the Task Unit during the major, part of the tour and a circular concentric screen was utilized for air operations as well as night steaming. When only two destroyers were available, a bent-line screen was utilized. The Task Unit operated in the vicinity of 37° 20' N. and 124° 55 Eduring the patrol retiring southward on completion of each days flight operations. Aircraft of the Task Unit were scheduled to commance air operations against the enemy at 0530I 6 July, however no flights were conducted until 09311 7 July due to widespread rain. fog and low ceilings throughout area. The air operations schedule provided for fifty mix (56) sorties daily, however bad weather usually morning fog, reduced the number of daily missions. Twenty daily sorties were supplied to tactical air controllers along the Eighth Army Front until the failure of both catapults on 10 July necessitated dack launching aircraft without external fuel tanks. External fuel, required for CAS flights to the bombline was sacrificed to facilitate deck run launches, since the relative wind across the dack was usually less than 25 knots. Scheduled daily sorties consisted of TARCAP for CTU 95.1.4, daily reconnaissance of the Han River Estuary and pre-briefed strikes. A reconnaissance of the area north of the Taedong River Estuary to Hanchon was scheduled on alturnate days and were coordinated with F-86 Sabra sweeps in this area,
- (E) The absence of detailed weather reports from the target area resulted in many strikes attacking alternate targets or conducting armed reconnaissance when low cellings prevented hitting primary targets.



DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

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- (F) Increased activity was evident during this patrol on the peninsula southwest of Haeju. This activity consisted of enemy construction of new trenchworks and gun positions, especially along the coastline. It was also noted that bridge reconstruction appears to be a top priority operation in northwest Korea. Daily strikes were sent to the Haeju area and a major effort was made to harass bridge reconstruction. Due to lower ceilings and higher terrain inland the major harassment affect was limited to coastal areas. This patrol was marked by an increase in intelligence information supplied by the First, Second and Sixth Partisan Infantry Regiments. All targets supplied by these units were attacked as time and weather permitted. All Partisan Infantry Regiment's target information was considered to be reliable however, it is felt that the First Partisan Infantry Regiment was the most reliable and certainly the most prompt and accurate in scrike evaluation. The most important single agency for target information was the file of photographs received from HMS OCEAN.
- (G) No emmy aircraft were encountered by aircraft of this flask Unit during the petrol. Part II of this report contains a flight by flight assessment of damage inflicted on enemy ground targets. The Rollowing summary of damage is based on pilot assessment and reports from Partisan Regiments.

TARGET	DESTROYED	LATATED
Small Boats Buildings (Troop Positions)	3 192	9 .25
Warehouses	7	<u>, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , </u>
Supply Dumps	1	2
Road Bridges	. 3	3
Gun Positions	· 2	9
Observation Posts	1	Ü
Trucks	1	Ü
Oxen	31	O
Troops	73 WIA	<b>3</b> 5 ₩¤A

#### TOTAL CASUALTIES UNASSESSED

(H) Aircraft of this Unit were scheduled for fifty six sorties a day and were airborne from dawn to dusk each day that weather permitted. A summary of hours and sorties is included below:

TYPE	NO. SORTIES	HOURS
CAS	* 49	122.6
STRIKES	181	374.1
ARMED RECCO	44	121.6
CAP	9	18.0
TARCAP	22	51.0
PHOTO RECCO	TOTAL: 308	8.1

\* This number of CAS sorties represents the number utilized by front line controllers. All other sorties were released to hit pre-briefed targets. DECLASSIFIED

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## PART II - CHRONOLUCICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

#### 4 July

15001 Underway from Sasebo, Japan in accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch 030738Z of July to rilieve the HMS OCEAN in Task Unit 95.1.1 by 21001, 5 July. High winds and seas caused by the influence of Typhoon "Kit", then southeast of Formosa, necessitated an early departure from Sasebo in order to insure arrival in the operating area on schedule.

## 5 July

- 1930I Passed HMS OCEAN and assumed operational control of the U.S.S. CHEVALIER (DIR-805), U.S.S. EUCK (DD-761) and the U.S.S. FRESTON DD-795). Continued steaming at various courses and speeds to arrive in area Nan at 0530I, 6 July 1953 to commence air operations against the enemy.
- 2100I The Commanding Officer U.S.S. Balkoko (CVE-115) assumed the duties of CTU 95.1.1.

### 6 July


- O2001 The U.S.S. PRESTON was detached to proceed inshore for fuel and to return on completion of fueling.
- O530I Air operations scheduled to commence at this time were delayed because of main and low ceilings in both the carrier and target areas. High winds and seas resulted from the passage of Typhoon "Kit".
- 1022I The U.S.S. PRESTON rejoined the unit from inshore.
- 16201 HMCS IROQUOIS joined the unit from Sasebo.
- 1700I Air operations were cancelled and the Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night returning to conduct air operations at 0530I.

- 0530I Low ceilings, rain and fog rendered air operations unfeasible. The weather still reflected the passage of Typhoon "Kit".
- O610I HMCS IROQUOIS came alongside to transfer mail to the BAIROKO,
- 0708I U.S.S. BUCK came alongside for mail transfer.
- 07421 The U.S.S. CHEVALIER come alongside to transfer personnel and mail.

- O9311 Launched seven Corsairs. Three Corsairs constituted Thumbtack Five flight which acted as combat air patrol for the Task Unit. Six Thumbtack flight, made up of the remaining four Corsairs, conducted radar controlled bombing (MPQ) in support of the Eighth Army along the bombline.
- lli8I Launched eight Corsairs. Seven Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked troops in a village southeast of Changyon. Three buildings were destroyed and one boat was damaged. Eight Thumbtack flight of four aircraft conducted radar controlled bombing (MPQ) along the Eighth Army front.
- Launched thirteen Corsairs. Thumbtack One flight of two aircraft acted as CAP for the Task Unit. Three Thumbtack flight of three aircraft photographed the airstrip at Haeju and a navigation channel east of the island of Yongmae-do in the Han River Estuary. Two photo escort planes scored a direct hit on a road bridge west of Haeju on the return flight. Nine Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked a supply dump seutheast of Yonan. The area was well covered and because of intense small arms fire no damage assessment was made. Ten Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked a salt processing plant and storage area on the Yonan peninsula in the Han River Estuary. Four warehouses were destroyed.
- 1535I Launched two Corsairs and one TBM COD plane which came aboard one hour previously with passengers and freight from K-6. Eleven Thumbtack flight of two planes escorted the COD aircraft to Point "C" and then acted as TARCAP for TU 95-1.4. This flight badly damaged one boat which was beached west of Chinnampo.
- 1739I Launched ten Corsairs. Thirteen Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked a troop concentration on the northern shore of the Taedong Man near Choppeki Point. Six buildings were destroyed, fires were started and troops were bombed and strafed. Fourteen Thumbtack flight of six aircraft attacked another troop concentration on the south shore of the same bay. This flight also started fires and scored four direct hits on bunkers in the area.
- 1804I Number six cross-deck pendant partod when engaged by the aircraft piloted by Captain KNUCER. As a result of this accident, the ten airborne aircraft were sent to K=6 for landing.
- 1700I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

## g July

0530I Adverse weather, fcg low ceilings and visibility forced postponement of air operations.




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
- OS19I The U.S.S. BUCK closed the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) for fueling.
- 1009I Launched eight Corsairs. All eight aircraft, Three Thumbtack and Two Thumbtack flight, conducted radar controlled bombing along the Eighth Army front.
- 1052I The U.S.S. CHEVALIER closed the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) for fueling.
- 1454I Launched seven Corsairs. Six Thumbtack flight of three aircraft attacked revettments southwest of Changyon. Damage was not observed because of ground fire. Seven Thumbtack flight of four aircraft hit at targets located southwest of Anak. One gun position and one boat was damaged and four buildings were destroyed in a troop concentration point. Four exam were killed as a result of strafing attacks.
- 1531I Launched Right Thumbtack flight consisting of seven Corsairs. This flight destroyed an observation post and ten buildings west of Anak suspected of housing troops.
- 1921I Recovered One Corsair and one COD TBM from K-6.
- 1930I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a scutherly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.
- 2002I The Task Unit conducted exercise "Saint Barbara" with each ship firing two rounds por barrel of each close range weapon manned. The elapsed times from signal to the first round are as follows:

U.S.S. BAIROKO1 minute- O8 secondsHMCS IROQUOIS1 minute- 50 secondsU.S.S. CHEVALIER1 minute- 52 secondsU.S.S. PRESTON1 minute- 55 secondsU.S.S. BUCK2 minutes- 25 seconds

## <u>9 July</u>

- 02001 MMCS IROQUOIS was detached to obtain mail, fuel inshere and rejoin the Task Unit.
- O522I Launched nine Corsairs. One Corsair aborted with enging trouble.
  One Thumbtack flight of four Corsairs conducted MPQ drops along the bombline under Gundeck control. Two Thumbtack flight of four Corsairs attacked troops in a village west of Changyon. Twelve buildings were destroyed and ten were damaged in this attack.
- 0535I The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND joined the Task Unit from Sastbo.
- 07001 The U.S.S. PRESTON was detached and released from operational control.





- O7511 Launched seven Corsairs and one TBM COD aircraft. Three Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked a village housing troops northwest of Changyon destroying twenty buildings. Four Thumbtack flight of three aircraft attacked troops in a village northwest of Changyon. Six buildings were destroyed in the village. Captain W. E. LINDBERG was killed in action during this flight. The aircraft disentegrated and burned after colliding with the ground, apparently as a result of his failure to pull out from a strafing run. Ground fire was a possible cause.
- 0930I Conducted gunnery firing exercises. All ships in company fired on balloons released from BAIROKO.
- Launched eight Corsairs and recovered one which aborted because of a malfunctioning engine. Five Thumbtack flight of three aircraft conducted MPQ drops under Garlic control in support of the Eighth Army. Six Thumbtack's flight of four aircfaft reported to Satan who controlled the flight for drops in the Choppeki Point area. Six Thumbtack flight was originally schoduled to strike the Hacju air strip and to photograph a navigation channel in the Han River Estuary but weather prevented ascomplishment of the mission.
- 1015I The H-2 catapult retrieving cable parted putting the catapult out of commission.
- 1032I Recovered Fourteen Thumbtack flight of three Corsairs from K-6. This flight destroyed one large building and killed six enemy troops in an attack upon a troop area northwest of Changyon.
- 1053I HMCS IROQUOIS rejoined the Unit from refueling inshore.
- Launched eight Corsairs. Seven Thumbtack flight of four sircraft attacked a village known to be housing troops south of Orgjin after being released from CAS by Elgin TADC. Fires were started in the village but the extent of damage was unassessed. Fight Thumbtack flight of four sircraft, unable to conduct a Han River Recco because of weather, left a supply area in flames while acting as TARCAP for TU 95.1.4. Launched Nine Thumbtack flight of four Corsairs. This flight was released from CAS and hit targets of apportunity on the Orgjin paninsula destroying one revetted building and closing one cave entrance.
- 1703I Launched seven Corsairs and recovered one which aborted because of complete hydraulic failure. Eleven Thumbtack flight of three aircraft destroyed five buildings and damaged one gun position in the area west of Anak. Twelve Thumbtack flight of three aircraft attacked troops and revettments on the island of Sunwi-do off the Ongjin peninsula. No damage assessment was made because of low ceilings and visibility.

## DECLASSIFIED




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2000I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a scutherly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

- 0530I Fog in the operating area delayed launching of the first scheduled air event.
- O744I Launched seven Corsairs at this time. Throo Thumbtack flight, of four aircraft, attacked a small supply area north of Haeju. Five buildings were destroyed in the attack. This flight landed at K-6 because of hung ordnance, refueled, re-armed, and returned to the ship via the target area where a bridge and village southeast of Ongjin were attacked. Twenty buildings and the read bridge were destroyed. Four Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked troops in a village southeast of Ongjin. Eight buildings were destroyed by this flight.
- 1004I Launched eight Corsairs. Five Thumbtack flight, of four aircraft conducted MPQ drops along the Eighth Army front under the control of Garlic TACP. Six Thumbtack flight of four aircraft destroyed one building and damaged one read bridge south of Yonan.
- 1223I Launched one Corsair to escort one COD TBM to K-6. Further launchings were cancelled due to two pump failures in the H-4 catapult. Light winds prohibited deck launches at this time.
- Partial repairs were effected to the H-4 Catapult and eight Corsairs were launched. One aircraft aborted because of a malfunctioning engine. Nine Thumbtack flight of four aircraft reported for CAS, but struck its pre-briefed target when released by Elgin TACC. A cluster of villages housing troops north of Yonan was attacked and a total of eleven buildings were destroyed. Ten Thumbtack flight of three aircraft attacked troops in a village scuth of Hanchon and destroyed ten buildings. Moderate, accurate 37MM and 20MM flak was encountered in the attack.
- 1704I Launched nime Corsairs. Eleven Thumbtack flight, of four aircraft, attacked three targets south of Changyon. The first, troops in a village, was well covered, destroying eleven buildings and damaging thirteen more. The second target, a gun position in a cave, was hit with HVAR's. Four more buildings were destroyed and direct hits on trenches were made with the remaining ordnance. Twelve Thumbtack flight of five aircraft hit the island of Sunwi-do. One gun position was damaged, eight buildings destroyed and fifteen damaged on the island.
- 2000I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.



- O527I Launched four Corsairs. One Thumbtack flight, of four aircraft, conducted a MPQ bomb drop along the Eighth Army front and proceeded to K-6 for landing. These four aircraft, plus one replacement aircraft, conducted drops controlled by Satan TAIC on the return flight to the Task Unit. These drops were upon the island of Yuk-to in our assigned target area.
- O802I Launched Four Thumbtack flight of four Corsairs. This flight strafed a village housing troops slightly south of Chinnampto. No damage assessment was made because of haze and low ceilings.
- O828I The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND closed the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) for faeling.
- O925I Launched seven Corsairs. Five Thumbtack flight of four aircraft and Six Thumbtack flight of three aircraft conducted armed reconnaissance missions throughout the target area. No targets were attacked by these flights.
- 11171 Launchod Seven Thumbtack flight of three Corsairs. The flight attacked enemy amplacements on the island of Ku-do in the Haeju Bay. A trench area was well covered by strafing and one command post was left aflame.
- 1310I Launched Nine Thumbtack flight of four Corsairs. The flight conducted an armed reconnaissance of the wast coast from Haaju to Cho-do. The flight killed five oxen by strafing in the area east of Point "X-Ray".
- 1334I Launched Ten Thumbtack flight of four Corsairs. This flight conducted an armed reconnaissance in the Haeju Bay area and strafed two villages housing troops.
- 14071 The U.S.S. BUCK closed the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) for fueling.
- 1517I Launched Eleven Thumbtack flight of five Corsairs. This flight attacked a suply area south of Changyon inflicting moderate damage.
- 1654I Launched Thirteen Thumbtack flight of five Corsairs. This flight strafed a command post located west of Ongjin.
- 1726I Launched Fourteen Thumbtack flight of three Corsairs. This flight strafed gun positions south of Changyon inflicting moderate damage.
- 1937I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.



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#### 12 July

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 01301 HMCS IROQUOIS was detached to fuel inshore and to pick up mail for the Task Unit.
- O5581 Launched eight Corsairs. One Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked a road bridge and a village housing troops in the area northeast of Haeju. The road bridge was destroyed and the village was left aflame. Two Thumbtack also attacked a village housing troops southeast of Changyon destroying three buildings.
- 0740I Launched eight Corsairs. Three Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked barges in Haeju bay. Four barges were strafed and two were assessed as destroyed. Four Thumbtack flight of four aircraft destroyed one supply building west of Haeju. Four exen were killed by strafing attacks.
- 09411 Launched five Corsairs. Five Thumbtack flight of two aircraft attacked troops in a village northwest of Anak destroying six buildings. Six Thumbtack flight of three aircraft conducted a reconnaissance of the Taedong River Estuary. Three oxen were killed during the flight,
- 1053I HMCS IROQUOIS rejoined the Task Unit from refueling inshore.
- Launched seven Corsairs. Seven Thumbtack flight of four aircraft strafed machine gun positions south of Yonan. No damage assessment was made because of ground fire. Eight Thumbtack flight of three aircraft attacked troops in a village and supply buildings south of Changyon. Major damage was inflicted on a warehouse and one building was destroyed.
- 1252I Launched six Corsairs. Nine Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked a village housing troops west of Ongjin and a bridge in the same area. The bridge and three buildings were damaged in the attack. Ten Thumbtack flight killed one owen while making a reconnaissance of the area surrounding Yonan.
- 1324I Recovered one TBM COD from K-3.
- 13551 The U.S.S. BUCK was detached to proceed on a special mission involving electronic countermeasures (Passive).
- 1440I Launched sevon Corsairs and one TBM COD. Eleven Thumbtack flight of four aircraft hit at storage dumps south of Changyon destroying three buildings. Two oxen were killed on the return flight. Twelve Thumbtack flight originally of three, but one Corsair aborted, made photographic runs of the Taedong Estuary.

#### SECURITY INFORMATION

- 1628I Launched seven Corsairs. Thirteen Thumbtack flight of three aircraft attacked caves and troops southwest of Yonan possibly destroying the cave. Fourteen Thumbtack flight of four aircraft conducted an armed reconnaissance of the Ongjin peninsula.
- 1745I Launched six strike Corsairs and one Corsair for K-6. Pifteen Thumbtack flight of six aircraft attacked an observation post west of Ongjin. No damage assessment was made because of low ceilings and ground fire.
- 2000I Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 0515I the following day.

- O5311 Launched eight Corsairs. One Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked its primary target, a road bridge northwest of Haeju, under a five hundred foot overcast. No damage assessment was made. Two Thumbtack flight attacked a village housing troops northeast of Changyon destroying two buildings.
- O7121 Launchod six Corsairs. Three Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked a road bridge northwest of Ongjin when its primary target was closed in by weather. Slight damage was inflicted upon the bridge. Four Thumbtack flight of two aircraft participated in the attack with Three Thumbtack.
- 0800I The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND closed the U.S.S. BATROKO (CVE-115) for fueling. Fueling was suspended at 0832I to permit recovery of a Corsair with a malfunctioning engine.
- O9081 Launched eight Corsairs. Five Thumbtack flight of four aircraft conducted an armed reconnaissance of the Ongjin peninsula destroying two buildings in a village housing troops. Six Thumbtack flight of four aircraft conducted radar controlled bombing under the directions of Satan TADC located on Paengnyong-do.
- 0920I The U.S.S. BUCK rejoined from special mission.
- 1136I Recovered Five and Six Thumbtack flights and suspended flight operations because of low ceilings and visibility in the target area.

  Recovered a two Corsair strike from K-6. This flight jettisoned due to poor weather.
- 1310I The U.S.S. BUCK closed the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) for fueling.
- 13571 The U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND closed the U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) to complete its fueling.

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- 1552I Launched eight Corsairs. Thirteen Thumbtack flight of four aircraft was unable to reach its pre-briefed target because of rain, fog and low ceilings in the area. This flight attacked a village housing troops destroying nine buildings. Fourteen Thumbtack flight of four aircraft attacked gun positions in the Haeju Bay area, two 37MM emplacements were damaged.
- 1735I Launched ten Corsairs. One Corsair aborted because of engine trouble, and one Corsair acted as CAP. Fifteen Thumbtack flight of three aircraft destroyed four buildings south of Yonan. Sixteen Thumbtack flight of five aircraft completely destroyed a supply area near a village south of Yonan. Large fires were started and two secondary explosions occurred.
- 20001 Task Unit 95.1.1 retired on a southerly course for the night, returning to conduct day air operations at 05151 the following day.

- 0216I Detached the U.S.S. BUCK to proceed inshore for mail.
- 05301 Flight operations were cancelled because of fog, low ceilings and rain in both the carrier and target area.
- 12031 The HMCS IROQUOIS was detached to CTU 95.1.2.
- 14001 Prepared to launch all available aircraft for CAS support of the Eighth Army in answer to a request from JOC.
- 1508I Launched eight Corseirs, One Thumbtack and Two Thumbtack flights for CAS along the Eighth Army front.
- 1633I Launched eight Corsairs, Three Thumbtack and Four Thumbtack flight for CAS along the Eighth Army front.
- 1840I Recovered One Thumbtack flight. Two Thumbtack proceeded to K-6 for landing.
- 19221 Recovered Three Thumbtack flight. Four Thumbtack landed at K-6. The sixteen CaS sorties supplied along the Righth Army front were launched, flaw about three hours and made their MPQ drops under instrument conditions. Right of these aircraft returned to the ship and made a radar controlled letdown.
- Task Unit 95-1-1 retired on a southerly course to effect rendez-20001 vous with HMS OCEAN.
- 20001 Detached the U.S.S. BUCK and the U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND to proceed independently and await rendezvous instructions from the HMS OCEAN.
- 00451 Passed the HMS OCEAN and continued to proceed independently enroute Yokosuka.





# PART III - REMARKS ON PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL

- (A) Performance of Ordnance Equipment and Material.
- 1. No undue difficulties were experienced in the handling of ordnance.
- 2. Listed below are the malfunctions encountered during this period:

#### a. Guns.

(1)	Failure to extract	_	1	
(2)	Link jams	**	3	
(3)	Charger brackets broken	-	2	
(4)	Faulty timing and headspace	-	3	
(5)	Bad solenoid	-	ĺ	
(6)	Ruptured cartridges	-	5	
(7)	Ammunition snagged feedway	-	2	
	Feeder mechanism trouble	-	3	
(9)	Oil buffer closed	-	í	
(10)	Failure to withdraw	-	1	
(11)	Faulty chargers	***	7	
(12)	Wire broken at canon plug at solenoid	-	2	

#### b. Rocket.


(1)	Pigtails blown out	-	7
(2)	Pigtails broken Duds		2
(3)	Duds	***	7

#### c. Bomb - Center Load.

(T)	Lua (armed solonoid failure) -	1
(2)	500# GP dropped manually - sway braces to tight -	1
(3)	Napalm tank hung up - caught in rear hook twisting	
	shackle - came off on landing at K-6. Bridal	
	caught tank on take off twisting shackle	1

#### d. Bombs - outer panel.

(1) 100# GP failed to release from Mk-55 rack - faulty rack.



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#### SECURITY INFORMATION

- (B) Amunition Expenditures.
- 1. During the period covered by this report, the following ordnance was expended:

#### BY VMA-332 AIRCRAFT

1000# GP -		 		. 3	
500# GP ·		 <u>-</u>		166	
250# GP -		 		6	
260# Frag.	,	 		. 12	
100# GP		 		928	
Napalm -		 	<b>-</b>	15	·
5" HVAR -					
20MM Ammo.		 		40,200	Rds.
50 Cal. As	mio.	 		34,425	Rds.

### PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENERY BATTLE DAMAGE

- (A) Own Battle Damage.
  - 1. None to vessel.
- 2. One aircraft was lost presumably to small arms fire. The Corsair desintegrated upon collision with the ground and burst into flames.
  - (B) Battle Damage Inflicted on Enemy.
    - 1. Ships of this unit inflicted no damage on the enemy.
- 2. During this period of combat operations, the aircraft of this unit inflicted the following damage on the enemy.

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Small Boats	3	9 25
Buildings (Troop Posi Warehouses	7	1
Supply Dumps Road Bridges	3	2 3
Gun Positions Observation Posts	2 1	9 0
Trucks Oxen	1 21	0
Troops	73 KIA	35 WIA

TOTAL CASUALTIES UNASSESSED

# PART - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASULITIES

## (A) Personnel.

- 1. Morale was high during the fourth patrol on the line.
- 2. The personnel strength of squadron and ship's company was as listed below:

VMA	<del>-332</del>			BAIROKO	
Officers: Enlisted Mon:	42 186		• •	68 814	

## (B) Recreation.

l. The following activities for Welfare and Recreation were available during this period:

a. A daily nowspaper, the BAIROKO NEWS was distributed to ships in the screen with the guard mail.

- b. The crew's library was open each evening until taps.
- C. Movies were held nightly on the mess deck and in the Wardroom.

# (C) Divine Services:

- 1. Protestant Morning Devotions were held each morning at 0740. Catholic Rosary was said each day at 1605 in the library. Bible classes met three times a weak at 1900.
- 2. Sunday 5 July and 12 July Protestant Divine services were held in the crows library at 0900, followed by Catholic Rosary. Latter Day Saints service was held at 1400 in the library.

# (D) Casualties - Personnel.

l. One pilot was lost to enemy action during this patrol. Captain W. E. LINDBERG was killed when his aircraft failed to recover from a low altitude strafing run. Due to presence of enemy troops it is assumed that the pilot, aircraft, or both were hit by small arms fire. The aircraft collided with the ground in a level flight position at approximately 300 knots and disintegrated before coming to rest. There was no possibility of pilot's curvival.



## (E) Casualties - Material.

#### 1. Air Department.

a. No. 4 arresting gear engine purchase cable: This purchase cable, on the 87th landing, snapped 25 feet from the port poured fitting on the second landing for this engine of the day. The aircraft was arrested by the barrier. Upon visual check, no cause for breakage was found. Ship's force re-reeved the No. 4 engine on both small and large sheaves, poured fittings and tested.

b. H-2 Catapult expansion tank fitting: The top of the expansion tank, which is threaded on to the main body of the tank on the forward buffer, carried away after 2,317 launchings. Silver solder repairs by ship's force proved to be satisfactory.

c. H-2 Catapult retrieving cable: The retrieving cable snapped between the cable tensioner and the fixed crosshead on the buffer assembly. This was the 632nd launching on this cable and the indicator card showed a normal shot. This discrepancy will be repaired during yard availability in Yokosuka.

d. H-4 Catapult union nut on the composite valve return line: The union nut on the composite valve return line sheered into two parts after serving for 3,534 launches. Silver solder repairs by ship's force proved to be adequate.

- e. H-4 Catapult, No. 2 oil gear pump: After 3,538 launches number two oil gear pump went out of commission due to the fact that effective pumping action could not be maintained above 1300 psi.
- f. H-4 Catapult, No. 1 oil gear pump: After 3545 launches, number one oil gear pump went out of commission due to the fact that effective pumping could not be maintained above 1700 psi. Both number one and two oil gear pumps will be replaced in Yokosuka during yard availability.

## 2. Engineering.

- a. Main Propulsion, Auxiliaries and Electrical Equipment.
  - (1) None.
- b. Damage Control.
  - (1) None.
- c. Electronics.
- (1) The YE-3 Radio Beacon was inoperative during the last two days of operations. The transmission line to the antenna was determined to be shorted between the Barco Rotary Joint and the antenna. The antenna and antenna drive shaft will have to be lifted to effect repairs. During our period of restricted availability this in-port period the antenna will be lifted and repairs will be effected with the assistance provided by COMSER-DIV-31.

- (2) The SP Radar was inoperative again this cruise due to the antenna hunting in train and the nutator drive motor being overloaded. Pending receipt of required parts repairs will be effected with the assistance of METU service engineers during the forth-coming in port period.
- (3) The IBF-1 Radio Direction Finder was inoperative again this cruise due to goniometer drive motor being inoperative. This motor was requested by priority "B" requisition No. CVE-115/6444-53(s) dated 1 June 1953 with DDD of 16 June 1953. The motor is scheduled for air shipment to the BAIROKO from NSC Oakland in accordance with Commander Service Division-31 message O81217Z of June 1953.
- (4) The AN/SPS-6B Radar was unreliable due to frequent failure of TR Tubes. Four TR Tubes had to be replaced during a period of twelve days operation. METU engineers and ships maintenance personnel were unable to determine the cause of the TR Tube failures prior to leaving port, however temporary repairs have been affected and further assistance has been requested from the METU unit in Yokosuka.

#### PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### (A) Operations Department

#### 1. Air Operations.

a. Five CAS missions were furnished daily from the beginning of this patrol until 10 July when casualties to both catapults necessitated deck launching the majority of all flights. Relative wind conditions were such that aircraft weights had to be reduced. Therefore, in order to retain the maximum effective ordnance load, the external fuel load was sacrificed. The internal fuel capacity of the Corsairs limited the radius of action to a point where assignment to CAS was impracticable. Accordingly aircraft were assigned targets within an acceptable range in order to fully and effectively utilize all sorties.

#### 2. C.I.C.

- a. Radar conditions encountered were exceptional. Ducting effect due to temperature inversions enabled tracking of surface contacts at ranges of 35-40,000 yards and air contacts up to 80 miles when aircraft altitudes were less than 5,000 feet. IFF return could be held consistently at 100 miles. During periods when air operations were suspended, individual and team training exercises were conducted.
- b. Calibration difficulties with the ECM receivers reduced the effectiveness of intercept search during the patrol. Several centacts were made both while EMCON orders were in effect and also during periods of maximum radar operation in the Task Unit, however, all were evaluated as friendly.



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c. The U.S.S. BUCK (DD 761) was detached 121400I to proceed on a special ECM mission along the West Coast of Korea from Chinnamp'o to Cholsan. Excellent results were obtained and a complete report was submitted by the BUCK to ComNavFe.

#### 3. Communications.

a. When the BAIRCKO first took station "on the line" off the West Coast of Korea as CTU 95.1.1, there were few communication personnel who had previous experience or prior knowledge of communications peculiar to this area. It was originally felt that a two section watch was in order to handle the traffic load adequately, but it was soon learned that morale and efficiency would be impaired thereby. Once a three section watch was placed in effect, most personnel problems were eliminated and a renowed interest and enthusiasm was evinced. Strikers were given every opportunity to qualify in standing circuit watches and by regular rotation a remarkable flexibility was achieved. Recent graduates of the Comfair Hawaii radio school demonstrated the greatest overall improvement and quickly qualified as competent circuit operators. This radio school has done a thorough and commendable task in rapidly training interested cendidates to fill the gaps left by the release of qualified rated reservists and the general service-wide shortage of radiomen.

b. The switch-over from copying Radio Guam Fleet Broadcast to HongKong FE was accomplished with little difficulty. Although traffic moves at a fast pace of 25-30 words a minute on the latter broadcast, most radionon were able to copy it solid in a short time. Inexperienced men were used to "back up" the circuit until sufficiently proficient to take over. Considerable difficulty has been encountered on the JOC-5th Air Force CW net, which CTU 95.1.1 guards for all the surface Naval units on the West Coast of Korea. It is understood that the U.S. Air Force has gone over to radio teletype almost entirely as the primary medium of communication, and if this is true, it would explain why there are few qualified CW operators controlling this net. Generally traffic moves slowly and there are many requests for repetitions, corrections, etc. HMS OCEAN which acted as CTU 95.1.1 when the BAIROKO was rotated to port, usually assigned three or four radiomen to handle the ship's traffic for JOC at Seoul. This solution appears to be an adequate one, and were the BAIROKO to have more than one remaining tour of Korea dity, serious consideration would be given to instituting a similar program. In the long run it would result in increased efficiency and speed in delivery of messages to and from the Task Unit.

c. Prior to the BAIRCKO's first appearance off Korea this year, an increase in CSP-2900 allowance was received, this increase in itself contributed considerably to the rapidity with which outgoing messages were encrypted and check-decrypted, and incoming coded traffic processed and disseminated within the ship. No crypto repair man is abourd, although one is presently finishing this school shortly and will return to the ship.

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It is almost imperative in such cases that two machines be always operable, and therefore, the extra machine came in quite handy. At all times two machines were being used, and if the situation warranted, which was rather often, all three were operated, it is recommended that all CVE's and CVL's be permitted this extra CSP-2900 before assuming CTU 95.1.1 in Korean waters, if no crypto repair man is aboard.

d. Classified ship movements constituted a large percentage of the incoming coded traffic handled by the crypto-board. In most cases this information, which was either a resurryption or readdressal of the individual ship's movement report by MRO Tokyo, was of only slight interest to CTU 95.1.1. Generally ships proceeding to the West Coast Op Zone reported to commanders of Task Units East of the area in which CTU 95.1.1 operated and were not sighted. In view of the already overloaded Navy communication circuits it is felt that were this information more stringently restricted to commands that "needed to know", other vital and more important traffic could be delivered more expeditiously and accurately.

#### 4. General.

a. This patrol was marked by a general improvement in performance by all units involved. The squadron, VMA-332, continued to display an increased proficiency in all aspects of operations. Screening ships conducted maneuvers expeditiously and smartly. Especially commendable was the sound knowledge of seamenship displayed in fueling and high-line transfers. The practice of rotating the Screen Commander assignment daily is considered to be sound for it not only provides training but creates an added interest in the normally routine screening maneuvers.

# (B) Air Department.

1. This period on the line was an extremely difficult one for the Air Department. Casualties to both catapults caused frequent improvisations, ordnance load changes, spot changes, etc. On 9 July, the retrieving cable snapped on the H-2 catapult placing it permanently out of commission. On 10 July, numbers one and two oil gear pumps on the H-4 catapult went permanently out of commission causing the launching interval to be greatly increased. On 11 July, to decrease this interval and to ease the strain on the catapult, the decision was made to deck-launch part of the aircraft. A total of 97 deck launches were made as follows:

11 July	Deck	Launched	l 35	Catapult	ed - 4
12 July	H .	n .	<del>- 4</del> 0	n	-16
13 July	<b>†</b>	17	- 22	10	-18
14 July	t)	If	÷ 0	, #	-16

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- 2. Weather condition varied from barely 21 knots of wind across the deck to a period when bare steerage way gave forty knots of wind across the deck. The minimum wind encountered almost resulted in the two-blocking of the arresting gear on one landing and the maximum wind together with wet and slippery decks prevented deck launching aircraft on a separate occasion. There were three barrier crashes and one aircraft received strike damage when a slightly wheels-first landing during low wind conditions resulted in a badly wrinkled fuselage.
- 3. Marine Air Attack Squadron VMA-332 on their second tour on the line found routine air operations aboard ship a great deal easier with greatly improved aircraft maintenance and ordnance loading. Hydraulic troubles were the major maintenance difficulty, as twelve complete hydraulic failures required emergency measures to lower wheels and flaps. The squadron, to alleviate this, asked for an increase of two hydraulic repair personnel to supplement their maintenance force.
- 4. Three replacement aircraft were received while on the line, one to replace the aircraft lost in action and two to replace the wrinkled fuselage and one barrier crash. This resulted in a total of twenty six aircraft assigned the last two and one-half days on the line. In spite of the various difficulties encountered, this period on the line resulted in approximately one hundred more missions performed than the previous period on the line and approximately fifty more than any other period on the line. The increased number of missions enabled the squadron to develop their carrier landing proficiency to a high degree especially in the latter days of this period.

# 5. Helicopter.

- a. The helicopter BuNo. 123139 went out of commission on 8 July. After the main rotors were unable to be engaged, an investigation disclosed that two metal particles, one roller and a piece of retaining ring, were in the oil sump drain. This helicopter had been received on 14 June to replace the former helicopter transferred to the U.S.S. BREMERTON, and had been flown 34 hours by the Unit based aboard, before the casualty occursed.
- 6. Diring this period of operations the flight deck crews performed in an exceptionally capable manner in spite of the various difficulties encountered. The casualties to the catapults required frequent departure from the established routine in order to make the scheduled flights. At times, it was necessary to change the ordnance load just prior to the launch in order to make satisfactory deck launches with the changing wind conditions. A maximum effort was required on the part of all flight deck personnel, including squadron, ordnance, catapult and arresting gear crews to make operations successful in spite of the adverse conditions encountered. The necessary changes were carried out expeditiously with a high degree of safety and with exceptionally high morale.

# (C) Navigation

- l. During day operations in area Nan, Radar navigation bearings were used primarily. At such times as visibility permitted, visual bearings were obtained on islands in the Sir James Hall group. However, with extremely light and variable winds during most of the cruise, it was not always feasible to approach the above islands sufficiently close to permit visual observations. During the entire ten day period, celestial observations of stars could be obtained on only two occasions; either the skies were overcast, or the horizon was not suitable because of restricted visibility. Due to the relatively flat see bottom, the fathometer was of little use in navigation.
- 2. For night steaming, a track was used which avoided the usual traffic lanes. As a general rule two course changes were scheduled for the night, with a one-hour cross leg, so that it would not be necessary to traverse the same water. Course changes were scheduled at times other than those in which watches would be relieved. While LORAN was not generally reliable in the area, the period from about midnight to 0430 was found to be the best, and half-hourly observations were made during these hours each night.

## (n) Supply.


- l. Aviation stores were obtained from the Aviation Supply Ship U.S.S. JUPITER during our last period at Sasebo. This replenishment eliminate most of our current avaiation shortages and resulted in a greater number of stores being available for the Squadron and Air Department.
  - 2. The ACCG Report is as follows:

Date	Aircraft	Bursau No.	Stock Number	Nomenclature
7-5-53	<b>P4U-4</b> B	63060	R <b>B3-CV-V</b> S-4 <b>8</b> 948	Valve Assy.

The above part was received on 8 July 1953.

## (E) Medical.

- 1. While on the line this period there were only nine admissions to the sickbay with a total of 49 sick days.
- 2. Vonereal disease continues to be the largest medical problem. There were only six cases of urethritis due to genococcus and no chancroid during this period but the number of chronic cases of non-genococcal urethritis is steadily increasing. One man developed a mild reaction with hematuria to sulfadiazene. The hot humid weather with associated excessive perspiration increases the hazard of the use of sulfa drugs but sulfadiazene remains the drug of choice for a new case of urethritis not due to genococcus.
- 3. On 14 July a patient with jaundice was transferred to this activity from the U.S.S. SOUTHERLAND. The patient is thought to have received an injection of some drug ashore and been injected by the use on a nonsterile needle. The patient will be transferred ashore upon our arrival in port.



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4. The only casualty was on 9 July when Captain W. E. LINIBERG was presumed to have been hit by small arms fire and was seen to crash in enemy territory. Observers relate there was no possibility for the pilot to have survived.

5. The morale and health of the crew are excellent.

EMET O'BEIRNE



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E0:PIM:amg CVE-115/10/412 Ser: 0127

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•	E 0531	* <b>√</b>	AIR	OPERATIONS SCHEDUL 14 July 1953	e sunset 20 Declastified	004
AT AT	LAUNCH 0645	RECOVE 0815	2 <u>00MP</u> 4 A/C	MISSION/TARGET STRIKE RR BRIUGE YC408126	AMMO 3 A C A 1 A/C B	PILOT ALVEN WHITESIDES BEECHLY SIMMON
A2	0645	0815	4 A/C	STRIKE ROAD BRIDGE AC962015	4 A/C C	IUDDEN SLEE PETERSON DE BONDT
В3	0800	1000	4 A/C	HANCHEN RECCO TIV XD992231	3 A/C D 1 A/C B	MC QUAY JONES HAIDT
B4	0800	1000	4 A/C	STRIKE STORES YC617146	4 V/C C	Brown Kurfess Beasley Moss Hevlett
C5	0945	1145	4 A/C	TARCAP Gun Posit XC768714	3 A/C A 1 A/C B	Berteling Carey Veach Lipetzky
<b>c</b> 6	0945	1145	4 M/C	STRIKE REVETTMENTS XC926609	4 A/C C	Beartund Lawson Kruger Lovelace
D7	1130	1330	4 A/C	STRIKE STORES YC313295	3 A/C A 1 A/C B	AILEN WHITESIDES LAWRENCE SIMMON
DS	1130	1330	4 <b>€/</b> ¢	STRIKE ROAD BRIDGE YC358549	4 A/C C	LUDDEN SLEE HUME MC LENON
<b>E9</b>	1315	1515	4 A/C	HAN RECCO CUN POSIT BS603916	3 A/C A 1 A/C B	WARD CLARZ GEOGHIX GEOLE
E10	1315	1515	<b>4</b> A∕C	Strike Tiv B <b>S46</b> 0889	4 A/C C	MA QUAY A DAES HATTO BROVA
Fll	* 1500	On Arri	4 A/C val	STRIKE ROAD BRIIGE YB <b>273</b> 969	3 A/C A 1 A/C B	BERTELING CLEVELAND O'NETEL EVANKO
F12	* 1500	On . Arri		STRIKE TRENCHES XB 975775	4 A/C A	STOCUM LAWSON KRUGER LOVELACE

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Encls (1)

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\* Aircraft wt. plus 700 lbs.

NOTES: 1. All A/C full internal fuel. Fll and 12 full internal fuel plus 100 gal. in belly tank.

	2.	All A/C full MG ammo.	WEIGHT
AMMO:	h.	1 500# GP inst/.025 - 6 HVAR	14,465
	В.	SAR KIT - 1 500# GP inst/.025 - 6 HVAR	14,520
	G.	1 500# GP inst/.025 - 2 100# GP inst/.025	13,675
	D-	Napalm - 2 HVAR	14,080

The remnants of typhoon "KIT" entered the Yellow Sea 5 July as a tropical storm moving into the Japan Sea late on the 6th as an extratropical system, dragging the Quasi-stationary front well to the North-ward, having finally attached itself to it in the Japan Sea. The front was then left lying across central Korea but became weak and diffure retreating to the Southward slowly as a ridge of high pressure pushed Southward across the Japan Sea, Korea, and the Yellow Sea. However, the target area was in general cluttered with low clouds, while the cailing and visibility was mostly unlimited in the Oboe area from 8-12 July, inclusive, during daylight hours. On 13 July the ceilings began to lower in advance of a low pressure system moving Northeastward from China. The system intensified and enlarged in the Yellow Sea 14 July with accompanied wide spread precipitation and winds of gale force.

The average sky cover was 7/10 with 10/10 coverage the 6th, 13th, and 14th. Intermittent rain, associated with "KIT" ended at midnight & July, at which time fog set in, becoming patchy by 0400 and dissipating by 0900. There were fog patches again the morning of the 8th ending by 0700 and patches of fog the morning of 10 July becoming CAVU by 1000. Intermittent rain began the 14th at 0000 ITEM and continued throughout the day. The average relative humidity was 92% and the lowest daily average was 89% on 11 and 12 July. Visibility except in fog and rain. was 8 miles or better. The maximum wind observed was 35 knots from the East on 6 July, and there were gusts to 35 knots again on 14 July from the South. It was calm at mid day on the 11th and 12th, with the average for those two days being 6 knots. Fronts associated with the lows are diffuse and ill defined at the surface. It is assumed that the lows moving out of China are more tropical than extra-tropical until entry into the Japan Sea. The maximum temperature observed was 81 and the minimum  $\epsilon 8_{\circ}$ The average sea temparature rose from 67 to 74 during this tenure. The state of the sea was very rough 5, 6, and 14 July, otherwise moderate to calm.